




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*A Mershon National Security Center Publication*



# TOTAL WAR AND COLD WAR

*Problems in Civilian Control  
of the Military*

*Edited by* HARRY L. COLES

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS




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COLONEL RALPH D. MERSHON



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## *Preface*

THIS BOOK of essays deals with the subject of civil-military relations in an era of total war and cold war. The problem of the proper role of the armed forces in government is not new: it is in fact as old as organized government itself, and some of the best minds from Plato to Marx have grappled with it. Though by no means new, the question of control of the military has taken on unprecedented dimensions and implications in the nuclear age. For the first time in modern history, the democracies of the Western world are forced in peacetime to devote a major part of their material resources and intellectual energies to the problems of survival. The belligerence of the totalitarian powers, the rapid rate of technological advance, and the strident demands of

emerging national states have complicated defense and foreign policy—and hence the problem of civilian control—beyond anything known in the past.

In an attempt to meet the challenges of the time, the United States has felt obliged to build up a military establishment with hundreds of thousands of personnel both in and out of uniform. This state within a state must be nourished with ever more expensive and delicate equipment, ever more deadly weapons and highly trained men. Thus there has been created a close tie-in among the defense establishment, the business community, and the scientists.

From all sides there come warnings of threats to democratic institutions. President Eisenhower chose the occasion of his farewell address to point out the implications of the growth of an immense military establishment and arms industry in the United States. Brooding over the total influence—economic, political, and even spiritual—he warned his fellow citizens against “the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought by the military-industrial complex.”<sup>1</sup> The retiring President is one of the first officials in high place to suggest openly that the time-honored principle of civilian control might be in danger; but from journalists, scholars, and some of the research foundations there has come an increasing stream of books and studies dealing with threats to democratic institutions. A recent pamphlet sponsored by the Fund for the Republic warns that “there is rather clearly a military elite emerging in the United States . . . and the general assumption that the American soldier is automatically responsive to his civilian masters might be rudely shaken were there a serious and clearly visible retreat on the world front by the American policy makers.”<sup>2</sup>

The authors of this volume do not necessarily share these dark forebodings. Nevertheless, the mere fact that such sentiments are coming more and more to be expressed in responsible quarters serves to illustrate the relevance of the topic today. As ex-

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plained more fully in the Introduction, these essays explore a wide range of civil-military problems in a variety of countries in the light of recent history. They deal with such topics as effective civilian leadership in time of war, various types of organization designed to tap the resources of government and the nation as a whole, fruitful collaboration between military and civilian officials where their jurisdictions of necessity overlap, and civil-military relations on the operational as well as the policy level. They deal with these problems in both democratic and totalitarian countries, and they cite instances of both success and failure. Recognizing the limitations of past experience, the authors offer these essays in the hope that they may throw some light on the difficult choices facing our leaders.

With one exception, the papers which comprise this book were read at a conference on civil-military relations held at Ohio State University under the auspices of the Mershon National Security Program on February 27-28, 1959. After the conference, the authors revised and in some cases enlarged their papers for publication. Professor William Emerson, of Yale University, read a paper on Franklin D. Roosevelt as Commander in Chief, but owing to the pressure of other academic commitments, he was unable to put his paper into publishable form. In place of Professor Emerson's paper, another on the same subject by Maurice Matloff of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Headquarters, Department of the Army, has been substituted.

I wish to thank Louis Morton and Samuel P. Huntington, both of whom read the entire manuscript and made many valuable suggestions. Various members of the Mershon National Security Program of the Ohio State University, and especially its former chairman, Harold F. Harding, and its present chairman, Robert J. Nordstrom, have taken an interest in the project and have been generous with financial aid. I wish also to thank my friends, Foster Rhea Dulles, Philip Poirier, John Rule, and Lester W. Smith who have read parts of the manuscript and

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made suggestions for improvement. Patricia Sinnott Coles deserves thanks for compiling the index and for helping in various ways.

The essay by Professor Huntington, "Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services," appeared in revised form in the *American Political Science Review*, March, 1961.

HARRY L. COLES

*Columbus, Ohio*  
*March 1, 1961*

1. The text of the speech may be found in the *New York Times*, January 18, 1961.

2. Harrison Brown and James Real, *Community of Fear* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960), pp. 28, 34.



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## TOTAL WAR AND COLD WAR



## *Introduction*

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HARRY L. COLES

TWO REGULAR army officers, responsible for training West Point cadets in the social sciences, recently stated in a scholarly periodical that civilian control of the armed forces of the United States is "a sacred cow to which everybody bows but which nobody has defined."<sup>1</sup> Now those who demand definitions of terms in ordinary common usage often cannot be satisfied, but President Eisenhower seems to have made the matter reasonably clear when he said that civilian control means that "basic decisions relating to military forces must be made by politically

accountable civilian officials.”<sup>2</sup> In other words, in a democracy all basic policy, including military policy, is made by officials responsible to the people with whom sovereignty ultimately rests. Certain interest groups may exploit civilian control to their advantage and at the expense of rival interests, but this in no way invalidates the principle.<sup>3</sup> All democratic institutions and principles are capable of being misused or abused.

While President Eisenhower’s definition is reasonably adequate for a democracy, it is by no means comprehensive. There is another view which makes the principle of civilian control of utmost importance to all governments, whether democratic or not. This view, which was given classical expression by Clausewitz, is based on a logical analysis of the relationship between force and other elements of society and emphasizes the primacy of politics. For Clausewitz, war by its very nature is a means to a political end; if there is no political end, war has no utility. This being the case, it is the statesmen, not the soldiers, who must determine policy. The rationale of civil control then rests on two forces of unequal strength: a long historical heritage based on fear of usurpation and tyranny, and a logical analysis of the relationship between force and society. By far the stronger of these in shaping Anglo-American attitudes is the liberal, anti-military tradition. By far the more relevant under present conditions is the logical concept of the primacy of politics in the affairs of states.

The real problem in civil-military relations is not so much to recover the principle of political primacy as to modify and adapt it to present-day circumstances. Clausewitz made his analysis at a time when war and peace were easily recognizable as separate conditions, when war was a viable instrument of policy, and when ends and means were clearly distinguishable. But the advent of an era of total war and the vast technological developments accompanying it have had the effect of blurring the distinction between the civilian and military aspects of society; foreign policy, military policy, and economic policy are more

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closely related than ever before. For example, since total war is no longer a practical instrument of policy, great stress is now laid on a strategy of deterrence. This shift in emphasis has forced the military to take cognizance of a broad range of political, social, and economic considerations. On the other hand, in an era of quasi war, or quasi peace—it makes no difference what one calls it—the main concern of national policy will be the allocation of resources. The unprecedented size and scope of the demands of the defense establishments will, therefore, force policymakers to inquire more and more into the military sphere. In fact, one author goes so far as to suggest that the problem today is not that the military elements are expanding at the expense of the civil, but rather that there is civilian interference with the military.<sup>4</sup> This is perhaps an extreme view, but it needs to be pointed out that thinking on the subject has been rooted in the specter of the “man on horseback” rather than on the relevant framework of the twentieth-century problem of the relation of the expert to the politician.<sup>5</sup> In this respect political control of the military is little different from political control of scientists, civil servants, or other technical types. In present-day circumstances it is not just a matter of keeping the military subordinate to the civilian authority, but of effective formulation of national policy which must increasingly take into consideration military implications.<sup>6</sup>

The essays in this volume are nearly all concerned with this positive and constructive approach to civil-military relations. They examine the broad theme of the political control of the armed forces from a variety of points of view, but, with one or two exceptions, they deal with the relations between political and military leaders at the top level of government. This theme is carried through three phases of analysis: (*a*) a constitutional democracy (the United States) in peacetime; (*b*) a variety of countries thrown into a common total-war situation; and (*c*) two Communist states in peacetime. With one possible exception (the essay on Communist China), they all deal with civil-

military relations in advanced, industrial societies characterized by a fairly high degree of internal political stability and of professionalism in their military. Since civil-military relations in these stable, industrialized societies are quite different from those of underdeveloped areas, and since significant comparisons can only be made within one group or the other, the underdeveloped areas have been arbitrarily excluded from consideration in this volume.<sup>7</sup>

The five papers concerned with World War II all deal with the relations between soldiers and statesmen in a total-war situation. Gibbs, Matloff, and Dorpalen, moreover, all tend to stress the extent to which the civilians were firmly in the saddle in their respective countries. Together with that of Challener, these four essays bring out very clearly the extent to which civil-military relations, even in a time of stress, reflect the underlying and pervasive characteristics of the total political system of the country. In each case, the state of civil-military relations, its strengths and weaknesses, mirrored the strength and weakness of the governmental setup as a whole. This group of papers ends with an analysis of the political problems of a coalition command. Pogue shows that in any situation a supreme commander will have to make decisions that pose difficult political problems, but that in a coalition command such decisions will be more numerous and more difficult.

Three of the papers in the second section deal with the structural relationships (organizational and political) between soldiers and civilians and among military men in the American national government. Morton is concerned with prewar efforts to achieve co-ordination among the armed services themselves and between the services and the civilian agencies, principally the State Department. Concerning himself primarily with inter-service relations, Huntington shows how competition between the services has strengthened civilian control. Zink is concerned with structural relationships within the government, although in a specific field and at a lower level. Implicit in his analysis are



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many of the policy issues which are discussed more explicitly by Morton and Huntington. In the fourth paper in this section, Ekirch examines the popular desire for peace, which he believes reached its greatest intensity in the period between the two world wars, and concludes that its role in the determination of American military policy was minor.

The two papers in the final section deal with continuing problems of civil-military relations in Communist totalitarian states. They are concerned with the role of the military in these countries in the broadest sense, at a high level of government, and over most of the postwar period.

One of the themes brought out in these essays is the importance of effective organization in modern war. Good organization does not, of course, automatically guarantee sound policy. In great enterprises men are always more important than administrative machinery, but bad organization at the least hampers the efforts of good men and at the worst defeats them. Furthermore the essays tend to show that good men are quick to try to change an inadequate organization and to modify and adapt existing machinery to the needs of the time. So much color and drama surround the personalities of Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt that their more mundane accomplishments in the field of administration are sometimes overlooked. Gibbs emphasizes what Churchill inherited from the past and the adaptations he made in his inheritance. Matloff, while admitting that Roosevelt was "untidy," maintains that there was method in this apparent confusion. Before the actual outbreak of war, the President shuffled agencies in the executive department so as to give free rein to his powers as Commander in Chief. In the case of France, Challenger shows that while many factors go to explain the French defeat, the twin evils of lack of collaboration among the defense ministries of the government and disunity among the armed services are chief among them.

The beginnings of the administrative story go back to the turn of the century. Before World War I, neither Britain nor the

United States was prepared for the demands of total war. In a period of isolation, the Army and Navy could safely be allowed to go their separate ways. But with the breakdown of isolation, the increasing destructiveness of weapons, and the realization that future wars would mean total involvement, it became apparent that there was a great need for co-ordination of information and for expert advice for shaping national policy. It is interesting that in the United States the Joint Army-Navy-Board, lineal ancestor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was created in 1903, while in Great Britain the Committee of Imperial Defense, which was to give way to the War Cabinet, was established in 1904.

Morton traces the checkered career of the Joint Board. For a short time after its creation, the Board was quite successful in co-ordinating matters of minor importance, and during this time it enjoyed the confidence and encouragement of President Theodore Roosevelt. But when it failed to agree on the best means of defending American interests in the Philippines, the President, not unnaturally, lost confidence. Neither Taft nor Wilson took any interest in the work of the Joint Board with the result that it played no role in World War I. As a war president, Wilson exercised vast powers; there can be no doubt that he maintained civilian control, but he left the running of the war up to his service secretaries and to the commander of the American Expeditionary Force. World War I saw no startling innovations so far as military organization was concerned.

The postwar period saw improvement in interservice co-operation. The Joint Board was revived and reorganized, the principal improvement being the establishment of a Joint Planning Committee. In the period between 1919 and 1938, in addition to a host of smaller matters, the Joint Planning Committee discussed such topics as the role of air power, Far Eastern strategy, and command in joint operations. One may criticize the wisdom of policies that emerged, but the important fact is

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that machinery for joint planning was established and was in working order.

Efforts of the services to co-ordinate military with political policy were less successful. Neither before nor immediately after World War I was adequate machinery available. During the thirties, however, informal contacts and co-operation on lower levels improved. As war approached, Secretary Hull consulted the Army and Navy departments frequently, especially on Far Eastern policy. He appointed a political adviser to serve on the Joint Planning Committee in 1935, and in 1938, suggested the formation of the Standing Liaison Committee to consider matters of national policy affecting the three departments. Thus when the war came, machinery for co-ordinating military and political policy was at hand, if only in embryonic form.

Foreseeing the inevitability of war and determined to exercise his powers as Commander in Chief to the full, President Roosevelt set about fashioning the machinery that would best suit his purposes. By a little known military order of July, 1939, the President transferred the Joint Board and the Joint Army-Navy Munitions Board into the newly established Executive Office of the President.<sup>8</sup> Likewise, the Munitions Board and other procurement agencies were placed directly under the President who exercised his control through the Assistant Secretary of War, Louis Johnson. Thus the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and an Assistant Secretary of War were, to a degree at least, independent of the service secretaries. If Roosevelt's administrative arrangements lacked symmetry and orderliness, they nevertheless enabled him to exercise vigorously his powers as Commander in Chief.

World War I and its aftermath provided Churchill with an even more substantial basis for war organization. In Britain, the responsibility for the conduct of the war, and indeed the responsibility for all government, had lain with the Cabinet. It was soon realized, however, during World War I, that a Cabinet

of twenty or thirty ministers, most of whom had heavy administrative duties, was too unwieldy for the conduct of modern war. Therefore, the functions of the Cabinet and of the peacetime Committee of Imperial Defense were combined in a smaller body known as the War Cabinet. This body consisted of the Prime Minister himself and five other ministers, none of whom, with the exception of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, held a portfolio. Lloyd George's aim was to create a small supervisory body to devote itself exclusively to the main issues of the war. In November, 1919, the War Cabinet was replaced by a Cabinet of normal size and the Committee of Imperial Defense resumed its normal duties. When war broke out again in September, 1939, Neville Chamberlain adopted a War Cabinet of nine ministers. When Churchill became Prime Minister in May, 1940, he adopted Lloyd George's idea of a small Cabinet of five, but he later increased the number to seven. One of Churchill's strongest convictions was that the formulation of policy should not be separated from its execution. Therefore, only three of his War Cabinet members were without responsibility for the administration of a department of the government. But what distinguishes the Churchill Cabinet from previous War Cabinets was the cabinet-committee system. Churchill, of course, did not invent the system, but he developed it and put it to more extensive use than ever before. The complex of cabinet committees may perhaps be visualized as a tripod. At the summit was the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet, and supporting them were the various committees concerned with military affairs, the home front, and supply. Of these, the Prime Minister was most directly concerned with military affairs. By assuming the office of Minister of Defense, the Prime Minister brought the full weight of his office to bear on the military committees. As in the United States, the head of state dealt directly with his military advisers, and the service ministers became concerned almost exclusively with administrative tasks. On the home front, the Lord President's

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Committee assumed extensive responsibilities and, by relieving the Prime Minister of concern with the civil side, enabled him to concentrate on the military. The end result of this extensive use of committees was that the War Cabinet itself practically fell into disuse. In the latter years of the war, Churchill seldom consulted the Cabinet on military operations. Here again, there is a strong parallel between British and American experience. In formulating military strategy, both Churchill and Roosevelt relied primarily on their professional military advisers and very little on their political advisers.

Organization is important, but these essays also emphasize the impact of personality. In fact, the increasing destructiveness of weapons and the greater efficiency of organization for war only serve to enhance the importance of the man at the summit who pulls the levers of power. The reader will probably be struck with the similarities between the war leadership of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Hitler. All three gloried in the direction of large-scale military enterprises, all had imagination and daring, and all three enjoyed the support of their governments and their peoples. They worked in various ways their wonders to perform. Churchill, as we have already seen, worked closely with his military chieftains. He did not sit back and wait for his military advisers to present him with a final plan to which he had only to say yea or nay. Rather, as Defense Minister he participated in the early stages of planning and made his influence felt from the first tentative outlines to the finished product. He had ideas, he explored alternatives on his own, and, above all, he kept the military machine running at full tilt. Bombarding his chiefs with minutes and inquiries, he exhorted them, argued with them, and, as Gibbs says, he came close at times to bullying them. But he respected their professional integrity, and he knew that it was wiser to persuade than to overrule. Churchill's influence was greatest during the first years of conflict; as the war progressed, the position of the British Chiefs of Staff became stronger. Dur-



ing the last two years it was generally the view of the professionals rather than that of the Prime Minister that prevailed in matters of strategy.

Virtually the same can be said about the war leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt. It is often stated that great harmony of views prevailed between the President and his Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that he overruled them on important matters of strategy only twice. But this is not the whole story. True, general harmony prevailed during the latter part of the war; but in the prewar period, Roosevelt made the large strategic decisions on his own as President and Commander in Chief and often without even consulting the military chiefs. Even after the war broke out, and until mid-1943, the President made the basic military decisions. During this period he was, perhaps, influenced as much by Churchill and the British Chiefs as by his own Chiefs of Staff. Having established his mastery in the early period, he set the pattern from which future decisions must emerge. After 1943, in the United States as in Britain, the influence of the Joint Chiefs grew, and they were seldom overruled. There can be no doubt that Roosevelt, like Churchill, was master in his own house, but their methods of operation differed. Where Churchill deliberately sought controversy, Roosevelt shunned it; where Churchill would argue stoutly and then in the end submit to his professional advisers, Roosevelt would often seemingly agree, but would actually seek alternative means of carrying out his will. In these matters Churchill acted like a forthright man; Roosevelt, like a clever woman.

Roosevelt and Churchill, using different methods, could work with professional soldiers and get excellent results. Hitler, on the other hand, had only contempt for professional soldiers, and his method of dealing with them varied according to the moods of his psychotic personality. Dorpalen points out the various methods Hitler used to bring the German Army completely under his control, and the reader will recognize that many of these methods are common to dictatorships, whether of the left or the right.

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One of the most original insights in Dorpalen's paper is that the form and timing of Hitler's subversion of the Army were related to the development of his views on strategy. It is his thesis that (a) Hitler realized very early in the Russian campaign he had lost the war militarily, and that (b) his subsequent strategy was not completely senseless, as is generally maintained, but made sense in terms of his policy of stalling for as much time as possible in the hope that some political development might eventually enable him to avoid military defeat.

Challener emphasizes that, in the case of France, there is no one simple explanation of defeat: the origins of the French tragedy were deeply rooted in chronic, inherent weaknesses in the nation's political, economic, and social structure; far more than the purely military record must be considered. Nevertheless, the record of civil-military relations throws much light on one of the worst failures of democratic government. In both England and the United States there were differences between the civilian heads of government and the military chiefs, but they were honest differences about how best to win the war. In neither country was there a tradition of contempt for civil authority on the part of the military, nor did the military attempt to make subtle distinctions between loyalty to the country and loyalty to the regime. France, in her hour of crisis, reaped the bitter fruits of a century-old military tradition that inculcated love of country but also suspicion of the politicians who might at the moment be in power. When Paul Reynaud became Premier, he had no confidence in his Chief of Staff for National Defense, Maurice Gamelin, but for political reasons he was unable to remove him. Only military disaster in the Low Countries enabled Reynaud to rid himself of Gamelin, and on May 19, 1940, General Maxime Weygand was summoned. Challener shows that Weygand proceeded not only to defy the civil authorities with acts of disobedience but also to make decisions which clearly invaded the political sphere. In contrast to Roosevelt and Churchill, Paul Reynaud was diffident, tired, hesitant, and he presided over a

regime that was divided and irresolute. Faced with defiance, he simply caved in. As one historian has written:

What Weygand's disobedience in 1940 illustrated was the enormous difficulty a democratic government may have, under the severely critical conditions of modern war, in avoiding a major political upheaval resulting from an attempt to enforce its strategic-political decisions upon a recalcitrant commander-in-chief determined to impose those of his own choosing. In an era of nuclear war, the problem is complex; in an age of close international military and diplomatic agreements, it is shared.<sup>9</sup>

But history is replete with paradox. If it was the disobedience of one officer that contributed to the death of the Third Republic, it was the disobedience of another that contributed to the rebirth of France. General Charles de Gaulle, who defied his superiors, civilian and military, and escaped to London, reappeared on the scene to fight again for France and to defy Allied authority, both military and civilian. Pogue shows that, as Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower had to deal with at least three different categories of political decisions: those concerned with insuring the success of the landing, which included closing the embarkation areas, censoring diplomatic mail, and bombing transportation facilities; those concerned with the early phases of the invasion, which included the unconditional-surrender policy and the question of recognition of the French provisional government; and those concerned with the later phases, which included the question of ground command and control and the French forces. The first category of decisions involved the sacrifice of the interests of groups not directly participating in the Allied effort—British civilians, neutral governments, French civilians—to the military demands of the effort. The political leaders of the Allied effort, Churchill primarily, had to balance military requirements against other interests, and military requirements won an easy victory. Such questions as changing the unconditional-surrender policy and recognition of the French provisional government, on the other hand, tended more to involve a subordinate-superior



type of conflict between a general who commands in the field and the political leaders who, for good political reasons, wish neither to modify one political decision nor to hasten another. In this case, political considerations prevailed, but they were modified to a degree by the military. None of these issues, though they involved real problems in civil-military relations, was peculiar to an interallied command. But the conflict with Montgomery over ground command and the broad-front strategy, and difficulties with De Gaulle over control of the French forces, could only arise in an interallied command; only here were there really conflicting national interests at stake. On the question of ground command and the broad strategy, General Eisenhower won out because Churchill was unwilling to make a real fight for Montgomery. But when De Gaulle insisted on having his say, Eisenhower had to give in to the show of force which the French mounted over the Strasbourg and Stuttgart issues.

Pogue, concerning himself with matters of high policy and strategy, deals with relations between the top brass and the top politicians. Zink, on the other hand, approaching the problems of civil-military relations from the working level, throws a shaft of light on the practical matters of day-to-day behavior—houses, cars, and parties—and shows that these mundane matters, often trivial in themselves, had, in the aggregate, considerable impact on organizational effectiveness and policy products.

If we are to understand the stresses and tensions that Zink describes, we must understand the Army's peculiar position in the occupation of Germany. No comparative studies of civil-military relations in the occupation experiences of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France have been made; it is an interesting fact, however, that the United States—which probably more than any of the others pays lip service to civilian supremacy—prolonged military control long after the others had abandoned military in favor of civilian control. This is all the more surprising when one learns that early in the war the Army wished to keep its occupation duties to a minimum. As one

historian has written: "The War Department thought of military government as a short military cleanup operation, a brief punitive spasm which in eight weeks or thereabouts would accomplish its task and then be superseded by a civilian high commission."<sup>10</sup> This conception of the military role in occupation proved illusory when it was ascertained that the State Department was reluctant to take over in Germany. The reasons why the State Department was unready and unwilling to take over the enormous task of administering the occupation are many and complicated; but division within the Department, concentration on economic rather than on political problems during the twenties and thirties, antiquated machinery, and a lack of sufficient numbers of trained personnel played their part. Furthermore, the State Department has traditionally regarded itself as a small, high-level policy-making agency, and has generally been reluctant to get involved in operational responsibilities. At any rate, President Roosevelt could see no real alternative to letting the Army run the show during and immediately after the war. The Army found itself in the position of the reluctant maiden: before yielding her charms she could extract concessions. One of the concessions that proved to be a powerful club in her dealings with civilian agencies was the independence of the zone commander. It is not necessary to assume any insincerity on the part of the Army; its reluctance was probably genuine since aggrandizement is completely satisfying only if it takes place in the realm of one's primary interests. Nevertheless, once launched on the career of occupation duty, the Army gradually grew to like its assignment. The very magnitude of the job to be done doubtless exercised its attraction. Military government was given the task of reshaping Germany's economy, punishing those guilty of crimes and atrocities, rendering Germany incapable of initiating another major war, and recasting the German mind and outlook. To carry out such an awe-inspiring assignment, the Army had to call upon a host of civilian experts in such diverse fields as government, agriculture, education, and finance. Civil-military rela-

tions in Germany, therefore, took on a special significance, and the story Zink unfolds is none too reassuring. Regardless of what may have been the enlightened views of the military on higher levels, soldiers on the lower levels often resented civilians and frustrated their work. With the progressive "civilianization" of the occupation, many of the military on the working levels yielded only with bad temper. But disagreements and refusal to co-operate should not be allowed to obscure—or should not dominate—the larger picture. The contribution of the State Department representatives in military organizations such as the US Group Control Council and the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) was substantial. The accomplishments of the interdepartmental committees such as State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC), in which both civil and military organizations participated, deserve commendation. And despite the varying points of view and the temperamental behavior of both civil and military representatives, the general record deserves praise.

The predominance of the military in the occupation of Germany was only one instance of the increased influence of military professionals in American society after World War II. The influence of the military was also manifested in the influx of military officers into governmental positions normally occupied by civilians, the close ties which developed between military leaders and business, and the widespread popularity and prestige of individual military figures.<sup>11</sup> It is interesting to note that in England no such vast increase in the influence of the military took place. In the totalitarian states, Russia and Communist China, the influence of the military also diminished in the postwar decade. Why? Possibly the answer lies in the method of controlling the military forces.

Perhaps it should be pointed out that, though the problem of civilian control is enhanced in an age of total war, it has been a problem to all nations throughout the ages. Plato asked the question: "Would it not be a monstrous thing to keep watchdogs

who, from want of discipline or some evil habit, might turn on the sheep and devour them?" The Romans put the matter a little more succinctly: "*Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*" With various permutations and combinations the ingenuity of the wisest men seems to have devised only two main methods of control: segregation and subversion. These have been called "objective" and "subjective" methods of control.<sup>12</sup> The objective method sets the military apart from society, encourages it to master its trade, and maximizes professionalism. Usually, though not necessarily, in such a situation the officers are recruited from the ruling classes and therefore reflect their views and interests. In the period from the Civil War to World War II, the method followed in the United States was the objective one; by and large, American soldiers were taught that they merely executed national policy, that they did not make it. During World War II, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military in general, engaged in activities far transcending those of a purely professional body. This was not the result of a plot or of conscious design but rather the result of the force of circumstances. The American soldier gained greatly in power at the expense of professionalism. The British Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, operated within professional limits during the war, with the result that their influence was much less out of line in the postwar period. In other words, objective control was maintained in Britain while in the United States, although not abandoned, it was seriously modified.

The subjective method of control regards with suspicion any group having its own values; it attempts, therefore, to indoctrinate the armed forces with the ideology of the ruling class. In all the totalitarian states treated in this volume, the method of control was subjective, and, whatever else may be said, it seems to have been effective. In Germany, Hitler was able to maintain his control even in the face of military disaster. In the early 1930's, the Nazis were able to consolidate their power only by reaching an understanding with the Army. The Nazis agreed

## INTRODUCTION

that if the Army would stay out of politics, they would support a rearmament program and allow the soldiers freedom in their restricted sphere. As a consequence, the Army became a sort of haven, an island of sanity, in a sea of rampant National Socialism. But an autonomous group with its own values, principles, discipline, and ideals is something that a totalitarian state cannot tolerate. Dorpalen shows the methods Hitler used to bend the Army completely to his will. For one thing, the level of the general staff was progressively lowered by the creation of various intervening and parallel headquarters. And not only was the Army reduced in the service hierarchy, its functions were divided. The S.S., Hitler's elite corps, was expanded until it reached twenty-five or thirty divisions by 1944, and it was furnished with the latest and best tanks and other equipment. Göring formed some twenty divisions from surplus Air Force personnel and these were available for ground operations. Thus Hitler eventually had at his disposal what amounted to three armies. In addition, in 1943, Hitler introduced political indoctrination officers (Nationalsozialistische Führungsoffiziere—NSFO) into the armed forces. Young officers, thoroughly reliable in their devotion to National Socialism, were infiltrated into the lower ranks. If propaganda, threats, and bribery failed to win over the older, high-ranking officers, they were summarily removed. Many liberal-minded people said after the war that every vestige of the German general staff would have to be removed to prevent future wars. Little did they realize that Hitler had already done the job.

In the Soviet Union, no less than in the United States, the generals emerged from the war with enhanced prestige. Immediately after the war the new heroes were given awards, promotions, and honors, but within two years the legacy of power and popularity which had been the marshals' spoils of war was no more. By periodically juggling the high command and by other devices, Stalin saw to it that the military were cut off from politics, denied initiative in their own fields, and reduced to mere administrators of the military bureaucracy.



With the death of Stalin, the position of the military changed for the better and continued to improve until another autocrat had established his unquestioned leadership at the head of the Soviet state. This improvement in the position of the military began with the liquidation of Beria and the downgrading of the secret police; but the armed forces acquired real political power in the period 1953–55 as a result of the struggle between two political factions headed by Malenkov and Khrushchev. Hoping to increase the power of the governmental and managerial bureaucracy, Malenkov reduced military expenditures, dipped into military stockpiles, and, in general, emphasized the importance of increasing consumer goods. Khrushchev, on the other hand, working through the Party machinery, opposed Malenkov's policies and supported investment in heavy industry so that, among other things, the level of armaments might be raised. Malenkov's fall in January, 1955, was a victory for the military, evidence for which may be found in the appointment of Marshal Zhukov as Minister of Defense and the generous promotions received by military men who had been associated with Khrushchev during the war.

In Germany, it will be recalled, the Nazis allowed the Army freedom while the politicians consolidated their position. In the Soviet Union, from February, 1955, to October, 1957, there was an alliance of mutual convenience between Khrushchev and Zhukov which allowed each to support the other in consolidating his control over matters of his own direct concern. Professional military thinking was relatively free from party control during this period, and Marshal Zhukov became a member of the Presidium. The armed forces reached the height of their political power in post-Stalinist Russia when, in June, 1957, Zhukov helped to save Khrushchev by pledging the armed forces to his support. No doubt Khrushchev was grateful, but the lesson was not lost on him: if a marshal of the Soviet Union could save him, might not a marshal, on some other occasion, turn the influence of the armed forces against him? Moreover, Khrushchev,

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like Hitler, could not tolerate an autonomous group with its own ideals and principles. As Garthoff puts it:

This development [the stress upon purely professional military competence] clashed with Party policy, not because the military sought to usurp political prerogatives, but because it threatened to become a self-contained professional body within the state. Khrushchev and the Party could not accept this since their whole aim was to revitalize the Party as the driving force in *all* activities of the state.

The result was the removal of Zhukov, and of the military in general, from participation in foreign policy and national strategic decision-making.

In Communist China, there have been no internal divisions or factional party strife which would permit the military to get out of line. The Chinese, no less than the Soviet Communists, insist on Party control of the armed forces. As early as 1934, Mao Tse-tung assumed effective control of the highest military organ of the Party, the Revolutionary Military Committee (or Council). At lower levels, Party control is exercised by the political officers assigned to all units down to and including the company; by the Party committee which exists in large units and which implements directives received from higher headquarters or Party committees; and by the device of maintaining the ratio of Party members to total strength at about one to three. The percentage of Party membership is higher in mechanized services, such as the air and armored forces. Among officers, Party membership is almost 100 per cent. In spite of modernized organization, and in spite of much technology imported from the Soviet Union, Mao's military principles remain official doctrine.

The major institutional change in China since World War II has been in the direction of centralization. From 1949 to 1954, three principal centers of power—the Party, the Army, and the government—displayed strong regional tendencies. Sensing the danger, the Party leaders attacked the problem, and by the spring of 1954, the abolition of regional power in the Party, the government, and the armed forces was completed. In the People's

Liberation Army (PLA), the Field Armies have given way to the Front Armies, which lack strong regional ties and are commanded by men lacking the political power of the former Field Army commanders. Selective service was introduced at the end of 1954 in place of the old, more informal methods of recruitment. Other organizational reforms included the establishment of a Ministry of Defense within the Cabinet, which gives Premier Chou En-lai a voice in military affairs that he probably lacked before 1954.

Using subjective methods of control, then, the totalitarian states have made the military the instrument of the party in power. In neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China is there serious interservice bickering or serious disagreement over strategy, at least so far as we know. In the totalitarian states, the party makes a bid to control the minds of the soldiers; in the United States, the services, disagreeing among themselves on matters of organization, doctrine, and strategy, make a bid to control the minds of the people, and hence have built up a most elaborate propaganda machine. Ekirch shows that even in the period between the wars, the military had become adept in the field of public relations. Huntington maintains that interservice competition is the inevitable result of the present organization of our Department of Defense; and he describes the elaborate efforts of the services to strengthen their positions with Congress, with the mass communication media (press, radio, television, movies, etc.), and with the people, as a process of "castellation." He observes that, ironically enough, the services which have been most successful in their bids for appropriations have also been the ones most convinced that they are "misunderstood" by the public. According to Huntington, interservice competition has had two main effects: it has strengthened the services themselves, and it has strengthened civilian control. Internecine warfare has sharpened the wits of the combatants and forced them to develop defenses in depth which add greatly to their survival potential in the pluralistic world of American



politics. Whether or not they have become better fighting organizations against foreign aggressors is, of course, quite another question. One method of civilian control, as we have seen, is to divide the military force into more than one group: the Founding Fathers were perceptive enough to see this and they checkmated the standing army with the citizen army. Interservice competition in modern times has put a powerful lever into the hands of civilians. Since the services do not speak with one voice, Congress and the Administration can pick and choose. Where there is real competition, the power of the purse is more powerful.

1. G. A. Lincoln and A. A. Jordan, "Leadership for the Common Defense," *Public Administration Review*, XVII (1957), 262.

2. Quoted by Harry H. Ransom, "Organizing for National Security Decisions," *Public Administration Review*, XIX (1959), 264.

3. Samuel P. Huntington discusses the fragmentation of civilian control and the resulting confusion in *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 80-97.

4. Michael Howard, "Civil-Military Relations in Great Britain and the United States, 1945-1958," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXV (March, 1960), 35-46.

5. I do not mean to rule out the possibility of usurpation entirely. It is the thesis of John W. Spanier, in *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), that the central issue of this episode was nothing less than the continuation of civilian supremacy itself.

6. Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder discuss this view in *The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy* (Garden City, N. Y., 1954); see also Michael Howard, *Soldiers and Governments* (London, 1958); Morris Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York, 1959); and Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (New York, 1958).

7. There is a growing literature on civil-military relations in the underdeveloped areas. See, for example, Edwin Lieuwien, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York, 1960); Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, XI (April, 1959), 325-45; and Lucian W. Pye, *Guerilla Communism* (Princeton, N. J., 1956).

8. William Emerson, "Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II," *Military Affairs*, XXII (Winter, 1958-59), 181-207.

9. Philip C. F. Bankwitz, "Maxime Weygand and the Fall of France: A Study of Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXI (1959), 239.

10. Walter L. Dorn, "The Debate over American Occupation Policy in Germany in 1944-45," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXII (1957), 487.

11. Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-73.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-97.



PART I

*The High Command in World War II*



## *Winston Churchill and the British War Cabinet*

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NORMAN GIBBS

IT IS one of the elements of high drama in Britain's history that, on more than one occasion, when the nation has faltered or even faced defeat in war, a leader of genius has arisen to rescue her in the crisis. Chatham, Lloyd George, and Winston Churchill immediately come to mind. Of these three, a strong case can be made for ranking Winston Churchill first.

It is true that the war he waged was no more widespread than Chatham's and that, fortunately, it was far less costly in human life than the struggle over which Lloyd George ultimately exer-

cised control. But Churchill held office as Britain's chief war minister for a longer continuous period than either of the other two. He led a nation more highly organized and disciplined for conflict than it had ever been before. When he took over the leadership in May, 1940, the country faced a threat which had been equalled only in the dark days before Trafalgar, or, more distant still, when Drake and his small ships overthrew the ambitions of Philip II of Spain. If ever a leader called a people to "their finest hour" by his own example, it was he. When the British people responded spontaneously and without question to Churchill's offer of "blood, toil, tears and sweat," they did so, at least in part, because they recognized a man who could make leadership acceptable even on those terms.

This, however, is not an essay in biography. It is rather an attempt to describe and analyze the machinery of government which Churchill, as Prime Minister, controlled, and, further, to assess the importance of the part he himself played in making the machine work. The emphasis, therefore, will be on organization rather than on persons, on the way things were done rather than on who did them.

### THE WAR CABINET TRADITION

World War I had demonstrated the wartime need, in Britain, for a Cabinet much smaller than the normal peacetime model of twenty or so ministers, especially when government was in the hands of a coalition of political parties. It also demonstrated the need for a Prime Minister who was a genuine War or Defense Minister, capable of taking the supreme direction of the nation's war effort into his own hands instead of delegating it to individual colleagues or to committees. Viewing the existing inadequacies, Sir William Robertson, later chief of the Imperial General Staff and Haig's close collaborator, suggested in the summer of 1915:

The responsibility for co-ordinating the many and varied aspects of military policy rests with the Prime Minister, who is *ex-officio*

Minister of Defence. When conflicting views are expressed, as must necessarily often be the case, it is the duty of the Prime Minister to weigh the arguments and formulate the policy to be laid before the Cabinet. Only by the firm exercise of these functions by the Prime Minister can a consistent policy be assured.<sup>1</sup>

The need, in other words, was for concentrated leadership which would be capable of swift decisions and capable, also, of seeing that those decisions resulted in action. The long drawn out and often inconclusive discussions on manpower conscription and on aircraft programs, for example, brought all this to a head in 1916, after more than two years of war. The result was something of a "palace revolution," which substituted Lloyd George for Asquith as Prime Minister in December of that year, and, together with the change of persons, introduced a small War Cabinet of five ministers. Originally, the War Cabinet consisted of Lloyd George, Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury; Lord Curzon, Lord President of the Council; Mr. Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord Milner and Mr. Arthur Henderson, ministers without portfolio. Later, the number varied between five and seven.<sup>2</sup>

Lloyd George's successful war leadership, coupled with the fact that his War Cabinet secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, remained in office continuously until 1938, led to the growing assumption, in the interwar years, that Britain would revert to the expedient of a small War Cabinet should the country ever again be involved in a major conflict. With certain modifications, this was done by Neville Chamberlain in September, 1939, and carried on by Winston Churchill when he became Prime Minister at the head of a coalition government in May, 1940.

Thus partly because of the growth of what might be called a "War Cabinet tradition," Churchill took office under conditions in many ways more favorable than those with which Lloyd George had to contend in World War I. Not only was there a genuine coalition of all three political parties in May, 1940—an advantage Lloyd George had never enjoyed—but it was taken for granted in 1940 that the right way to run the war, at the Cabinet



level, was for the Prime Minister to work with an inner circle of some six or seven senior ministers to whom would be delegated by all other ministers, another forty or so, the supreme responsibility for planning the civil and military conduct of the war and for insuring that their plans were put into effect.

Nor did the legacy left to Churchill end there. In 1917, Lloyd George had discovered that he and his chosen few could not, in fact, simply sit apart and think, even though all but one of them were without specific departmental duties. Increasingly, he and his colleagues in the War Cabinet were compelled to supervise the organization of the whole nation for war through a group of high-level committees, each designed to co-ordinate the work of a number of government departments. Only thus was it possible to insure that emergencies, arising, for example, from the need to establish priority rights to the restricted stock of raw materials, could either be anticipated or dealt with promptly when they arose.<sup>3</sup>

Here, again, Churchill inherited much from the experience of his predecessors. Based on the experience of World War I and the interwar years, there was by 1940 a firmly established cabinet-committee system, both civil and military, and a most efficient permanent Civil Service Secretariat to serve it. In other words, Churchill was fortunate in taking over, ready-made, not only a type of cabinet designed for war administration, but also a committee system through which the small number of ministers comprising a War Cabinet could supervise, control, and, when necessary, galvanize into action the whole range of government departments. And it was through this committee system, developed and adapted to the needs of war and his own methods of working, that Churchill came increasingly to exercise his personal control over the nation's war effort.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, it was fortunate, both for Churchill and for Britain, that his two closest professional assistants in this process, men already established in their jobs when Churchill became Prime Minister, were, in their individual ways, ideal committee organ-

izers and secretaries—Sir Edward Bridges, head of the whole War Cabinet Secretariat, and Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Lionel Ismay, Churchill's Chief Staff Officer and later the first Secretary-General of NATO. These two men typified and maintained the invaluable tradition that the Cabinet Secretariat oiled the wheels of government without attempting to turn them, except at the behest of politically responsible ministers, at any particular speed or in any specific direction. It was the tradition of impersonality of the British Civil Service at its best. Although, inevitably, with the expanding scale of the war effort, this secretariat grew from a hundred or so to an office six or seven times that size, the standard of its work was not impaired.

All this, Churchill inherited. But upon the whole system—War Cabinet, committees, and Secretariat—he imposed the unmistakable imprint of his own personality. That he did so was a tribute not only to his own organizing abilities and tireless energy, but also to his authority in the Cabinet, in Parliament, and in the country as a whole, an authority which remained virtually unchallenged from the day he took office in May, 1940, until the end of the coalition administration in May, 1945.

Churchill's development of the whole War Cabinet machine may be studied under three heads for the purpose of convenience: (*a*) his use of the War Cabinet itself; (*b*) his use of the committee system and its development under his leadership; and (*c*) his association, as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, with the Chiefs of Staff Committee in planning Britain's strategy and in the day-to-day organization of the war in all its military aspects.

### THE WAR CABINET UNDER CHURCHILL

During Churchill's period of office there were two developments in the War Cabinet itself, i.e., the small inner circle of ministers, that are worth noting. First, Churchill did not believe in "planners" who were not "doers," or, as he himself put it, in

"the exalted brooding over the work done by others." Therefore, he always retained in his War Cabinet a substantial proportion of ministers who were also heads of major government departments. Describing a number of ministerial changes made early in 1942, he writes:

. . . In direct contrariety to a strong current of opinion, I had now given full effect to my view that War Cabinet members should also be the holders of responsible offices and not mere advisers at large with nothing to do but think and talk and take decisions by compromise or majority.<sup>5</sup>

Thus the final court of appeal in government was composed of men who were in close touch with daily practical details. Responsibility for plans and decisions was intimately associated with responsibility for execution.

Second, Churchill was able to relieve his War Cabinet of much of its former load of daily work because of his development and use of the committee system. Lloyd George's War Cabinet had met nearly every day, sometimes twice a day. From September, 1939, to May, 1940, the practice was much the same, and so it remained until the end of 1940. From early 1941 on, however, the War Cabinet met only once every two or three days, and that continued to be the practice until the end of the war.<sup>6</sup> In February, 1942, for example, the Secretary of the War Cabinet noted that:

. . . In recent months the War Cabinet as such has met on very few occasions to consider general policy and . . . nearly all its Meetings have been to dispose of particular operations, which have usually called for the attendance of a good many other Ministers.<sup>7</sup>

It was as though, having agreed on the nature, composition, and size of the final executive court of appeal, ministers automatically felt less need to refer to it. This was true of both the civil and military affairs of government, although the War Cabinet, throughout the war, continued to do much more work on civilian

than on military matters. In the latter its gradual effacement was marked.

From 1941 on, the War Cabinet, although it always retained supreme executive authority, took part less and less in strategic planning. Churchill himself describes this process:

As confidence grew the War Cabinet intervened less actively in operational matters, though they watched them with close attention and full knowledge. They took almost the whole weight of home and party affairs off my shoulders, thus setting me free to concentrate upon the main theme. With regard to all future operations of importance I always consulted them in good time; but, while they gave careful consideration to the issues involved, they frequently asked not to be informed of dates and details, and indeed on several occasions stopped me when I was about to unfold these to them.<sup>8</sup>

During the last two years of the war the only major strategic issue on which the opinion of the War Cabinet was sought in detail was in connection with the "Transportation Plan," i.e., the plan to bomb the road, river, and rail communications into the invasion area of northwest Europe. With this notable exception, the War Cabinet was seldom consulted and was little concerned as a body with the details of military operations. Its influence was more directly felt in foreign and economic matters.<sup>9</sup> But in all matters of national policy the War Cabinet exercised general supervision and could be, and indeed was, retained as a final court of appeal, particularly on occasions when serious disagreements on strategy between Britain and her American ally arose.

The explanation for this apparent inactivity on the part of the War Cabinet lies in the increasing use made of Cabinet committees. In this process by far the most important items were, on the one hand, the gradual concentration of influence in all domestic and civil matters in the Lord President's Committee, and on the other, the increasingly close and detailed control of all military matters by the Prime Minister himself working together with the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

## THE CIVIL COMMITTEES

With the immediate danger of invasion past, and with the worst effects of the blitz under control, Churchill was able to turn to a much needed reorganization of his committees, particularly the ones dealing with civil matters, early in 1941. The details of that reorganization are not important here.<sup>10</sup> What is important is that, from this time forward, the central planning and co-ordination of the civil side of war administration came increasingly under the control of the Lord President's Committee, so called because its chairman was the Lord President of the Council, one of the senior ministers in Churchill's War Cabinet. The duties of that committee were defined as first,

The general duty of handling, on behalf of the War Cabinet, all questions of domestic policy not specifically assigned to other Committees, and of concerting that of the Civil Committees of the War Cabinet; [and second] the specific duty of keeping continual watch over the Home Front questions and the general trend of our economic development.<sup>11</sup>

Although the powers of the Lord President's Committee were obviously extensive, I do not wish to suggest that Churchill ever delegated ultimate responsibility on this side of government to another minister. He was not the man to do that, even had the constitutional system made it possible. On critical occasions, he stepped in decisively himself to organize *ad hoc* emergency measures in connection with such matters as air-raid precautions and shipping. Nevertheless, it remains true that, as the war went on, the Lord President became, in virtue of his committee's work, the senior minister in the civil sphere, a status which was strengthened when Attlee, leader of the Labor Party, became Lord President in September, 1943, and combined that appointment with the post of Deputy Prime Minister.

Moreover, this development left Churchill, on his own admission as we have seen, comparatively free from anxiety about party



and domestic matters, and therefore all the better able to concentrate on his more important work as Minister of Defense.

### THE MILITARY COMMITTEES

Churchill assumed the office of Minister of Defense when he became Prime Minister in May, 1940, and combined the two offices without a break until the end of the war. At no time during the war, however, did Churchill create a Department of Defense in the normal sense of that term. He, himself, tells us:

I had never intended to embody the office of Minister of Defence in a department. This would have required legislation, and all the delicate adjustments I have described, most of which settled themselves by personal goodwill, would have had to be thrashed out in a process of ill-timed constitution-making.<sup>12</sup>

Here again the Prime Minister, even where his own private work and interests were most intimately involved, used well-developed sections of the machinery of government which he inherited from the past although, as usual, he made important adaptations of his own. As his immediate "Defense Department," Churchill gathered round him a small personal staff who formed the military wing of the War Cabinet Secretariat, headed by officers who had been trained in prewar years in the Secretariat of the Committee of Imperial Defense. The Committee of Imperial Defense itself went out of existence the day the War Cabinet was formed. Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Lionel Ismay was Churchill's Chief Staff Officer, with Colonel Leslie C. Hollis and Colonel Edward I. C. Jacob as his immediate subordinates. This small group of three remained constantly with the Prime Minister until the end of the war, for, says Churchill:

Displacements in a sphere so intimate and so concerned with secret matters are detrimental to continuous and efficient dispatch of business.<sup>13</sup>

These officers, together with their very small staff, then, constituted the Prime Minister's personal link with all departments

on military matters and, further, with the whole Chiefs of Staff organization. Indeed, from May, 1940, General Ismay became the Prime Minister's personal representative on the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Nowhere did Churchill's individual methods of working show more clearly or succeed more notably than in the case of General Ismay, his Chief of Staff.

As Deputy Secretary [Military] of the War Cabinet, Ismay supervised the running of the military Committees and their relations with other interests; as a member of the Chiefs of Staff's Committee, he took his share of responsibility in its decisions, and geared the machine to its demands; as Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence, he acted as the link between the machine, the Committee and the Minister, and as the link for the Committee with Washington and for the Prime Minister with allies and with commanders.<sup>14</sup>

But in making this use of Ismay and his brother officers, Churchill was wisely drawing upon the experience and traditions of the Committee of Imperial Defense which went back to the very beginning of the present century.

For the first year or so of his period of office as Prime Minister, Churchill ran the military side of affairs at the top level mainly through the Defense Committee, a mixed committee of ministers and Chiefs of Staff. From the end of 1941, however, he tended increasingly to thrust the Defense Committee into the background, and worked directly with and through the Chiefs of Staff Committee—again a prewar creation—which consisted simply of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Fighting Services together with General Ismay. Churchill writes:

The key-change which occurred on my taking over was of course the supervision and direction of the Chiefs of Staff Committee by a Minister of Defence with undefined powers. As this Minister was also the Prime Minister, he had all the rights inherent in that office, including very wide powers of selection and removal of all professional and political personages. Thus for the first time the Chiefs of Staff Committee assumed its due and proper place in direct daily contact with the executive head of the Government, and in accord with him had full control over the conduct of the war and the armed forces.<sup>15</sup>



The Chiefs of Staff Committee, together with its planning and intelligence sections, had grown slowly as an offshoot of the Committee of Imperial Defense during the fifteen years before World War II. Whatever its limitations, whether in numbers or in the effectiveness of its joint staff work, the C.O.S. organization provided a firm basis to expand on when war broke out. With Churchill in office, a major expansion did, in fact, take place.

First, two bodies, the Vice-Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff Committee, were formed to relieve the Chiefs themselves, and particularly to take over routine matters. Second, the Joint Planning Staff, consisting basically of the three Service Directors of Plans, together, as was necessary, with civilian representatives, now branched out into the Strategic Planning Section, the Future Operations Planning Section, and the Executive Planning Section. The fact that the first of these was sometimes labeled the "Stratospherical Planners" and the second the "Futile Planners" should not be accepted as a complete description of their value during the war. Third, on a level with the senior Joint Planners, was the Joint Intelligence Committee consisting of the Directors of Intelligence of the three services, again reinforced by civilian representatives. Finally, from 1942 on, there was an Administrative Planning Staff "to advise the Chiefs of Staff Committee on the administrative aspects of operational and strategic questions."<sup>16</sup>

Behind these main groups of committees there grew up a host of others, standing as well as *ad hoc*, to deal with such matters as research and development; Technical, chemical, and biological warfare; the defense of bases; and post-hostilities planning. In face of this elaborate, highly-developed, and basically efficient organization, it is not surprising that the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff felt themselves to have been outwitted, and almost mesmerized at some of the earlier Allied conferences after December, 1941. For example, the British took with them to the Casablanca Conference of January, 1943, an elaborate staff, planning, and cipher organization, with the technical equipment for working

out every quantitative calculation that might be called for. "They sent it out in advance to Casablanca in a 6,000 ton liner, equipped by Combined Operations Command as a headquarters and communications vessel, thus temporarily transferring George Street to Morocco." Commenting on this, one of Churchill's senior staff officers wrote in his diary:

What was completely lacking in the American party was any kind of staff who could tackle the problems that were bound to arise in the course of the conversations, and to produce detailed solutions for the Chiefs of Staff. When the U. S. Chiefs saw how the land lay and the size of our party, they suddenly woke up to the fact that they had left most of their clubs behind.<sup>17</sup>

It was through the Chiefs of Staff Committee, itself fed and sustained by the complex of subcommittees which have been briefly described, that Churchill exercised his control over the war as a whole. As Minister of Defense, Churchill, as we have seen, had no department in the normal sense of that term. His department was the whole organization of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and its subcommittees.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee met, on an average, some ten times per week throughout the war. Although Churchill could have attended any or all of these meetings as he chose, he actually attended little more than one in ten. But he bombarded the Chiefs with an inexhaustible stream of minutes, prayers, and directives, often demanding a virtually immediate reply; he was free to summon the Chiefs of Staff to him, either individually or collectively as he chose; and, above all, his own Chief Staff Officer, General Ismay, was a fourth member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Through this last link, in its personal sense one of the outstanding happy accidents of the war, the Service Chiefs and the Prime Minister were constantly in touch with each other's thinking.

It is difficult indeed to apportion separately credit or blame for the conduct of the war to the Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff. It is clear that there were repeated disagreements and, on

both sides, occasional sulks and bad temper. Disagreements ranged from major problems of strategy to minor matters of behavior. But Churchill in World War II, unlike Lloyd George in World War I, was not prepared in the last resort to adopt a strategy that ran counter to the views of his military advisers.<sup>18</sup> He advised the Chiefs of Staff, he pressed them, and at times came near to bullying them. Indeed, what helped to make Alanbrooke so successful as C.I.G.S. was that, unlike his predecessor, Dill, he was tough enough to withstand the Prime Minister's bombardments and keep his head even when a sense of grievance and exhaustion brought him near the breaking point. In the end, however, Churchill knew that it was his duty to persuade and not to overrule; and that, of itself, implied a willingness to be persuaded, or, in other words, to compromise. He has written:

I cannot say that we never differed among ourselves even at home, but a kind of understanding grew up between me and the British Chiefs of Staff that we should convince and persuade rather than try to overrule each other. This was, of course, helped by the fact that we spoke the same technical language, and possessed a large common body of military doctrine and war experience. In this ever-changing scene we moved as one, and the War Cabinet clothed us with ever more discretion, and sustained us with unwearied and unflinching constancy. There was no division, as in the previous war, between politicians and soldiers, between the "Frocks" and the "Brass Hats"—odious terms which darkened counsel.<sup>19</sup>

It would be foolish to try to underestimate the extent to which, on occasion, Churchill differed and sometimes differed bitterly from his Chiefs of Staff. It is clear that in the last eighteen months of the war, they often differed acutely over such major problems as the conduct of operations in Burma and the Pacific, in the eastern Mediterranean, and in northwest Europe. But as the war went on, two generalizations in this context became apparent: first, that the Chiefs of Staff acquired increasing confidence in expressing their own point of view, however opposed to that of the Prime Minister and provided it was their agreed view worked out in their own detailed consultations;

second, that the longer the Chiefs of Staff in London co-operated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, the more the former represented to the Prime Minister those combined views about strategy which, however distasteful, had to be accepted if victory was to be won.

## CONCLUSION

Few subjects are of more absorbing interest to the student of modern British history than the contrast between the bitter quarrels that divided soldiers from statesmen in World War I and the absence of that division in World War II. In attempting to account for this contrast, one must undoubtedly give first place to the character, experience, and abilities of Winston Churchill himself. He was, by experience, better equipped than any of his contemporaries to lead the nation in war. His record made others, civilians and soldiers alike, willing to accept both his leadership and the modifications in the accepted ways of doing things which his personality and the needs of wartime imposed. And his character made him, for Parliament and public alike—despite frequent serious criticisms—the one leader whom they trusted “to see the job through.”

Beyond all this, however, it must be admitted that Winston Churchill, in contrast to Lloyd George, was blessed in his inheritance. In the first place, he took over the convention of a small War Cabinet by means of which a small group of ministers took on day-to-day responsibility for the conduct of the war while all the other ministers accepted, in practice, an inferior status. There was, for Churchill, none of that jockeying for position which created for Lloyd George such bitter enemies both during World War I and after it was ended.

Second, and no less important, Churchill inherited the wisdom and experience of a generation in the whole complex of cabinet committees, both civil and military, and with them the Secretariat which gave those committees effectiveness and continuity.

Of these, for Churchill, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was undoubtedly the most important. Despite disagreements, Churchill was able to go to the War Cabinet, to Parliament, and to the people of Britain with plans and with a strategy which were supported by all three services and, through the Chiefs of Staff of those services, by Britain's allies. Whatever the disagreements, there was a coherence in planning and a basic accommodation of civil and military points of view which had never existed in World War I. It is difficult to believe that without the developments in the machinery of government which made that possible, even Churchill's genius could have saved Britain in World War II.

1. Sir William R. Robertson, *Statesmen and Soldiers, 1914-1915* (London, 1926), I, 161-62.

2. John Ehrman, *Cabinet Government and War, 1890-1940* (Cambridge, England, 1958), pp. 71-72.

3. For accounts of the workings of Lloyd George's War Cabinet, see Cd. 9005 (1918), and Cmd. 325 (1919); see also Ehrman, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-80.

4. Ehrman, *op. cit.*, chap. iv; H. L. Ismay, "The Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defense," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institutions*, LXXXIV (May, 1939), 241-57.

5. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War* (Boston, 1948-53), IV, 86.

6. James R. M. Butler, *Grand Strategy* (London, 1957), II, 561.

7. Quoted by John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy* (London, 1958), VI, 324.

8. Churchill, *op. cit.*, II, 19.

9. Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, VI, 324.

10. For accounts of this reorganization, see Churchill, *op. cit.*, III, 117; *Times* (London), January 7, 1941; and 368 H. C. Deb. 5s, 81-150.

11. Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, VI, 321.

12. Churchill, *op. cit.*, II, 19.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

14. Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, VI, 333.

15. Churchill, *op. cit.*, II, 16.

16. For full details of this whole organization, see "The Organization for Joint Planning," Cmd. 6351 (1942).

17. Sir Arthur Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide, 1939-1943* (London, 1957), p. 541.

18. Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, VI, 337.

19. Churchill, *op. cit.*, II, 21.

## *Franklin Delano Roosevelt as War Leader*

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MAURICE MATLOFF

OF ALL the controversies that have arisen out of the conduct of World War II, none have aroused more debate than those revolving around the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Two extreme and conflicting views have emerged. One presents a picture of a President who blundered into war, bungled its conduct, and lost the peace. The other portrays a President, who having been drawn into a war he did not want, rallied free men everywhere and won a glorious victory only to die before he could realize all its fruits. To one, Pearl Harbor was



a conspiracy smacking of treason; unconditional surrender, a policy of madness; and Yalta, a sell-out to the Russians. To the other, Pearl Harbor was a conspiracy of nothing more than circumstances; unconditional surrender, a stroke of genius; and Yalta, a high-water mark of hope and promise in international relations. Some have maintained that Roosevelt had a master plan and a strategy to match; others have argued that he had no plan but played strictly by ear. Some have argued that he was a witless tool of his staff; others have contended that his staff became a tool manipulated at his will.

Probably no problem of World War II is more difficult to treat definitively and objectively than this question of Roosevelt's leadership. Aside from the confusions of partisan prejudices, there is a special problem of evidence. World War II records are massive; they fill large buildings in Washington, Kansas City, and elsewhere. But all too often, at the end of a search through mountains of paper, the historian finds the trail he has so painstakingly followed disappearing into thin air at the crucial point of decision-making. The problem of motivation is especially difficult. Mr. Roosevelt rarely recorded precise reasons for his actions, or, more properly perhaps, all his reasons; and he left no memoirs. The historian must therefore pick and choose, interpret and re-interpret, seeking to distinguish between appearances and realities and to fit the pieces in their proper places.<sup>1</sup>

It is also important to recognize at the outset that an American President must, in time of crisis, gather his powers where he may. Some he derives from constitutional clauses giving him authority to execute the laws and to conduct foreign relations. And much of his authority is obtained through statutory delegation. A third source is the constitutional provision designating him Commander in Chief. This terse clause simply states that the President shall be the "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States"; it does not give any suggestion of the content of these powers and they have eluded precise description by the Supreme Court. One result has been that the President's



position as Commander in Chief has shown a peculiar capacity for growth and responsiveness to the various military crises that have come upon the nation since 1789. Some Presidents have been passive commanders in chief; others have been extremely active. It is clear that the use by any President of his powers as Commander in Chief depends to a considerable extent on his own predilections and the nature of the crisis he faces. While the President customarily delegates supreme command of the forces in active service, there appears to be no constitutional reason why he must do so. Similarly, there appear to be no prohibitions to his becoming involved in the details of military affairs, as well as in the highest questions of policy, if he chooses. Unlike George Washington, Franklin Roosevelt did not take the field to command from horseback, and, unlike Abraham Lincoln, he seldom became involved in the operational details of command. But he was an extremely active and forceful Commander in Chief—one of the most active in American history. He gloried in the role and expanded its functions to the full.

In examining FDR's role and contribution as war leader, the interplay of multiple factors must be considered—his personality; his predilections; his conception of the office of President; the nature and progress of the war with which he was confronted; the type and state of the alliance; his attitudes toward military affairs, war, and peace; his relations with his staff; his methods; and his goals in the war. Using these measuring sticks, what can we conclude about Mr. Roosevelt?

### PREPARATION FOR WAR

Roosevelt's education and preparation for war leadership began long before Pearl Harbor. Interested in naval affairs from his youth, he was proud to follow in the footsteps of Theodore Roosevelt and to become Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Wilson.<sup>2</sup> In this position he gained experience with preparedness and learned about dealing with Congress on such issues. We

know that he promoted a trip abroad at the time of the Paris Peace Conference and hovered on the fringes of that conference. He was familiar with the battle over the League of Nations from the beginning and had fought for it in the elections of 1920. As Robert E. Sherwood has said, Roosevelt worked from the beginning with the ghost of Wilson at his shoulder. He was determined to avoid Wilson's mistakes.<sup>3</sup> A year before Pearl Harbor (December 29, 1940), in his "arsenal of democracy" speech, he had warned against the folly of a negotiated peace with the Nazis. That same year he took the first of what was to be a series of steps in bipartisanship by appointing two Republicans, Knox and Stimson, to the secretaryships of the Navy and War departments. The Commander in Chief would also be the politician-in-chief and the co-ordinator-in-chief.

Aware of the public reaction to his "Quarantine" speech, he learned, as a shrewd foreign observer remarked in the summer of 1941, to lead public opinion by following it. With his country and advisers split, even down to the eve of war, between those who would retreat to isolationism and those who would intervene immediately and directly, he tried to steer a middle course. Step-by-step adjustments were made which at any time before Pearl Harbor could have been called off without much political embarrassment. Roosevelt grew along with the country in its gradual retreat from isolationism. Concerned with legal niceties no more than he was in the New Deal days, he stretched neutrality as far as he could in aiding the free world.

The Depression had steeled him for crisis, even as it had given him experience and confidence in directing a great national effort. Indeed, fighting the Depression had taken on some of the aspects of managing a war economy. And when the period of intensive mobilization for war began, he carried forward the same methods of balancing and harnessing diverse economic interests for the common effort. Again he was the energizer and the setter of high goals; again there was a proliferation of overlapping agencies; again there was the same "looseness at the

joints" in his administration; and again a relaxation of his direct interest once programs were well started.<sup>4</sup>

Certain characteristics in his wartime relationships with his military staff asserted themselves early. From the beginning he showed a strong disposition at critical points to rely on his own intuitive judgments, even against the advice of his professional staff—in what the military call "estimates of the situation." Two examples must suffice. After the fall of France in the spring of 1940, everything hinged on whether British resistance, on which the United States had come to rely as a bulwark for hemisphere defense, would continue. The President, on the basis of faith in his own estimates of the situation, rather than in those of the military, was optimistic. In fact, despite predictions that Britain was doomed, the White House, at a critical point in June, 1940, exerted pressure on the services for the transfer of munitions from America's scanty reserves.<sup>5</sup> When the problem of extending aid to Russia came to the fore in the summer and fall of 1941, it was pertinent to know how much military equipment the Soviet Union already had, how much her production could furnish, and when and where the Russians could use American equipment in combat. Only with such complete information could the United States realistically determine when and how much war material should be provided to the Soviet Union at the expense of United States armed forces and aid to other potential allies. Little was known, however, about Russia's capabilities and intentions in 1941, a condition that was to obtain throughout the war. In fact, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, the American staff seriously doubted the ability of the Russians to continue as an active participant in the war against Germany, and shaped war plans accordingly. The President, however, having no doubt that the Russians would continue the fight, ordered that supplies for Russia be given a top priority.

During the drift to war—as national policy and public opinion underwent a gradual transformation—the military staffs kept aloof from controversies over national policies, in line with their

traditions, even though they did not always agree with the wisdom of the President's words or actions. The President, during the period 1939-41, broadened his knowledge of military affairs to include Army and air plans, as well as Navy strategy; but neither did he commit himself irrevocably to their war plans nor seek immediately to influence their strategic ideas. Under these circumstances American staff plans could not be, nor indeed were they, authoritative interpretations of national policy in the field of military strategy. The partial dissociation of war plans from national policy limited their immediate practical value; but in the long run there were important advantages in the loose relationship. It permitted the military planners a good deal of freedom to discuss with British officers the possible ways of using U. S. forces in coalition strategy. The President could—at some political risk, to be sure—afford to authorize informal discussions with the British, from which both staffs had a good deal to learn, without seriously committing the administration. For the first time in its history, the United States entered a war considerably advanced in its military planning.

The limitations and advantages of the loose relationship were reflected in the prewar planning. From 1939 to 1941, the character of war-planning underwent a considerable change from the earlier period of abstract exercises—the so-called color plans of the 1920's and 30's, each designed for operations against one or another single power. The trend of events abroad obliged and the President's concern licensed the military planners to study the possible effect on America's security of action resulting from concerted aggression by Germany and Italy, in conjunction with action by Japan. As a result of the exchange of ideas between the Army and Navy, the Joint Board, in June, 1939, authorized the preparation of five new basic war plans. Since the five new plans envisaged the probability of war against more than one enemy, and in more than one theater, they were called RAINBOW plans. These plans represented an important step in the efforts of the planners to re-establish contact with reality in the defense pic-

ture. They were the first joint (Army-Navy) plans that envisaged a global war.

Early in 1941, a second important step in gearing American strategic planning for war was taken with the initiation of British-American staff conversations. For months, both the American and British staffs had been eager for discussions. The President did not definitely commit himself on any of the strategic proposals outlined in advance of the meetings by the American staff, but he did authorize exploratory talks. Their stated purpose was "to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war."<sup>6</sup> Out of these staff talks emerged ABC-1. Although this document did not represent a binding political commitment upon the United States to enter the war, it did lay down the principles of British-American co-operation if the United States had to resort to war. On the basis of the belief that Germany was the predominant member of the hostile coalition, the main United States and British effort was to be exerted in the Atlantic and European area. It was agreed that if Japan entered the war, military strategy in the Far East would be defensive. The principle that the first aim was the defeat of Germany—perhaps the single most important decision of World War II—thus emerged. The ABC talks marked the real opening of formal, permanent relations between the American and British staffs. The exchange of views and information between the staffs became continuous, and the American staff became increasingly familiar with the problems of coalition warfare. By the time of Pearl Harbor, the United States had made considerable progress in co-ordinating its military objectives with those of the British, in so far as this could be done on a hypothetical basis. When war came, the over-all strategy adopted, despite initial Japanese successes, was essentially that of ABC-1.

Of all the basic war plans on which the military staff had been working since the summer of 1939, Rainbow 5 fitted most



closely the strategy outlined in the American-British Conversations. Rainbow 5 and ABC-1 were approved by the Joint Board on May 14, 1941. In early June, the documents were sent to the President, who read both and returned them without his approval or disapproval. Actually, Rainbow 5 was the formal war plan which went into effect on December 7, 1941.<sup>7</sup>

The three years of peacetime preparations were brought to an end, not by Presidential wish or design, but by enemy action. The measures he had instituted to stop Japanese aggression may have narrowed the choices for Japan, but it must be emphasized that the decision for war was made by the Japanese. The plans and preparations the President had fostered for preparedness were still far from complete. Yet so far as advance military planning was concerned, the nation never entered a war so well prepared. The armed forces were in the process of being built up, weapons were beginning to flow, the basis of co-ordinated action with Britain had been set, and the general course for winning the war had been charted. Pearl Harbor exposed weaknesses in America's preparations, but it left the major part of the work of the President and his staff unaffected. The preparations that had been made since 1939 enabled the United States to withstand the initial losses and to begin offensive action against Germany and Japan within less than a year. The wheels the President had set in motion, actively or permissively, had successfully converted the peaceful democracy to war purposes.

#### PEARL HARBOR TO CASABLANCA

In the year that followed Pearl Harbor, the President was intimately concerned with the tasks of molding the Grand Alliance. We must remember that this coalition was really a polygamous marriage and represented different degrees of partnership. With Churchill and the British, Roosevelt had a special relation, an alliance within an alliance. Wearing both a political and military hat, Roosevelt sometimes found himself more in agree-

ment with Churchill than with his own staff. Throughout the war, and particularly in this early defensive stage, Churchill, whose conversation always intrigued Roosevelt even when his ideas did not, exercised a strong influence on him. The doughty British statesman-warrior was a perfect foil for Roosevelt. As the President once put it, "It is fun to be in the same decade with you."<sup>8</sup> With the Soviet Union, relations were never so intimate; and early in the alliance Roosevelt took over a special role as mediator between Churchill and Stalin. China was also of special interest to the President, and he did not always find himself in agreement with the British or with his own staff concerning its role. From the beginning he wished to raise China to the status of a great power. From the beginning he set out to win the friendship of the Soviet Union by sending supplies, banking good will, and doing sundry good works. He acted on the principle that the only way to have a friend is to be one. To bring the Soviet Union out of its isolation became a major goal. It is clear that Roosevelt regarded the Grand Alliance as an exercise in "winning friends and influencing people," an unparalleled opportunity for the allied nations, united by a common bond of danger, to get to know each other better and break down the legacies of suspicion. To this end he early essayed the role he played throughout the war—guardian of the good relations of the coalition.

This attitude colored his views on the conduct of military strategy. Usually, he went along with his staff on military strategy and was content to let that strategy take its own course or have the British and the Joint Chiefs of Staff settle it; but whenever basic differences with major allies arose, he stepped in. Thus, in the summer of 1942, he broke a deadlock between the American Joint Chiefs, intent on preparing for an early cross-Channel operation in force (*BOLERO-ROUNDUP*), and the Prime Minister and his staff, intent on launching a North African operation. The resultant decision—a reversal of the approval he had given the *BOLERO-ROUNDUP* plan in the early spring—he justified on the



ground that he wanted American troops in action in 1942.<sup>9</sup> Not only did he overrule his staff on this occasion—as he was to do on several others—but he refused to permit the staff to give the British an ultimatum, threatening to go all-out in the Pacific. Throughout the war he steadfastly backed the “Europe first” decision—a coalition decision reached by the Allies as much on politically expedient as on military grounds.

It must be stressed that, in general, Roosevelt exercised a loose control over military strategy. Bored with the details of war, as with those of administration generally, he took delight in his strategic role. When the invasion of North Africa proved successful, he could hardly repress a note of personal triumph to General Marshall.<sup>10</sup> Although it is difficult, on the face of available evidence, to ascribe strong convictions on strategy to Roosevelt, he continued to show what his staff regarded as diversionist tendencies well into the middle of the war. The Mediterranean fascinated him almost as much as it did Churchill, and the American staff spent a good part of its wartime efforts trying to win him—and seeing that he stayed won—to a strategy based on a scheduled cross-Channel operation in force. It is not generally realized that Roosevelt, as late as the summer of 1943, proposed a campaign through the Iberian Peninsula in place of the cross-Channel attack and that even at Teheran he showed interest in Adriatic ventures. Although he allowed his staff wide latitude in the day-to-day conduct of the war, he reserved for himself the right to make important decisions. Once determined—and no man could be more resolute when his mind was made up—Roosevelt would stand fast—as witness his stand at Teheran for OVERLORD, and, in the summer of 1944, for a southern France operation.<sup>11</sup>

Roosevelt's approach to strategy presented his staff with unique problems. It could result, as it did in the spring of 1942, in a lightly tossed-off promise to Molotov for an early second front, much to the consternation of his staff. It meant occasional overruling of their advice; a cautious “wait and see” attitude and

reluctance to commit himself in advance on the cross-Channel operation, as at the Casablanca Conference; an occasional prodding of the "cautious planners" to do more for the Mediterranean; the playing-off of one school of thought against the other, as in the case of the Marshall-Stimson-Stilwell espousal of ground operations versus the Chennault-Hopkins-Chiang advocacy of more air support in China; and decision by default, as in the case of a large-scale operation on the mainland of China. It meant that for a long time the planners could not work out a united front with the President, vis-à-vis the British, at the great conferences.

If Roosevelt preserved an independent, though unsystematic, role in strategy, his staff was also given a large and independent part to play. Both were capable of thinking for themselves and asserting themselves vis-à-vis each other. Roosevelt was fortunate in his choice of staff and commanders. Unlike Lincoln, he found his general early. General Marshall soon won his confidence and bore much of the burden of debate with Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff over European strategy, permitting Roosevelt to play his favored role of mediator. How much faith he had in Marshall was reflected in his decision, after much deliberation, not to release Marshall for the OVERLORD top command. As he put it, "I . . . could not sleep at night with you out of the country."<sup>12</sup> In Admirals King and Leahy he found strong naval advisers, and Leahy, his personal link with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, became his "leg-man." Each of these could get his ear, as could also General "Hap" Arnold via Harry Hopkins. Roosevelt established his ties with these and others, kept his cards close to his chest, and persuaded rather than commanded, or let events make the decisions in due time. His system of administration during the war may have appeared haphazard and his relationship with his staff loose, but that system and relationship worked for him.

As time went on, his respect for the complexities of military

planning grew along with his knowledge. Though he never evolved a War Cabinet or anything remotely resembling the closely-knit British politico-military staff, the JCS system, which came into existence soon after Pearl Harbor and to which, characteristically, he had never even given a charter, remained his bulwark in the military field. Unlike the ubiquitous Churchill, he did not hang over the shoulders of his staff and commanders, harrying them with messages even in matters of operational detail, overwhelming them in debate, and giving them no rest. Weeks would go by without Marshall's seeing the Commander in Chief and for a long period after the TORCH decision, to which Stimson had objected strenuously, the President did not see his Secretary of War. While much advice from non-military sources reached him informally through various members of his inner circle, as Commander in Chief he preserved formal but friendly relations with the commanders in the field through the accepted military channels. It was not his habit to interfere in relations between the JCS and the commanders in the field. Only once, at Pearl Harbor, in July, 1944, did he see General MacArthur during the war, and it is doubtful that he intervened even then in the strategic decisions that were pending.

How much the Commander in Chief came to depend on his professional staff in the strategic planning of the war was reflected in his retrospective observations at the time the noose had begun to tighten about Germany and Japan.

All these operations had to be planned far in advance. You can't imagine how tired I sometimes get when I am told that something that looks simple is going to take three months—six months to do. Well, that is part of the job of a Commander-in-Chief. Sometimes I have to be disappointed, sometimes I have to go along with the estimates of the professionals. That does not mean merely drawing arrows on maps—planning. It has meant planning in terms of precisely how many men will be needed, and how many ships—warships, cargo ships, landing craft—how many bombers, how many fighter planes—how much equipment—food—what types of equip-

ment down to the last cartridge. And, it has meant getting all of them to the right place at the right time.<sup>13</sup>

### THE MIDWAR PERIOD: CASABLANCA TO OCTAGON

What were Roosevelt's objectives during and after the war? The Casablanca Conference represents a watershed in his direction of World War II, for it was at this conference that he announced the unconditional-surrender formula. It is significant that the President did not set forth as his war aim the objective of restoring the European or Asian balance of power; nor was his concern here with the terms of the peace settlement. What the President appeared to be offering at the time was a simple formula of common and resolute purpose—a slogan that would rally the Allies for victory and drive home to friend and foe alike that this time there would be no negotiated peace and no "escape clauses" offered by another Fourteen Points. In particular, it might serve to reassure the Russians, who were disappointed by the continued failure of the western powers to open the second front in Europe, of the uncompromising determination of the western powers to wage a fight to the finish with Germany.

For the Allies and the American Staff, no less than for the enemies, the announcement was to prove important. Before Casablanca the specific objectives for which Roosevelt was prepared to run serious political and military risks, even against the better judgment of his military advisers, were the traditional defensive objectives of U. S. policy—essentially the security of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These were reflected in the politico-military policies he had actively supported in 1942—establishing the line from Australia to Hawaii, keeping China in the war, maintaining the lines of communication to the United Kingdom, invading North Africa. Beyond this, the United States had no well-defined objectives. It may be conjectured that when these objectives were secured, the President passed at once in his mind, impatiently, to the peace conferences that would

follow a clear-cut victory, at which he could appear—uncommitted and disinterested—to emulate the purposes, while avoiding the mistakes, of President Wilson.

The formula was of a piece with his strong disposition from the beginning of the war to postpone territorial and political settlements until after it was over. Indeed, it should be noted that, in spite of all the postwar talk about “concessions” that he made to the Russians, he had, in May, 1942, intervened in Anglo-Russian treaty negotiations to oppose a guarantee of territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, even though Churchill had indicated his willingness to accede to the Soviet Union’s desire. The formula was also of a piece with his thinking about the international security system for the postwar period. At Argentia, in August, 1941, he had refused, on the ground of expediency, to adopt Churchill’s suggestion for incorporating the term “general security organization” into the Atlantic Charter. In 1942, he seemed to be thinking of an armed alliance of big powers—“sheriffs of the peace”<sup>14</sup>—to keep order during the transition from war to peace; but in 1943, he definitely gave his support to a United Nations Organization. In this connection, it has generally been overlooked that the subcommittee of the State Department, whose recommendation for unconditional surrender was brought to his attention shortly before Casablanca, had arrived at this proposal in the context of its study of postwar organization for peace.<sup>15</sup> Small wonder that the seed fell on fertile ground. Unconditional surrender was part and parcel of the President’s desire to substitute for the old balance of power in Europe a balance of community interest in the well-being of the world. It promised to allow him to retain complete freedom of action—with allies and enemies alike—in order to insure reconstruction of a peaceful world after the war.

After Casablanca, the President gave himself to the tasks of realizing the unconditional surrender of the enemies and the establishment of the United Nations. For the American military staff, to whom he had announced the proposal but with whom he



had not discussed it in advance of the conference, unconditional surrender was to serve essentially as a military objective, reinforcing their own notions of a concentrated, decisive war. Winning the war decisively obtained top priority, just as it had in the war games held in peacetime. At the same time, however, the formula complicated the task of the American military staff. It meant that henceforth—largely without consistent Presidential guidance—they had to work out the precise terms of the offensive phase of the war through negotiation with the Allies. Thus military strategy began to shape national policy. The President's apparent reluctance to spell out his political objectives discouraged, though it did not entirely prevent, the U. S. military authorities from requesting guidance on questions of national policy that would be influenced—or simply settled—by future operations. The strategic planners, who had been concerned since 1940 over the President's apparent indifference to military expediency, were left with a comparatively free hand to work out their problems in strictly military terms. But it was by no means a coincidence that, as the war progressed, they began to insist that there were really no strictly military problems in grand strategy and to seek to establish closer relations with the White House and the State Department in the hope of getting political guidance.

As American military power in the field grew, Roosevelt's influence at the great conferences was strengthened, and by midwar his objectives seemed well on the road to realization. By Teheran, the blueprint of quick, decisive military victory in Europe—centering in *OVERLORD*, the cross-Channel attack—had finally been agreed upon by the Russians, English, and Americans; and the Allies had also agreed to the principle of a United Nations Organization. Teheran was the high point of the President's war leadership. He had met Stalin face to face for the first time in the war and, as he put it, had "cracked the ice."<sup>16</sup> The personal relationship he had enjoyed with Churchill might even be extended to Stalin, and he had, as Sherwood has pointed out, great faith in his ability to handle such firsthand dealings. So

pleased was he by Teheran and its aftermath that early in March, 1944, he stated:

On international co-operation, we are now working, since the last meeting in Teheran, in really good co-operation with the Russians. And I think the Russians are perfectly friendly; they aren't trying to gobble up all the rest of Europe or the world. They didn't know us, that's the really fundamental difference. They are friendly people. They haven't got any crazy ideas of conquest, and so forth; and now that they have got to know us, they are much more willing to accept us. And we are working in with them on actual operations and plans much better than we did before, just because we didn't know each other.

So that was one of the great gains of last fall in Teheran. Things of that kind take quite a while to work out with people who are five or six thousand miles away, who don't talk our language, English—and we certainly don't know Russian. And yet we are getting somewhere with them.

And all these fears that have been expressed by a lot of people here—with some reason—that the Russians are going to try to dominate Europe, I personally don't think there's anything in it. They have got a large enough "hunk of bread" right in Russia to keep them busy for a great many years to come without taking on any more headaches.<sup>17</sup>

The successful landings in Normandy in June, 1944, and the simultaneous Russian drive from the east promised to crush Germany quickly; in August, the representatives of the Allies met at Dumbarton Oaks to spell out further their ideas on the international organization to keep the peace. At the Second Quebec Conference in September, 1944, Churchill felt the Allies had indeed entered "a golden age."

### THE FINAL PERIOD: OCTAGON TO YALTA

In the final months of the war the picture changed. Even as Allied troops swept to victory on the European continent and tightened the ring around Japan, the coalition began to break up. It became more difficult to separate political from military prob-



lems. As the Russians picked up capital after capital in eastern and central Europe and flowed into the Balkans behind the retreating Germans, the course of the war and the movement of armies began to shape the conditions of the peace. The curtain began to lift on the divergent national objectives and war aims of the Allies—hitherto obscured by the common bond of danger, the compromise military strategy that had been hammered out, and the political declarations to which they had subscribed. The thin shell of the Grand Alliance became more apparent.

The full impact of the President's methods and policies began to be felt—even as the distinctions between his roles as Commander in Chief and manager of foreign relations became blurred and his dilemmas mounted. The demands of a policy of total victory and total peace began to conflict. Never was his leadership more necessary; never was it more fitful.<sup>18</sup>

As the strategy unrolled in the field and the American staff bent its efforts for a swift conclusion to the war, Churchill, warily watching the swift Soviet advance, wanted western Allied strength diverted to forestall the Soviet surge and the war steered into more direct political channels. But the President, who had so often sided with the Prime Minister in the past, would not yield. Many reasons may account for the President's position—state of health, desire to hasten the victory over Japan, impatience to get on with the business of the peace—but of none of these can we as yet be certain. In any event, by 1944–45, the Commander in Chief was caught on the horns of a political dilemma. He was not unconcerned about the unilateral efforts of the Soviet Union to put its impress on the shape of postwar Europe—as witness his stand on Soviet efforts to reconstruct the Polish government. But from the viewpoint of domestic political considerations, he had to fight a quick and decisive war, one that would justify American entry and the dispatch of troops abroad. For the Americans, war was an aberration, an unwelcome disturber of normalcy, a disagreeable business to be done with as quickly as possible. “Thrash the bullies and get

the boys home" was the American approach. Once the bullies were beaten, it was doubtful whether the American people would countenance a prolonged occupation in Europe or a more active role in southern Europe, such as the Prime Minister desired. Moreover, the President's policy for peace centered on an international organization to maintain the peace, not on reliance on the balance of power. To achieve his aim he had to take the calculated risk of being able to handle Stalin and keep the friendship of the U.S.S.R. Whatever the precise explanation may be, American national policy in the final year of the war—whether through drift or deliberate choice, or both—placed no obstacles in the way of a decisive ending of the European conflict. The President did not choose to use the great military power built up on the Continent for immediate political purposes. In the absence of political instructions to the contrary, the American military staff fell back on the task of getting the war over with as quickly as possible.

It is one of the ironies of history that President Roosevelt, pragmatist that he was, should go down as almost inflexible on the Russian issue. To the end, he refused to allow lend-lease to be used as a bargaining weapon in dealing with the Soviet Union. However, his last message to Churchill, written an hour before his death, while expressing the optimistic hope that the Polish problem, like others, would also pass and that the course taken toward the Russians had so far been correct, also urged firmness. When compared with the tone of their wartime correspondence, some of Roosevelt's last exchanges with Stalin were most sharp.

It is also ironical that in the final period, when his two main goals—winning the war decisively and establishing the United Nations—were clearly in sight, his dilemmas were piling up. Weaknesses in his leadership began to become apparent, along with growing divergences within the coalition he had tried to preserve and shape for postwar purposes. Immediate and harsh political problems for which his two main objectives provided no ready solution were arising in the liberated countries of Europe;

the presence of armies—not principle—threatened to be the determining factor and to set the conditions of the peace. The final months showed that Roosevelt's Russian, as well as his China, policies had been only partly successful.

Against this background, the much-debated conference of Yalta must be regarded not as the cause but as the symptom of Western weakness and growing Soviet strength and influence. What Yalta did was to bring together the three great powers and their divergent approaches to the fundamental problems of war and peace. The danger that was the common bond that held the alliance together was lessening; the declarations to which the Allies had subscribed—notably the unconditional-surrender formula—were beginning to show weaknesses as binding links. Great Britain was growing weaker, the United States and the Soviet Union relatively stronger. The opening phase in the struggle between the West and the Soviet Union was beginning.

What Yalta marked, then, was the growing intrusion of problems of victory and peace, the disunity of the West, and the emergence of the Soviet Union to world power. As for the American military, they were conscious of the Soviet rise and troubled by it. It is not too much to say that they were fully as alert as Churchill to Russia's growing strength and its importance for the world balance of power—their political naïveté has been grossly exaggerated. They were anxious to establish closer liaison in the field with the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia, but at the same time they were aware of the need to take a stronger stand against Russia. Even before Yalta they were stiffening their stand in dealings with the Soviet forces in the field and calling for a *quid pro quo*. But they were also conscious that the war was not yet over in Europe—the Battle of the Bulge was still fresh in their minds—and that the final battles with Japan were still to be fought. Following military advice, Roosevelt's immediate objective was to get the Russians into the war against Japan as soon as possible; his long-range objective remained to emerge from the war with a working relationship to prevent another world catas-

trophe. But this time he had to pay a price, and that price was a breach in his policy of postponement.

All in all, Yalta was the harbinger of a new era. A mighty war alliance was breaking up, and the power structure itself was changing. The balance had shifted, and the West and its leaders did not fully realize what this meant. The great powers were on the threshold of the atomic age without knowing it.

## DEBITS AND CREDITS

In retrospect, it is apparent that Roosevelt was not infallible and that he made mistakes. Before the war was over, his policies of concentrating on military victory and on laying the groundwork for the long-range development of a sound postwar structure of international relations began to conflict, and he had to yield on his policy of postponement. His political objectives remained general—a mixture of idealism and practicality, of optimism and reality. Soviet political ambitions were underestimated. Certain policies of the President that were introduced in the early phases of the war were probably held too long and rigidly; notably, the generous lend-lease policy and the unconditional-surrender concept. The limitations of unconditional surrender as a political formula began to show up in the last year of the war when the time had come—perhaps was long overdue—to replace the common war aim with a common peace aim.

No appraisal of Roosevelt's failures and successes as a war leader would be complete without comparing his role with Wilson's. Both saw war and peace as two distinct phenomena. Neither appeared to appreciate fully that the way a war was fought would determine the conditions of the peace. Neither appreciated that warfare in the twentieth century was undergoing a revolution and that distinctions between war and peace were becoming blurred. Although Roosevelt could wear his military hat more jauntily and less self-consciously than Wilson, both disliked war. Indeed, the driving purpose behind the war policies of

both men was to create an instrumentality for peace as part of the conclusion of the war. Both laid the foundations of a structure for international security that was intended to provide against the problems and dangers of the future; unfortunately, the more urgent issues of the critical present still remained. Both realized that in the twentieth century America's security would have to be tied to world security. But neither faced up to the full price the United States would have to pay to back its new responsibilities in the world with effective power. Neither liked communism, but both were willing to give the Soviet power a chance to work out its problems and join with the other nations in a new international security system. Neither, it may be safely assumed, really understood Marxist-Soviet politico-military strategy any more than did most of their generation.

In the two world coalition wars of the twentieth century, the two American Presidents deliberately staked their all on a new international order that would guarantee peace and achieve the noblest aspirations of mankind. The war they waged was part of the larger, never-ending struggle of man with himself, the struggle to end war itself. With all its cruel dilemmas, war abroad gave them the greatest challenge and opportunity of their careers—a chance to project the vision of America on a world canvas. Both fell in the crusade they were waging. Aside from their constitutional role, they were, therefore, Commanders in Chief in a very special sense. Whatever their so-called mistakes in World War I and World War II, it is in the context of the struggle for their ideals and for men's minds that they largely staked their place in history. Who can yet say with certainty whether in this respect they were impractical dreamers or true pragmatists?

What, then, may we conclude about Roosevelt, the war leader? His strength as a war President arose from multiple factors—the full powers residing in the Presidential office, his long experience in it, his dominant, persuasive personality, his unique system of administration, the mighty war machine he generated,



and, above all, his position as "arbiter in international affairs," as active but disinterested leader at the summit. He kept a firm, if outwardly loose, hold on the reins of national policy and reserved the right to make his own strategic choices among the conflicting opinions and divergent factors—economic, political, diplomatic, and military—converging on his office. Preoccupied with the mistakes of Wilson, when he put on his military hat, he kept one eye on the domestic political front, the other on the postwar situation. If at times the Commander in Chief yielded to the politician, and at others to the statesman, he fought a bipartisan war aimed at a bipartisan peace. As a politician in chief he was highly successful.

He was a great war President, but his greatness lay neither in the field of grand strategy nor in statesmanship. His greatness lay rather in his rallying and mobilizing his country and the free world for war, and in his articulating the hopes of the common man for peace—he was as much a prophet as a man of action. In this sense, he carried the line that ran from Lincoln to Wilson one step further and promoted the marriage of democracy, peace, and international security. His war leadership was more intimately concerned with planning the grand design for international security and peace—of which the United Nations was to be the keystone—than with the grand design of military victory. Without his wartime drive, it is doubtful that the United Nations Organization would have come into existence. He linked national with international security. He realized that the United States would have to accept responsibility along with power on the world stage, but power would have to be joined with morality. Although as war president his power came to rival Hitler's, he remained a champion of democratic ideals. His war leadership demonstrated that the structure of the American government, and of the office of the President, was, in the hands of an active and forceful Commander in Chief, capable of meeting the greatest test in war the nation had yet faced.

1. This paper grew out of a talk given by the author at the Pacific Coast Branch meeting of the American Historical Association in December, 1958. It is in large part a by-product of his research and writing on World War II incorporated in *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, with E. M. Snell (Washington, D. C., 1953), and *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (Washington, D. C., 1959).

The published literature is scattered in official and unofficial accounts of World War II, and despite the flow of biographies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the definitive, full-scale treatment of his war leadership remains to be written. The memoirs of his top-level military associates—the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admirals Leahy and King and General Arnold—are helpful; unfortunately, General Marshall left none, and a definitive biography has yet to appear. Cordell Hull, *Memoirs* (2 vols.; New York, 1948), and Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1948) are revealing on FDR's dealings with two heads of departments. Useful, illuminating published sources are Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, 1941-1950), the volumes for 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, and 1944-45; Elliott Roosevelt (ed.), *FDR, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945* (New York, 1950), Vol. II; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (rev. ed.; New York, 1950); and Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin* (Princeton, N. J., 1957). Interesting, provocative British views on FDR's wartime role and relationships are contained in British official accounts of World War II, especially J. R. M. Butler, *Grand Strategy* (London, 1957), Vol. II; John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy* (London, 1956), Vols. V and VI; and in the memoirs of Churchill and the diaries of Alanbrooke.

2. Louis B. Wehle, *Hidden Threads of History: Wilson through Roosevelt* (New York, 1953), p. 226. The story of FDR's prewar years may be followed in the biographies by Frank Freidel and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

3. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, 1948), p. 227.

4. See Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, *Arms and the State* (New York, 1958), p. 43. Part I of this volume, prepared by the latter two authors, contains an interesting survey of U. S. civil-military relationships in the prewar and war years, based largely on published sources, and presents valuable insights into FDR's role and manner of operating.

5. Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-21.

6. Maurice Matloff, "Prewar Military Plans and Preparations, 1939-41," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXIX (July, 1953), 744.

7. The fullest account of peacetime military preparations is contained in Mark Skinner Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, D. C., 1950). For discussions of American prewar strategic planning culminating in the evolution of the RAINBOW plans, see *ibid.*, chap. iv; Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, chaps. i-iii; and Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, D. C., 1960). On the diplomatic side, see William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (New York, 1952) and *The Undeclared War: 1940-1941* (New York, 1953).

8. Edward R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (New York, 1949), p. 70.

9. For the evolution of the BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan and the eventual decision to launch TORCH, see Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, chaps. viii, xii, xiii; Sherwood, *op. cit.*



## ROOSEVELT AS WAR LEADER

(rev. ed.), chaps. xxiii, xxv; Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, chap. xvii; and Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), Book I, chaps. xviii, xxii, and Book II, chap. ii.

10. Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, p. 68.

11. See Maurice Matloff, "The ANVIL Decision: Crossroads of Strategy," in *Command Decisions*, a volume prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (New York, 1959). Roosevelt's positions at Teheran and in the summer of 1944 are developed at greater length in Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-44*, chaps. xvi, xxi.

12. Sherwood, *op. cit.* (1948), p. 803.

13. Rosenman, *op. cit.* (1950), volume for 1944-45, p. 362.

14. Elliott Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, II, 1447.

15. For the proposal of the State Department subcommittee, see Department of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* ("General Foreign Policy Series," No. 15, released February, 1950 [Washington, D. C., 1949]), p. 127.

16. Rosenman, *op. cit.*, volume for 1944-45, pp. 232-36.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

18. Published sources shedding light on the President's role in the last year of the war, relations with the Russians, and Yalta include Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, 1953); Ehrman, *op. cit.*; John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance* (New York, 1947); William H. McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia, Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (New York, 1953); Feis, *op. cit.*; and John L. Snell (ed.), *The Meaning of Yalta* (Baton Rouge, 1956). Two useful official documentaries are *The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945* (Department of Defense Press Release, September, 1955); and Department of State, *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta* (Washington, D. C., 1955). Two articles dealing with the subject are Ernest R. May, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Far Eastern War, 1941-1945," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXIV (May, 1955), 153-74; and Maurice Matloff, "The Soviet Union and the War in the West," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXXII (March, 1956), 261-71.

*Hitler, the Nazi Party, and the  
Wehrmacht in World War II*

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—ANDREAS DORPALEN

IF DURING World War I, Germany was the country in which the military assumed civil government functions to a degree unknown anywhere else, it was, during World War II, the state in which the military lost ground to the civil leadership to an extent unequaled even in the Soviet Union. Civil ascendancy was especially marked in the Army, over which Hitler assumed direct control; it was less evident in both the Navy and the Air Force. But if intervention was not so frequent in the case of these latter services, such restraint was due, not to any organizational prin-

ciples, but to a combination of special circumstances. The Air Force had been built up from its beginning as an instrument of National Socialism, while the Navy leaders, Raeder and Dönitz, were not only more ready than the generals to go along with Hitler's plans, but also found him often more cautious in matters of naval strategy than they were themselves. Hitler, moreover, never showed as much interest in naval and air warfare as he did in ground operations.<sup>1</sup>

Of the three branches of the German Wehrmacht, the Army was the one which had resisted full Nazification more effectively than the others before the outbreak of the war. It displayed a distinct aloofness towards the Nazi philosophy and maintained its traditional standards of social conservatism; in an era of revolutionary changes, it insisted on keeping alive historical ties and loyalties. The Army thus managed to preserve a measure of homogeneity and an *esprit de corps* that set it somewhat apart from other agencies of the Nazi state.

But if the Army prided itself on its privileged status, it also indulged in a false sense of security. Hitler could never tolerate the existence of any organization which had standards and values of its own. For the execution of his plans he needed an Army that would obey him without reservation and carry out his orders no matter what they involved. For he envisaged himself as the architect, the builder of a new society, using human beings like bricks as he saw fit, to be settled and resettled, shaped and reshaped in accordance with his plans and needs, or ruthlessly sacrificed or destroyed if need be.<sup>2</sup> Obviously, then, the Army, if it was to help him carry out his plans in their full ruthlessness and brutality, had to be subjected completely to his control and will.

### EARLY MEASURES TO CONTROL THE ARMY

Even before the war, Hitler had begun to make the Army the instrument of his will. After Hindenburg's death he had required

each soldier and officer to swear an oath of loyalty to him personally. In 1938, he had assumed the functions of the War Minister and filled the top advisory posts with pliable men. He had badly shaken the confidence of the generals in their own judgment when he decided over their objections to proceed with the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the occupation of Austria, and the annexation of the Sudetenland. Finally, he had begun to build a military force entirely independent of the Army, a fully militarized branch of his elite guard (*Waffen-S.S.*), completely at his own disposal.<sup>3</sup>

When war broke out in 1939, Hitler put a check on all non-military activities that the German Army had customarily taken over in wartime. In earlier wars, the military commander of a district had automatically become the head of the civil administration too. Now, the local *Gauleiter* was appointed Defense Commissioner of his district, in charge of all but purely military functions.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, in almost all occupied territories Nazi commissars took over the administration as soon as the area had been pacified, with S.S. units rather than the Army assuming all police functions.<sup>5</sup> Obviously, the Army was not to be trusted to carry out the policies which Hitler had decided to impose on the conquered countries.

Hitler's policy reflected his belief that the Army had not yet sufficiently absorbed the spirit of National Socialism. A major reason, in the view of Nazi Party officials, was that religious activities were still given too wide a scope in the armed forces. A concerted campaign got under way during the early months of the war to counteract and, if possible, to limit religious influences in the Army and Navy (apparently, the Air Force presented no problem in this regard). Particular efforts were made to publish Nazi tracts to counter any possible effects of the religious literature which was still circulating in the Wehrmacht—tracts which, in the words of Martin Bormann, were to convey to the soldiers "not a Christian but a National Socialist *Weltanschauung*."<sup>6</sup> To emphasize further the superiority of the Na-

tional Socialist spirit, Party officials frequently minimized or ignored altogether the role of the Army in the conquest of Poland and attributed the victory primarily or exclusively to the S.S.<sup>7</sup>

### THE DECISION TO INVADE POLAND

The status of the Army was most clearly revealed in the changing relationship between Hitler and the Army leadership. Here, the primacy of political over military considerations made itself felt to an extent rarely encountered.<sup>8</sup> A careful reading of Hitler's statements and speeches prior to the Polish campaign makes it quite clear that he was well aware of the fact that military victory was by no means assured. He knew that a war into which England and France were drawn might easily develop into a long, drawn-out struggle and that Germany could hardly win such a war. Although he hoped to the last that the two Western powers would not come to Poland's aid, he did not think of abandoning the attack on Poland if they should. Hitler may well have been prepared to go to war against Poland and the Western powers even without coming to terms with Russia; though the available evidence is not conclusive, it does not preclude this possibility. As one scholar has suggested, Hitler probably did not know himself what he would have done had he failed to sign his non-aggression pact with Moscow.<sup>9</sup>

If military considerations played so limited a role in his thinking—they figured negatively in the sense that he felt that the military odds against Germany would become worse as time went on<sup>10</sup>—what, then, induced him to go to war in 1939? Hitler has given the answer with that brutal frankness which his contempt for his generals so often inspired. In justifying his decision to attack, he told a gathering of Army leaders a few days before the Polish campaign that he thought the moment opportune because, with him as leader, the nation could finally secure its necessary *Lebensraum*, despite its unfavorable geopolitical

situation. The outcome of this struggle, he declared, "depends essentially on me, my being here, because of my political gifts."<sup>11</sup> His very existence, he stated, was Germany's greatest asset, and it was therefore essential that the country strike while he was at its head. Whatever military considerations he mentioned were clearly afterthoughts meant to assure his listeners that he was not unaware of their concerns. What really mattered, he was convinced, was the special mission with which "Providence" had entrusted him, his leadership ability, and the spirit which he had inculcated in the nation. "This is a war, not of machines, but of men. Qualitatively we have the better men; spiritual factors are decisive." An iron determination, strong nerves, ruthless brutality would somehow assure Germany's victory against all military odds.<sup>12</sup> In saying this, he was reiterating what he had firmly believed since those youthful days in Vienna when he had first devoured Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. For they had convinced him that will power was decisive in human affairs, and this he was sure he had. This makes it clear, also, why he insisted that the armed forces discard their traditional military concepts and adopt unquestioningly the National Socialist spirit. For the essence of that spirit was blind faith in the Führer and readiness to follow him wherever he led.

There was another factor which virtually drove Hitler to war. He was a man who thrived on fighting; to fight was an essential part of his nature, something of a physical necessity. "He who wants to live should fight," he had written in *Mein Kampf*, "and he who does not want to battle in this world of eternal struggle does not deserve to be alive." In the same vein, he had warned the officers of the Weimar Reichswehr that "if men want to live they are forced to kill others." He was just as blunt when he told his generals some ten years later: "Someone may say: fighting, always fighting. I see in fighting the destiny of all living beings. No one can avoid fighting unless he is prepared to perish." He made clear how deep and personal an obsession this was with him when he told his commanders just before the start of the



Polish campaign: "My only fear is that at the last moment some fool is going to propose a plan of mediation."<sup>13</sup>

To reduce the role of the distrusted regular staffs as much as possible, Hitler created his own military staff, the *Wehrmachtführungsstab*, which was charged with the task of preparing the basic plans on the highest level and of issuing the necessary directives to the three branches of the Wehrmacht. In order that it might discharge its tasks unhampered by what he considered the uninspired professionalism of the General Staff, it was to be composed of men who were not only experts but also endowed with imagination and original ideas. The regular staffs were to be limited even further in the scope of their work by Hitler's insistence that no one was to learn more of his plans than was absolutely necessary, and that much only at the latest possible moment. Nor was anyone outside of the *Wehrmachtführungsstab* entitled to learn the reasons for any of the decisions made by him and his staff.<sup>14</sup>

The swiftness with which events moved toward war in the summer of 1939 limited the role of the *Wehrmachtführungsstab* in the preparation of the Polish campaign; while it drew up the general directive for the offensive, implementation was left to the individual services. Hitler himself insisted on some strategic modifications of the Army's plans, but seems to have refrained, on the whole, from interfering with their tactical execution.<sup>15</sup>

## EARLY PHASES OF THE WESTERN FRONT

Hitler's attitude changed radically, however, when he turned his attention to the western front. Shortly after the collapse of Poland it became clear that the war would not end with the defeat of that country. Contrary to his hope, the Western powers were determined to stay in the fight. Hitler knew that if they were given time to mobilize their full military and economic resources, Germany was likely to lose the war. The only chance of victory lay in an immediate attack, and this he now ordered



over the objections of the Army leaders. Again, he was by no means certain that Germany would win. "No one can tell whether the attack will be successful," he admitted to his generals. "Everything depends on a favorable Providence." But Providence had always been with him and would not desert him now. And for the benefit of any dissenters he added the pointed warning: "I shall shy away from nothing and shall destroy anyone who is against me."<sup>16</sup>

For various reasons he was forced to postpone the attack until the following spring; but when it was launched, it bore the hallmarks of his personal strategy. It was he who revised the original plans drawn up by the General Staff and accepted Manstein's plan for the break through the Ardennes which so confounded the Allies. He was likewise instrumental in planning the surprise attack on the Belgian fort, Eben Emael, which was taken by parachutists dropped from noiseless gliders. Ready to resort to any means to win, he insisted that an important Dutch bridge across the Meuse be seized by Germans disguised in Dutch uniforms. His generals lacked resourcefulness and imagination, he began to complain; "they are too correct, their thinking is too conventional. They should have read more Wild West stories."<sup>17</sup>

Although Hitler could claim a large share in the success of the western offensive, he was also responsible for the one serious setback the Germans suffered in that campaign—the escape through Dunkirk of the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force. That that evacuation succeeded on so large a scale was due to his arbitrary interference in the German operations. After his panzer columns had advanced within twenty miles of Dunkirk, he suddenly ordered them to stop and leave the further pursuit of the British to the Luftwaffe.<sup>18</sup> Delays and unfavorable weather conditions prevented the air force from stopping the evacuation, while the ground forces could doubtless have done so, if given a free hand.<sup>19</sup>

Hitler was confident that once France had been defeated

Britain would readily agree to negotiate a peace treaty. When his hopes were not fulfilled and he decided to prepare for a cross-Channel attack, he pursued this plan without his customary intensity. "The invasion of Britain is an exceptionally daring undertaking," he stated with unusual wariness, "even if the way is short, this is not just a river crossing, but the crossing of a sea which is dominated by the enemy." There was no appeal to Providence this time, no readiness to stake everything on his ability, for, as he told Admiral Raeder, "on land I am a hero, but at sea I am a coward." Almost simultaneously he began to turn his attention to the much more congenial task of considering plans for an attack on Soviet Russia. It is not at all unlikely that the preparations for the invasion of Britain were staged simply in the hope, as F. H. Hinsley has suggested, of frightening Britain into negotiations.<sup>20</sup>

### THE EASTERN FRONT

Hitler displayed no such halfheartedness when he turned against Russia. Here he proved his old self again, ready to risk and to gamble. He was by no means as confident of a quick victory as he claimed in front of his worried generals or in public. There is much evidence that he realized he was taking a gamble, hoping that, as so often before, luck would be on his side. He himself attested repeatedly to his uncertainty in those endless nocturnal monologues to which he liked to treat his immediate entourage.<sup>21</sup>

Hitler's approach to the invasion of Russia also indicates that he did not preclude the possibility of a prolonged campaign. This led to renewed disagreements with his Army leaders. The latter, obeying his orders to plan a short, swift campaign of annihilation against the Russians, maintained that this objective could be accomplished, if at all, only by a concentrated attack on Moscow. Hitler disagreed and insisted that the capture of Moscow was of secondary importance. It was far more important, he maintained,

to get control of the Baltic region with Leningrad and its naval base of Kronstadt so as to eliminate the Red Fleet from the Baltic Sea and render secure, as quickly as possible, the Baltic route for iron ore shipments from Norway to Germany. Only if Soviet resistance should collapse unexpectedly and quickly could there be any question of advancing on Moscow at once, but even in that case a simultaneous offensive would have to be launched against Leningrad. (This last thought was incorporated almost verbatim into the famous Barbarossa directive of December 18, 1940, which ordered the Wehrmacht to prepare for an invasion of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941.)<sup>22</sup> Since the entire campaign was to be based on the assumption that it would be a very short one, Hitler's reference to an unexpectedly quick collapse of Russian resistance is revealing as an unwitting admission of his doubts about the actual prospects of the campaign.<sup>23</sup> Other statements suggest similar misgivings.<sup>24</sup>

If Hitler thought in terms of a long struggle, the main reason was doubtless that in Stalin he knew he faced an opponent with whom he had much in common. He admired the Soviet dictator for his ruthlessness, his resourcefulness, his ability to control the Russians. He also realized that the Russians were imbued with a fanatical ideology which would lend Russian resistance a special impetus and, as he warned his generals, turn this undertaking into a life-and-death struggle.<sup>25</sup>

For a brief moment it looked as if Hitler's gamble would again pay off. The invading German armies inflicted a series of heavy blows on the Russians. With renewed confidence in his star, Hitler ordered the demobilization of large forces on the completion of the Russian campaign. But he soon realized that the German victories were not decisive. A new controversy then developed between him and his generals which demonstrated strikingly how completely he had succeeded in leaving them in the dark as to his thoughts and ultimate intentions. There had been disagreements earlier about the strategy in Poland, about the timing of the attack against France, and about other ques-

tions; but in all these cases the generals had at least known why Hitler preferred one strategy over another. Now this was no longer the case; without realizing it, they had been reduced to the status of purely technical aides.

The General Staff still wished to concentrate the bulk of the German forces in an attack against Moscow after the Russians had been driven from the border areas. But in late July, Hitler insisted on another attack in the South with the object of seizing the Ukraine with its valuable food supplies and the Donets Basin with its coal mines and industrial equipment. Again the generals pointed out that Moscow was a more important objective. The Russians could be expected to defend their capital with all the resources they could muster, and there alone would the Germans be able to inflict a really decisive defeat. Without Moscow, moreover, the Russian transportation system would be completely disorganized. But the main argument was that the capture of Moscow would inflict so serious a psychological blow that the Russians would become completely demoralized. Normally, such an argument would have carried much weight with Hitler, but this time he curtly dismissed it. He insisted that the economic prizes of the Ukraine and the Donets Basin were far more important. What he did not explain was that, all his public utterances to the contrary, he had come to the conclusion that the war would most likely be a long one<sup>26</sup> and that for this reason Germany must capture at once whatever economic resources it could. (The extent to which Germany's economic vulnerability preoccupied him at the time is evident from the frequency with which he returned to this topic in his nighttime conversations.)<sup>27</sup> He also seems to have felt that the battle for Moscow would be extremely costly since Stalin could be expected to defend it to the last man. Even then, the capture of the city would probably not be decisive, for Stalin would undoubtedly fight on after its fall.<sup>28</sup> "The most important objective which must still be attained before winter sets in," he stated in an Army order of August 21, 1941, "is not the capture of Moscow, but the seizure

of the Crimea, of the industrial and coal region along the Donets River, and the blocking of Russian oil transports from the Caucasus, in the north the isolation of Leningrad and the junction with the Finns.”<sup>29</sup>

Hitler won out; the major attack was launched southward,<sup>30</sup> and the Ukraine and the Donets Basin were taken. Only then, in early October, did the German forces advance against Moscow;<sup>31</sup> but hampered first by incessant rain and later by an unusually severe winter, poorly equipped and utterly exhausted, they were unable to take the Russian capital. The generals now urged Hitler to allow them to shorten their lines and retreat to more easily defended positions. But Hitler would not hear of it and insisted that the troops hold their positions.<sup>32</sup> The ensuing dispute led to the dismissal of the Commander in Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch.

#### ASCENDANCY OF THE PARTY OVER THE WEHRMACHT

Hitler himself assumed Brauchitsch's post, with the revealing explanation: "Those few operations which will be necessary anyone can carry out. The main task of the commander-in-chief of the Army is to educate the Army in National Socialism. I don't know any general of the Army who could fulfill this task as I want it done. For this reason I have decided to take over myself the command of the Army." Or, as he put it to Field Marshal Keitel, he wanted to bind the Army to his person and to his destiny.<sup>33</sup> He had come to realize (but would not admit) that it was most likely that the war could no longer be won by ordinary military means, and in an unguarded moment he even spoke of the need to negotiate a peace treaty with the Russians.<sup>34</sup> (The situation had meanwhile been aggravated further by the entry of the United States into the war.) All that could save Germany now was some special development—the invention of a miracle weapon (he was almost to find it in the V-1 and V-2 bombs), some surprise development in politics, some ingenious move



such as only he, Hitler, could conceive. Meanwhile, to gain time, the German forces would have to hold what they had and never retreat. Since they would be confronted with increasing difficulties, however, they could be expected to do so only if Hitler was able to maintain and strengthen their faith in his personal leadership.

For to gain time meant to prepare for a drawn-out struggle, "a hundred years war, if necessary," as he warned Goebbels, and this again brought up the question of economic resources. The offensive which he undertook in the summer of 1942, against the well-founded advice of most of his military leaders, was once more designed primarily to relieve Germany's most serious raw-material shortages—above all, in oil. Such was Hitler's anxiety to reach the oil wells of the Caucasus that he neglected to secure the flank of his advancing forces by taking Stalingrad, which, according to military opinion, could have been captured that summer without much difficulty. And the stubbornness with which he later clung to Stalingrad, after the Russians had concentrated vastly superior forces there, was inspired by the realization that his withdrawal would put an end to all hopes of gaining control of the Caucasian oil. A retreat from Stalingrad was out of the question, he insisted, for it would amount to sacrificing "the whole meaning of the campaign." Faced with the danger that for lack of fuel he might not be able to continue the war, he was fully prepared to risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of men in the hope that they might somehow hold back the Soviet onslaught.<sup>35</sup>

It is doubtful that he had much hope that they would do so. While he continued to assure his generals that the Russians were on the verge of collapse for lack of reserves, he admitted to Goebbels that he had no idea how many reserves they still had. They might collapse sooner or later, he thought, but he was not basing his strategy on such an assumption. How serious he considered the situation, he unwittingly revealed in November, 1942, at the height of the Battle of Stalingrad, when he addressed



a gathering of old Party members on the anniversary of the Beer Cellar Putsch: "All our enemies may rest assured that while the Germany of [1918] laid down its arms at a quarter to twelve, I on principle have never finished before five minutes *past twelve*." <sup>36</sup>

It was on the issue of rigidly holding on to all conquered territory that Hitler again and again came to grips with the Army leaders. Mindful of their responsibilities toward their men, they did not want to defend indefensible positions and preferred to yield ground in order to resume the fight from stronger positions in the rear. But Hitler refused to heed their advice. He was fully convinced that, given the growing strength of the Russians, any retreat would be final. There would be no chance of recovering the lost territory; rather there would soon be demands for further withdrawals. Shortly, the advancing Russians would reach German soil and surrender would be inevitable.<sup>37</sup> The best strategy, he was certain, lay in keeping his troops where they were until forced to retreat, and he could order them to do so the more readily since he was unconcerned about the losses they suffered. "That's what they are there for," he calmly maintained. Or as he put it on another occasion: "We must not value so highly an individual life. If its survival mattered, it would not perish. A fly lays a million eggs which all perish. But the flies remain." In pursuit of his great mission, he assured his entourage, he considered himself entitled to demand from every German soldier the sacrifice of his life.<sup>38</sup>

To accept such a fate required indeed, as he put it, National Socialist training or blind, unquestioning faith in the Führer and the wisdom of his decisions. As the military position grew more serious, Hitler and his Party leaders redoubled their efforts to imbue the armed forces with National Socialist standards and values. A barrage of orders was issued for that purpose. "Without a National Socialist *Weltanschauung*," a typical directive read, "the best training in the use of arms has but limited value . . . . Every officer must have the proud knowledge that

his stand at the front serves as a model of National Socialist strength to the German people. He must therefore accept the proud obligation to live his life as a National Socialist fighter." It was imperative that all leaders and subleaders be guided by the same ideological views, and many of those considered ideologically unreliable were transferred to other posts. "The life struggle of the German people demands that all proper measures be taken to realize these principles. And on this basis the meaning of this war must be explained to every soldier. He must be convinced of the necessity of all political, military, and economic measures of the leadership and must be unshakable in his faith."<sup>39</sup> "There is no such thing as a division into military and ideological leadership . . . . Today's soldier wins with both his weapons and his *Weltanschauung*."<sup>40</sup> *Gauleiter* and other Party officials were sent to the various fronts to strengthen the Party's ties with the fighting men. Party speakers went out to hold meetings, and a special front-line edition of the regular training letter (*Schulungsbrief*) was sent to Party officials serving in the Wehrmacht. At the same time, the functions of Wehrmacht chaplains were further curtailed.<sup>41</sup>

In order to bring the services under even closer and more constant control, Party organizations began to take over functions which traditionally belonged to the Army. Party officials took charge of the planning of recreational and non-military instructional programs; they became social and spiritual advisers to the troops; and they supervised the care of the wounded. Above all, complaints against military superiors could now be lodged with these officials, whereas complaints to outsiders had previously been considered a grave breach of discipline.<sup>42</sup>

The Party thus tried to exert its influence on the Army's rank and file. As for the generals, Hitler took it upon himself to bend them completely to his will. The groundwork, we know, had been laid; but now the full effects of his measures became evident. All except very minor operational movements were strictly forbidden without Hitler's express approval. To make his gen-

erals as dependent as possible on him, he supervised personally the allocation of equipment, especially tanks, to the various fronts as it came off the assembly line. (The S.S., incidentally, always got more and better equipment than the Army.) He kept the military leaders uninformed about political and economic developments; he would not allow them to sit in on conferences concerned with other than their own fronts; and he would not even allow them to consult each other on the same front. "No one was supposed to know more than what concerned him," Field Marshal von Rundstedt testified at Nuremberg. "I was not supposed to know how [Field Marshal von] Bock was going to operate. According to Hitler's order this was none of my business. I was only allowed to know where the tip of his right wing was."<sup>43</sup>

Under these circumstances, Hitler had little interest in the strategic ability of his generals. Men like Brauchitsch, Rundstedt, Manstein, and Guderian sat on the sidelines while the military situation grew ever more desperate. The tasks which remained to the Army, Hitler explained to Halder, the Chief of the Army's General Staff, in September, 1942, required, "not professional expertise, but the fervor of National Socialist dedication." He had recourse to Nietzsche to prove to Halder that instinct and will power were more important than reason and knowledge, that the latter were apt to have a devitalizing influence, and that they were the enemies of all genuine life and culture. The real hero, he insisted, was guided not by cautious strategic calculations, but by his natural impulses. He assured the dumbfounded Chief of Staff that his attitude was truly heroic, while he complained to Goebbels in a similar pseudo-Nietzschean vein that his generals were devoid of all culture.<sup>44</sup> What he needed, he kept telling his entourage, was not generals whose expertise saw only difficulties and obstacles, but leaders who were hard and brutal, daredevils who could inspire in their men the will to keep fighting against all odds, men, above all, who had faith in him. This type of men he now put into posi-

tions of command in increasing numbers. Traditionalists, on the other hand, he tried to bribe into the acceptance of his views by lavish promotions and monetary gifts.<sup>45</sup>

The old leaders, unable to fathom his thinking, saw in this but another sign of his megalomania, and they do not appear to have changed their views since. There is something pathetic about the German military memoirs which poured forth after the war, for they all seem somehow beside the point. All of these books revolve around the same theme—Hitler's fateful role, his assumption of the direct command of the Army despite his lack of experience, his constant interference, his rigidity, his strategic and tactical blunders. From there they go on to show what could and should have been done in order to avoid the disastrous defeats and catastrophic losses which Hitler, because of his lack of military talent and experience, inflicted on the German forces. To this day these men do not understand why he refused to listen to their cautious suggestion that he appoint an able Chief of Staff who would co-ordinate the activities of all the services and the actions on the various battle fronts and provide him with expert advice.<sup>46</sup>

Hitler knew that military experience as such could no longer help him, and he was much franker than the Army leaders realized when he told them to their faces: "I cannot demand that my generals understand my orders, but I do demand that they follow them."<sup>47</sup> He knew, and they did not realize, that his only hope lay in gaining time. And from this viewpoint, it may be said, his strategy was in all likelihood the most effective one. It is difficult to see in what other way he could have delayed Germany's surrender as long as he did. The argument that a more flexible strategy could have worn down the Soviet forces despite their numerical and material superiority is unconvincing. Those who advance it—Manstein and Westphal, for example—are forced to admit that in view of the ever growing strength of Germany's opponents, the success of the operations which they proposed—withdrawals out of which counterattacks would

then be developed—was quite uncertain. In fact, as F. H. Hinsley has pointed out, it is probable that strategic withdrawals would have hastened Germany's final defeat. "Apart altogether from the political effect of such a policy in Germany and among Germany's satellites," Hinsley notes, "its military consequences, if only because of the saving of effort for the Allies and the more rapid concentration of their strength at Germany's borders, would have been more rapidly disastrous than those which followed on Hitler's choice."<sup>48</sup>

That Hitler succeeded in concealing his true views and intentions so effectively from the military is a remarkable testimony to his power of dissimulation. The Wehrmacht leaders sensed that he was not truthful with them. "We always knew what was expected of us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought or wanted," one admiral testified at Nuremberg. Except for General Heusinger, none of them seems to have realized that his stubbornness and strategic rigidity were as much the result of his increasing desperation as they were an expression of his continued insistence on his "Providential" mission.<sup>49</sup> Had they been better psychologists, they might also have understood that his growing unwillingness to listen to bad news and his refusal to visit the battle fronts or the bombed cities in the Reich were simply attempts to close his eyes to anything which might weaken his determination, and that his outbursts at those who dared to disagree with him were likewise inspired by that inner uncertainty which any pessimistic appraisal of the situation was apt to increase.<sup>50</sup>

Hitler's ability to shield his innermost thoughts from his military leaders also provides a revealing insight into the degree of subordination to which these men had been reduced. The question has often been asked why the generals submitted to his ascendancy, especially after they saw that the war was lost militarily. Trained to obey and maintain discipline, European generals, unlike those in Latin America or the Near East, have



rarely rebelled against their governments, no matter how criminal its actions were or how much they disapproved of its policies. There were other factors which restrained the German generals, such as the fear of precipitating rather than averting the final catastrophe by a revolt. Yet even sustained disagreement was checked by the hold which Hitler, through the dynamism of his personality, had acquired over these men (as over almost everyone else who had more than a fleeting contact with him). This domination was partly the result of the remarkable fascination which seems to have enmeshed so many who came to know him more closely, but it was also, especially in later years, the product of that uninhibited brutality which would shy from nothing and made every opponent realize that any disagreement might cost him his life.<sup>51</sup>

There were, of course, cases in which generals quietly modified, reinterpreted, or altogether ignored Hitler's orders, but it is not without interest in this connection that most of these men held positions which did not bring them into direct contact with him.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, the military leaders of the resistance movement (and except for Schacht, their civilian counterparts as well) were men who had never been in close touch with Hitler and had thus remained relatively immune from the impact of his personality. Even General Beck had been received only twice by the Führer during his four years as Chief of the General Staff.<sup>53</sup> There was, in fact, only one man in Hitler's immediate entourage who dared to counteract his orders and openly tell him so, and this was Albert Speer, his Minister of Armaments Production. But Speer could take such a risk more easily than anyone else; an architect by profession, he enjoyed a privileged position with his fellow architect, Hitler, who, as he blandly told Speer, could not very well have him executed for his disobedience since he was "his artist."<sup>54</sup>

The attempt on Hitler's life, on July 20, 1944, brought on further measures to curtail Army functions. All home defense



organizations were turned over to the Party, and Himmler became the Commander in Chief of the Reserve Army. The new militia, the *Volkssturm*, which was set up that fall for a last-ditch stand, was entrusted to the *Gauleiter*, who were put in charge of the *Volkssturm* forces in their respective districts. They were the ones who selected the leaders of the various units, and here again Party fanaticism was considered more important than military experience. Promotions in the regular Army were now made dependent on the approval of Party authorities, and the Party could also demand the demotion of those whom it considered unreliable. In the appointment and promotion of officers, Party leaders were favored on the grounds that they had already proven their leadership qualifications. The ascendancy of the Party over the Wehrmacht was demonstrated further in Wehrmacht directives which introduced the Nazi salute in the armed forces and ordered military commanders to assign units to propaganda marches and other Party functions if a local Party leader so desired. It culminated in the assigning of party-trained political officers to all military headquarters and ships to check on political attitudes and intensify indoctrination.<sup>55</sup>

The Army came more and more to resemble the Storm Troopers, the so-called political soldiers of the Party, and many of the orders which were now issued to it sounded like those which Hitler had addressed to his brown-shirts in the days of the street fights and beer-hall battles. "Almost four years of an Asiatic war have given the frontline soldier a different face," an order by one Army group commander read, "they have made him hard and fanatic in the struggle against the Bolsheviks . . . . No prisoners are being taken these days. During the eastern campaign the political soldier has gained in strength—that same soldier who was forged in the foxholes of the West [during World War I] and organized the National Socialist front and who knew then, as he knows now, what is at stake; he acts and lives accordingly." This war, the order warned, could not be won by bourgeois

methods. "We can change things only if we set to work with the utmost fanaticism . . . I shall not tolerate any further evasion in this matter." One of Hitler's last orders stated: "National Socialist *Weltanschauung* and political firmness must be applied as the strongest weapons. This requires the strengthening of . . . the National Socialist leadership in the Wehrmacht. The most urgent task of the troop leader is to strengthen the political attitude and the fanaticism of his men; he is directly responsible to me for their National Socialist attitude." And once more he urged all enlisted men to report to Party officials in the armed forces on any inadequacies of their superiors.<sup>56</sup>

Whether the proper National Socialist attitudes were developed and furthered this way, in the face of the imminent total defeat, is doubtful. But these measures served to destroy what little *esprit de corps* still existed in the military and thus helped to make any counteraction seem even more hopeless. Together with special drumhead courts-martial and the terror of the Gestapo, they did subject the Wehrmacht completely to Hitler's will.<sup>57</sup>

Hitler himself seems to have remained hopeful, despite all setbacks, that Providence would somehow come to his rescue, either in the form of a split between East and West, or in that of a new "miracle weapon," or in some entirely unforeseen denouement. For a fleeting moment he may have thought that the death of President Roosevelt marked the turning point of the war.<sup>58</sup> But there was, of course, no escape.

As long as he lived, the fight went on. How completely he had succeeded in subjecting the Wehrmacht to his direct control, Field Marshal Keitel made clear in his testimony at Nuremberg. "After his death," Keitel stated, "the only thing to do was to seek an armistice to save whatever could be saved. But naturally, up until his death, I considered it my greatest task, and so did the others, . . . to relieve Berlin so that he could get out."<sup>59</sup> The Wehrmacht had indeed been reduced to but another of

Hitler's tools, alongside the Party, the S. S., and the Storm Troops, and like them it remained until the end completely at the Führer's personal disposal.

1. He was, for example, extremely reluctant to authorize the invasion of Crete, and despite Malta's strategic importance, rejected all plans proposing the capture of that island. Anthony Martiensen, *Hitler and His Admirals* (New York, 1949), pp. 128-29; B. H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk* (New York, 1948), p. 159.

2. Andreas Dorpalen, "Hitler—Twelve Years After," *Review of Politics*, XIX (1957), 499-501; see also Henry Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-42*, ed. Gerhard Ritter (hereinafter cited as *Tischgespräche*), (Bonn, 1951), July 4, 1942, p. 436.

3. Directive from Hitler, August 17, 1938, *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (hereinafter cited as *IMT Trial*), (Nuremberg, 1947-49), XXVI, 191, 194.

4. Address by Dr. Wilhelm Frick, March 7, 1940, *IMT Trial*, XXXI, 23-24; Siegfried Westphal, *Heer in Fesseln: Aus den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt* (Bonn, 1950), p. 96.

5. Westphal, *op. cit.*, p. 93; affidavits of General Erwin Lahousen, November 30-December 1, 1945, and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, October 19, 1945, in Office of the U. S. Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (hereinafter cited as *Nazi Conspiracy*), (Washington, 1948), VIII, 590, 679. In the few territories in which the military commanders remained in charge of the civil administration, as in France and Belgium, S.S. and other Party organizations received special assignments of their own. Cf. Alexander Freiherr von Neubronn, "Zwischen Hitler und Pétain," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, IV (1956), 239, 242; Ulrich von Hassell, *Vom anderen Deutschland: Aus den nachgelassenen Tagebüchern 1938-1944* (Zurich, 1947), March 8, 1944, p. 351.

6. Letters from Martin Bormann to Alfred Rosenberg, January-April, 1940, *IMT Trial*, XXV, 121-24, 128-30, 202-6; Hassell, *op. cit.*, March 19, 1940, p. 139.

7. General Petzel to Commander of Reserve Army, November 23, 1939, *IMT Trial*, XXXV, 90-91; Hassell, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

8. His earlier actions were, of course, characterized by a similar neglect of military factors. The objections of his generals to his march into the Rhineland and to his annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland had been entirely justified militarily, as Hitler himself knew best. See address by Hitler to commanders in chief, August 22, 1939, *IMT Trial*, XXVI, 340-41; Dorpalen, *op. cit.*, pp. 501-2.

9. Talk made by Hitler to Wehrmacht leaders, May 23, 1939, *IMT Trial*, XXXVII, 548-50, 551, 553; Hitler's address of August 22, 1939, *ibid.*, XXVI, 340, 341, 343; Hitler's address to commanders in chief, November 23, 1939, *ibid.*, XXVI, 335-36; unsigned memorandum (undoubtedly by Hitler, as internal evidence shows), October 9, 1939, *ibid.*, XXXVII, 469-70, 472-73, 474-75; F. H. Hinsley, *Hitler's Strategy* (Cambridge, England, 1951), pp. 9-27. In his speech of May 23, 1939, Hitler declared that he would go to war even if Russia and the

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Western powers concluded the alliance which was then being discussed at Moscow, but it is questionable, of course, whether this was more than a spontaneous outburst.

10. *IMT Trial*, XXVI, 341-42, 330-32, 334; XXXVII, 469, 472, 479, 551. Although Hitler was convinced that time was favoring Germany's opponents, he did not hesitate to assure his military leaders on at least one occasion that it was not (*ibid.*, p. 555).

11. *IMT Trial*, XXVI, 339. The emphasis on political rather than military ability is characteristic of his thinking.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 523.

13. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (New York, 1941), p. 397; his address of March 15, 1929, reprinted in Otto Schüddekopf, *Heer und Republik: Quellen zur Politik der Reichswehrführung: 1918-1933* (Hanover and Frankfurt am Main, 1955), p. 281; his addresses of November 23, 1939, *IMT Trial*, XXVI, 329, and August 22, 1939, *ibid.*, p. 343.

14. Hitler's talk of May 23, 1939, *IMT Trial*, XXXVII, 555-56; Adolf Heusinger, *Befehl im Widerstreit: Schicksalsstunden der deutschen Armee 1923-1945* (Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1950), p. 80.

15. Bernhard von Lossberg, *Im Wehrmachtsführungsstab: Bericht eines Generalstabsoffiziers* (Hamburg, 1950), pp. 29, 39; Franz Halder, *Hitler als Feldherr* (Munich, 1949), p. 27; Helmuth Greiner, *Die oberste Wehrmachtsführung: 1939-1943* (Wiesbaden, 1951), pp. 53-54; Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

16. Hitler's address of November 23, 1939, *IMT Trial*, XXVI, 331-32, 334-36; also memorandum of October 9, 1939, *ibid.*, XXXVII, 469-74.

17. Lossberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-56; Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-14; Greiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100; Heusinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82, 88.

18. For his reasons, see Hans Meier-Welcker, "Der Entschluss zum Anhalten der deutschen Panzertruppen in Flandern 1940," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, II (1954), 274-90, esp. 286-89.

19. Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-33; Lossberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82; Halder, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

20. Martienssen, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 65-91; Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-53; Hinsley, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-85, esp. 82-83.

21. A. Zoller, *Hitler Privat* (Düsseldorf, 1949), pp. 142-43; Otto Dietrich, *12 Jahre mit Hitler* (Munich, 1955), p. 82; *Hitler's Secret Conversations: 1941-1944* (New York, 1953), September 17, October 17, 1941, January 5, 1942, pp. 26-27, 59, 150.

22. Greiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-35, esp. 330-31, 333.

23. In fact, the statement makes sense only as such a *reservatio mentalis*. Otherwise it has actually no meaning at all. For once Russian resistance collapsed, German forces could advance wherever they wanted to, and so there was no need to state that in that case they could advance against both Leningrad and Moscow at the same time. On the other hand, Hitler could not have had in mind a quick collapse of Russian resistance in the Baltic area as a result of a sudden eastward withdrawal of the Soviet forces, because even if that were to occur he still insisted on the capture of Leningrad before there was to be an attack on Moscow. Cf. Hitler's conference with Army leaders, February 3, 1941, *IMT Trial*, XXVI, 394.

24. Hinsley, *op. cit.*, p. 140. Cf. Halder, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 39.
25. *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, July 11, 1941, July 22, August 22, 26, 1942, pp. 7, 476, 534, 536; Zoller, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-59; Ribbentrop, in *IMT Trial*, X, 298; Lossberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-19; Heusinger, *op. cit.*, p. 122.
26. *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, September 17, 27, 1941, pp. 30, 37; Hitler's remark to General Guderian, August 4, 1941, in Heinz Guderian, *Erinnerungen eines Soldaten* (Heidelberg, 1950), p. 172; Dietrich, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
27. *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, September 25, October 13, November 12, 1941, pp. 35, 45, 104. See also memorandum of General Thomas, June 20, 1941, *IMT Trial*, XXVII, 220-21; Heusinger, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
28. Heusinger, *loc. cit.* Cf. General Blumentritt, in Seymour Freiden and William Richardson (eds.), *The Fatal Decisions* (New York, 1958), pp. 82-83.
29. Quoted in Gert Buchheit, *Hitler der Feldherr* (Rastatt, 1958), p. 231. In his endeavor to conceal the seriousness of the situation from the Army, Hitler preferred to discuss the strategic importance of the Caucasus in terms of Russia's rather than Germany's need for its oil. Cf. Heusinger, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
30. By then Hitler had given up his plans for a direct attack on Leningrad; he preferred to starve the city into surrender in the expectation that the Russians would hold out so long that few survivors would remain to be fed after the city's capture. Lossberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-33; Heusinger, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
31. Hitler still refused to send all available forces against Moscow and ordered his Southern Army to advance on the Caucasus with its coveted oil wells.
32. There is now general agreement, however, that, whatever his motives, his decision saved the German forces from almost certain disaster. A retreat in the rigor of the Russian winter, with Russian forces pursuing them, might easily have led to panic and complete annihilation of the German troops. Cf. Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 189; Westphal, *op. cit.*, p. 81; and Blumentritt, in Freiden and Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
33. Halder, *op. cit.*, p. 45; Keitel, affidavit of October 19, 1945, in *Nazi Conspiracy*, VIII, 675.
34. Kurt Assmann, *Deutsche Schicksalsjahre* (Wiesbaden, 1950), pp. 277, 286. In retrospect, some of the German military leaders now believe that the war was lost militarily by the end of 1941 (p. 286). Lossberg, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
35. Louis P. Lochner (ed.), *The Goebbels Diaries: 1942-1943*, (Garden City, 1948), March 20, 1942, p. 136; General Zimmermann, in Freiden and Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 195; *Tischgespräche*, May 9, 1942, p. 80; *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, July 26, August 5, 9, 1942, pp. 482, 499, 506-7; Halder, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-55; Felix Gilbert, *Hitler Directs His War* (New York, 1951), p. 9.
36. Lochner, *op. cit.*, March 9, 1943, p. 285; Hitler's speech of November 8, 1942, quoted in Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York, 1952), p. 630, italics added.
37. Heusinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 168, 200, 267; Lossberg, *op. cit.*, p. 147; Westphal, *op. cit.*, p. 83; Hinsley, *op. cit.*, p. 235.
38. Zoller, *op. cit.*, pp. 115, 196; *Tischgespräche*, December 1, 1941, p. 347; Guderian, *op. cit.*, p. 241; see also *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, December 1, 1941, p. 116; and Dorpalen, *op. cit.*, pp. 499-501.



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39. Order by Keitel, June 11, 1942, *Records of Organizations of the National Socialist German Labor Party*, National Archives Microcopy No. T-81, Roll 2, Frames 12409-11. (These records are cited hereinafter in the following manner: Nazi Party Records, 2/12409-11.)

40. Army order by Colonel General Schoerner, February 1, 1943, *ibid.*, 1/11625.

41. Party directive from Bormann, May 29, 1943, *ibid.*, 1/11639; *Vertrauliche Informationen der Partei-Kanzlei*, No. 21, May 7, 1943, and No. 22, May 11, 1943, Nazi Party Records, 3/62617, 62639; directives from Supreme Command of Armed Forces, May 24, July 10, 1942, *ibid.*, 1/11958-9, 11949. On the status of religion in the Wehrmacht, see also the revealing correspondence reprinted under the title, "Soldatenblätter und Weihnachtsfest," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, V (1957), 297-99.

42. Lochner, *op. cit.*, March 21, 1942, p. 140; affidavit of Keitel, October 19, 1945, in *Nazi Conspiracy*, VIII, 674; directive from Keitel, May 22, 1942, Nazi Party Records, 1/11994-6; Party directive from Bormann, July 4, 1942, *ibid.*, 1/11992-3.

43. Lochner, *op. cit.*, September 23, 1943, p. 476; testimony of Minister Speer, June 19, 1946, *IMT Trial*, XVI, 437-38; testimony of Colonel General Jodl, June 3, 5, 1946, *ibid.*, XV, 307, 401; Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44, 195-96; Lossberg, *op. cit.*, p. 128; Guderian, *op. cit.*, p. 265; testimony of Rundstedt, August 12, 1946, *IMT Trial*, XXI, 50; Buchheit, *op. cit.*, pp. 517-18.

44. Halder, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 49; Lochner, *op. cit.*, March 9, 1943, p. 280; see also Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 43. For a convenient survey of those passages from Nietzsche on which Hitler seized to bolster his argument, see Thomas Mann, "Nietzsches Philosophie im Lichte unserer Erfahrung," *Neue Studien* (Stockholm, 1948), pp. 120-26. In his search for reassurance, Hitler may have read a great deal of Nietzsche during those days, if his recurrent use of Nietzschean terms and phrases is any indication. Cf. *Tischgespräche*, p. 15 and *passim*.

45. *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, November 2, 1941, January 17, 20, 1942, pp. 90, 181, 187, and *passim*; Oron J. Hale, "Adolf Hitler as Feldherr," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXIV (1948), 211-12; Buchheit, *op. cit.*, p. 328; Colonel General Zeitzler, in Freiden and Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

46. See, for example, Erich von Manstein, *Verlorene Siege* (Bonn, 1957), p. 313; Lossberg, *op. cit.*, p. 147; Guderian, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

47. Quoted by Jodl, June 5, 1946, *IMT Trial*, XV, 308.

48. Manstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-10, 402-3; Westphal, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84; Hinsley, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-40. This, of course, does not mean that Hitler did not make grave mistakes in the implementation of his strategy and in the planning of individual operations. See *ibid.*, p. 234, although I am not certain that all of Hinsley's illustrations are valid; Buchheit, *op. cit.*, pp. 398-401.

49. Admiral Schulte-Mönting, May 22, 1946, *IMT Trial*, XIV, 314; affidavit of Keitel, October 10, 1945, *Nazi Conspiracy*, Suppl. B, 1283; Heusinger, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

50. It is significant that after Hitler finally conceded openly, in late April, 1945, that the war was lost, he displayed an unusual serenity and kindness toward his



entourage, evidently because of the relief he felt about not having to pretend and dissimulate any more. Cf. H. R. Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler* (New York, 1947), pp. 122, 136-37. See also Dorpalen, *op. cit.*, pp. 504-5.

51. Testimony of Dönitz, May 9, 1946, *IMT Trial*, XIII, 301; Jodl, June 5, 1946, *ibid.*, XV, 302; Speer, June 20, 21, 1946, *ibid.*, XVI, 492, 493, 533; Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 113; *Tischgespräche*, April 9, 1942, p. 140; Neubronn, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

52. Westphal, *op. cit.*, pp. 194, 196; Guderian, *op. cit.*, p. 138; Lossberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 44, 46, 119; Manstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-77; Heusinger, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

53. Westphal, *op. cit.*, pp. 39, 51.

54. Testimony of Speer, June 20, 1946, *IMT Trial*, XVI, 499-502; Speer to Hitler, March 29, 1945, *ibid.*, XLI, 425-29, esp. 425-26; testimony of Kempf, May 2, 1946, *ibid.*, XLI, 500-507, esp. 504.

55. Decree by Hitler, July 25, 1944, and orders by Bormann, August 23, October 2, 14, 19, November 6, 1944, Nazi Party Records, 1/10821, 10839-40, 11224, 11229-30; Army Personnel Office directive of July 1, 1944, and Wehrmacht order of September 13, 1944, *Vertrauliche Informationen*, No. 23, August 29, 1944, and No. 24, September 13, 1944, Nazi Party Records, 4/62054, 62077; affidavit of Keitel, October 19, 1945, *Nazi Conspiracy*, VIII, 674; Burke Wilkinson, in *New York Times Book Review*, April 5, 1959, p. 14.

56. Order by Field Marshal Schoerner, February 27, 1945, and order by Hitler, March 13, 1945, Nazi Party Records, 5/12944-7, 13031-3.

57. Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 249; Westphal, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-99; Guderian, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-14, 359-60. See also Army directive of August 27, 1944, quoted in Emil Obermann, *Soldaten, Bürger, Militaristen* (Stuttgart, 1958), p. 275; Friedrich Hossbach, "Die Entwicklung des Oberbefehls über das Heer . . . von 1655-1945," *Jahrbuch der Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg/Pr.*, VIII (1958), 253-54.

58. Trevor-Roper, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

59. Testimony of Keitel, October 10, 1945, *Nazi Conspiracy*, Suppl. B, p. 1283.

*The Third Republic and the Generals:  
The Gravediggers Revisited*

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RICHARD D. CHALLENGER

AN EXPOSÉ published some fifteen years ago by André Géraud, writing under the pseudonym of Pertinax, *The Gravediggers of France*, was an angry book; it tore the hides off such figures as Gamelin, Daladier, Reynaud, and Pétain.<sup>1</sup> In the best tradition of Parisian journalism, it cruelly exposed their inadequacies in the Chamber of Deputies, on the battlefield, and in the boudoir.

Since Pertinax published his charges against the French civil

and military leaders, there have been, naturally, many and far more sophisticated interpretations of the French defeat. In the memoirs of General Weygand, for instance, France emerges as the advance guard of a world coalition which had not as yet fully mobilized; lacking space to trade for time, she had inevitably to be sacrificed until the British, the Russians, and the Americans fully woke up to the German threat.<sup>2</sup> Other writers, impressed by the fact that France was not tremendously inferior in quantities of tanks, artillery, and war materiel, have written that, with a little bit of luck and better management—much better management, one should add—the verdict of 1940 could have been different. This sentiment was epitomized a few years ago in the book of a French colonel which bore the title 1940: *La Guerre des occasions perdues*—"The War of Lost Opportunities."<sup>3</sup> More recently, another Parisian journalist, a participant in the 1940 debacle who could never forget the fabled taxis of the Marne of 1914, has written an existentialist diatribe about the defeat, a slam-bang, frequently hilarious book that reaches the conclusion—through invective rather than evidence—that what happened to France was really so completely inexplicable that it was simply absurd.<sup>4</sup>

Even Americans have added interpretations which present the defeat of 1940 in a different light. Paul Kecskemeti, in a study written for the Rand Corporation—a book which, incidentally, drew Congressional fire when it was reported in the press that the Air Force was studying the prospect of an American surrender in some future nuclear war in which we came out second best—has suggested that the French surrender was, in fact, a strategic one. The French, Kecskemeti argues, obtained certain tangible advantages by giving up while they still possessed some residual strength; their continuing control of their fleet, for instance, led Hitler to make concessions. Thus the surrender, at least at the moment of its negotiation, was a realistic solution for the French military plight.<sup>5</sup>

Sufficient space cannot be given in this chapter to a debate

upon the relative merits of these varying points of view. But there is still considerable validity in an approach that returns to the theme of the "gravediggers." As I have tried to point out elsewhere in a more detailed study, the civil and military leaders of France failed to create a theory of warfare that was adequate for the kind of war that Hitler unleashed in the spring of 1940.<sup>6</sup> The same judgment remains pertinent when the French experience is considered in terms of civil-military relations. The Game-lins, Weygands, Daladiers, and Reynauds still emerge as gravediggers—some, to be sure, more well-meaning than others, but gravediggers nonetheless.

### CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN WORLD WARS

Until the spring of 1940 there was simply too much agreement, too much rapport, between French civilian and military leaders on the main lines of national defense policy. Conversely, and ironically, there was far too little agreement between them once the "phony war" had erupted into a German blitzkrieg.

But there was concurrence throughout the 1930's. When Charles de Gaulle, advocate of professional soldiers and, more important, of armored columns, launched his now famous criticism of the French military structure in the mid-thirties, he was opposed not only by the military chiefs but also by the political leaders of the Third Republic. It is relatively easy to criticize Marshal Pétain for the many notorious prefaces which he wrote for other people's books in which he argued that continuous military fronts could not be broken;<sup>7</sup> or to lambaste officers like General Debeney, Chief of Staff in the thirties, who publicly blessed the military status quo.<sup>8</sup> But it is also necessary, while criticizing the military, to make clear that the responsible leaders of French political life—men like Edouard Daladier and Léon Blum, both leaders of major political parties—also wanted no part of the De Gaulle system and rejected it almost out of hand.<sup>9</sup> Between 1919 and 1939, the French built up a military structure

which rested upon a system of universal, and short-term, military service—a system which was heavily dependent upon the recall of reservists in any emergency, which was based upon the assumption that any future European conflict would tend to follow the pattern of the war of 1914–18, and which was, of course, mortgaged to the concrete emplacements of the Maginot Line. The civilian leaders of France had erected this system because it was in accord with their own political and social ideas; the ranking officers had accepted it because it seemed to be in accord with the “lessons” of World War I, particularly with that of the dominance of the defense and defensive weapons.<sup>10</sup>

This system—and the attendant agreement between civil and military—certainly lasted well into the period when Hitler was launching his first attacks against the Versailles system. When the Germans occupied the Rhineland in 1936, General Gamelin informed the French Cabinet that no counteraction was possible without an extensive mobilization of men and resources. He pointed out that the French army was oriented so completely toward defensive operations and relied so heavily upon the recall of reservists that there were insufficient forces for any immediate countermove, even one of a “symbolic” nature. Moreover, Gamelin himself thought that any Franco-German conflict would—even at this date when Hitler’s rearmament was far from complete—turn rather quickly into a military stalemate, with stabilized battle fronts, trench warfare, and most of the other paraphernalia of the war of 1914–18.<sup>11</sup> These recommendations were too much for the Cabinet; it was a caretaker regime, holding office on sufferance until the elections scheduled for later in the spring. But, significantly, the Rhineland debacle failed to create in civilian circles any real questioning of the basic principles of the French military organization. The new Popular Front government, which came to power in the late spring of 1936, did, it is true, begin rearmament and the construction of some armored units. On the whole, however, it was a rearmament carried out within the existing framework of things, one which attempted

little in the way of innovation and which indicated that the politicians agreed with the assumptions of the military. And when, in 1936, the high command published a new edition of its manual dealing with the wartime employment of units the size of a division and larger, the theorists of the general staff emphasized that every improvement in offensive weapons had been matched by comparable improvements in defensive weapons and techniques.<sup>12</sup>

The key civilian policymaker in these years was Edouard Daladier, Minister of National defense after 1936 and, after 1938, also President of the Council of Ministers. That Daladier meant well is beyond question. Moreover, he recognized from time to time that all was not perfection in the French military system. But fundamentally he believed in the prevailing assumptions of the military staff and subscribed to the so-called fire-kills theory, the thesis that a curtain of fire put down from defensive positions like those of the Maginot Line could stop enemy attacks.<sup>13</sup> It was Daladier, for instance, who, on one occasion, sought to reassure Neville Chamberlain that the "lesson" of the Spanish Civil War was that a few machine gunners could still deter enemy movement on the battlefield.<sup>14</sup>

Once World War II began in September, 1939, Daladier and Gamelin appear to have thought alike on the major issue of military policy. Together they worked out plans for a defensive war, a war to be won, eventually, by the Allied blockade, superior economic power, and defensive military operations. The decision to move into Belgium and meet the German attack there—the decision which ultimately led to disaster—was a joint decision. The record of the meetings of the Anglo-French war councils certainly indicates that both Gamelin and Daladier were proceeding upon the same general assumptions.<sup>15</sup>

Indeed, General Gamelin was, and remained, Daladier's "man," and the Premier was always eager to defend his general against critics. During the Norwegian operations, Daladier was forced to give up the premiership, although he continued in the



Cabinet and remained Minister of National Defense. Much of his time was spent in defending Gamelin against the attacks of the new premier, Paul Reynaud, who was eager to remove Gamelin from command. When Reynaud launched an attack upon Gamelin's handling of the Norwegian fiasco, Daladier insisted that Norway was primarily a British show, a matter for the British Admiralty, and that Gamelin could in no way be blamed for Allied misadventures.<sup>16</sup> In short, to try to distinguish between the basic military policies of Gamelin and Daladier is like trying to distinguish between Tweedledee and Tweedledum—and about as intellectually rewarding.

But despite the firm support Daladier gave Gamelin, the overall structure of civil-military relations in France was far from satisfactory. And here—in view of what the French had learned from the experiences of the war of 1914–18—is one of the bitter paradoxes of French military history. After 1918, the French could recall many things which had gone wrong during the course of the war: the long struggle of the legislature to regain some of the authority it had abdicated in August, 1914; the bitter disputes, such as that over Verdun, which had scarred the relationship between government and command; the near tragedy of a divided command which had been remedied only at the last moment by the appointment of Foch. These things and others they set out to correct. In 1921, one of the first reforms was a reorganization of the Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale. The intention was to make it a genuine interdepartmental committee; composed of the leaders of the French government and the ranking officers of the military services, it was to have worked out common solutions for fundamental military problems.<sup>17</sup> By the mid-twenties, the Conseil Supérieur was already beginning to propose specific legislation for the successful prosecution of a future war. Its principal proposal—titled, somewhat grandiosely, the Law for the Organization of the Nation in Time of War—was designed to establish the basic structure of political and military relationships and responsibilities in a future con-

flict. The proposal dealt with recommended procedures for industrial mobilization, provided for the appointment of a Commander in Chief in time of war, and attempted to establish the responsibility of the government for the general conduct of war.

But the National Organization Law was never enacted during the twenties. It failed, not because of any great disagreement over the respective roles of government and military command, but because of its social and economic aspects. The French Senate objected to clauses which appeared to threaten the freedom—and profits—of the entrepreneur in time of war. The Socialists, who originally sponsored the bill, suddenly got cold feet when the Communist deputies attacked it and when the French labor unions began to show little enthusiasm for a law which would subject the worker to the wartime rule of the state. Thus a bill, which originally passed the Chamber of Deputies by a vote of 500 to 31, was pigeonholed for over a decade. Not until July, 1938—only a few short weeks before the Munich crisis—was the National Organization Law resurrected and, finally, enacted; and even then it was subjected to only a rather cursory and inconclusive debate. Few thought to inquire whether the bill was still suited to French defense requirements or needed modification to meet changed circumstances.<sup>18</sup>

What debate there was, served only to underscore the weaknesses in the civil-military structure of France. Some deputies wanted to toughen the National Organization Law by creating a truly unified Ministry of National Defense; their goal was to give the Minister of National Defense real power to control the three military services. As I have noted previously, Edouard Daladier already held that title; he was Minister of National Defense as well as Minister of War. Despite his dual capacity, however, he was only a glorified Minister of War. His authority over the Navy and Air ministries was, at best, only minimal; he could “co-ordinate” their activities but could not control them. But in 1938, Daladier was not interested in adding to his power as Minister of National Defense, and he rejected every

suggestion for a unified defense structure. He argued that such changes would reduce excessively the importance of the separate War, Navy, and Air ministries, and claimed that the necessary co-ordination of the French military effort should be achieved not by the Minister of National Defense but by the Premier. His reluctance to tighten the defense organization was also the result of political considerations, for there were strong groups in the Chamber which did not want the Air Force and the Navy to lose their autonomous status. The Navy, in particular, had its own entrenched supporters. Daladier, therefore, backed off from unification.<sup>19</sup>

There were comparable difficulties in the structure of the military command. Maurice Gamelin was Chief of Staff for National Defense, and would have been in charge of operations if war came. But Gamelin had few powers over the other services and exercised the same sort of vague co-ordination which Daladier had in the ministerial area. Again, when the National Organization Law was under discussion in 1938, some deputies suggested the advisability of naming a supreme commander—of setting up a unified command—well in advance of hostilities. But again Daladier manned the dikes of the status quo. He wanted the conduct of the war to remain in the hands of a committee—the *Comité de Guerre*—composed of civilians as well as of military men. Apparently, he feared that a generalissimo would have too much power and too much authority for such a committee. He was aware, moreover, that unifying the command under Gamelin would provoke a nasty fight with Admiral Darlan and the French Navy. In addition, Daladier distrusted General Georges—the officer next in command to Gamelin—who would have become commander of all French ground forces if the reform had been carried through. Daladier and Georges were, in fact, opposed on many points, and the Premier thought that Georges was feeding military information to his political enemies in the Chamber.<sup>20</sup>

Once the war had started, these conflicts created real trouble.

Daladier began to accumulate offices until he became a sort of Gallic Pooh Bah, the Lord High Everything Else of France. At one and the same time, he was Premier, Minister of National Defense, and Minister of War. In September, 1939, he forced the resignation of Georges Bonnet and became Minister of Foreign Affairs. These were too many hats for any man to wear—certainly too many for Daladier. Yet even with this superabundance of ministerial offices, Daladier's powers as Minister of National Defense were still restricted.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the positions of Generals Gamelin and Georges remained anomalous; the line of demarcation between the responsibilities and powers of the two men was vague and misty, and there was considerable friction between them. At one point Gamelin had to threaten to resign—or rather to retire when he reached the age of sixty-eight in January, 1940—to get clarification. Even so, what emerged was still unsatisfactory, for Daladier refused to hand over the authority to Georges that was needed.<sup>22</sup>

Daladier, of course, continued to defend Gamelin. When Paul Reynaud succeeded him as Premier, as noted earlier, the new head of the government wanted to sack both Gamelin and Daladier. But the Reynaud Cabinet, unfortunately, had a parliamentary majority of only one vote in the Chamber. Reynaud, therefore, if he was to remain in office, had to have the political support of the Radical Socialist party—and Daladier was the head of the Radical Socialists. Thus Daladier remained at the Defense Ministry and Gamelin stayed on as Commander in Chief. Reynaud made several futile attempts to get his Cabinet to approve the removal of Gamelin. The most dramatic of these occurred on the afternoon of May 9, by which time Reynaud was prepared to submit his own resignation as Premier to force the issue. The only thing which saved Gamelin at this point—and saved him for a worse fate, one should quickly add—was that only fifteen hours later Hitler launched his attack on Belgium and Holland. It was obviously impossible for Reynaud to turn

him out at this point and send the Allied armies into the Low Countries with a new Commander in Chief.<sup>23</sup>

Thus when the decisive hour came, the structure of civil-military relations in France was in complete disarray. Gamelin knew full well that neither he nor his plan of operations enjoyed the confidence of the political head of the government. Reynaud had not changed his mind about either Gamelin or Daladier; he continued to tolerate the latter in his Cabinet solely for political reasons, but complained bitterly that Daladier had rigged procedures so that he, although he was head of the government, could not effectively control military policymaking.<sup>24</sup> It was indeed not until the disaster in the Low Countries had become complete that Reynaud was finally able to rid himself of both men.

#### POLITICIANS AND GENERALS IN TIME OF CRISIS

Reynaud's next moves were scarcely an improvement. He brought Marshal Pétain into his cabinet, apparently in the vain hope that the enormous prestige of this legendary figure would improve his own political position, and he appointed Maxime Weygand to the command of the French armies. Both Weygand and Pétain soon decided that France must ask for an armistice, and the stage was quickly set for the last act in the history of the Third Republic.<sup>25</sup>

The story of France's decision when faced with surrendering or continuing the war from North Africa has been told many times with both passion and detail.<sup>26</sup> It is in many ways a classic example of civil disobedience on the part of the military. Starkly put, the issue was: who controls the French state, the civil or the military? When Reynaud suggested imitating the Dutch example and surrendering the armies but continuing the war from overseas, Weygand bluntly rejected a policy which he termed a blot on the honor of the Army and flatly refused to let his armies capitulate in the field. Just as bluntly, he refused to leave the



country, even if, he shouted, his legs were put in irons.<sup>27</sup> Marshal Pétain, a subordinate member of the Cabinet, personally invited the Commander in Chief to attend a Cabinet meeting in order to force the issue of an armistice, and then, in another forcing play, threatened to resign from the Cabinet when the decision was delayed.<sup>28</sup> Other scenes between civil and military leaders occurred when Weygand accused those who wanted to continue the war of practicing mere "verbal heroism" and charged the government with dereliction of duty in ever permitting the nation to go to war.<sup>29</sup>

In this bitter dialogue between civilians and military leaders, Pétain and Weygand made use of arguments which were as much political as military. They not only proffered military advice, but insisted that the politicians must remain in France to retain any authority, that there would be civil disorder and chaos without a surrender, that a move to North Africa would be tantamount to treason against the French people, and that the government share the indignities of defeat and occupation with the civilian populace.<sup>30</sup> Under any definition of the respective wartime roles of the military and civilians, these were political issues, and were matters for the political leadership to decide.

Yet it is equally clear that many of Paul Reynaud's civilian colleagues were persuaded by the various arguments put forth by the military. As Ybarnegary, once considered a leader of the group opposed to surrender, put it: "Since Marshal Pétain and General Weygand show us our duty, we have but to obey . . . . I support the opinion of the military chiefs."<sup>31</sup> The key motion in the Cabinet discussions—the motion which, in fact, confounded Reynaud's plans to fight on from North Africa—was made by Camille Chautemps, the President of the French Senate. Aware of the split within government circles, Chautemps suavely proposed that the Cabinet might at least find out the German terms for an armistice before making a final decision.<sup>32</sup> Nor does Paul Reynaud ultimately emerge as a truly energetic



war leader; he was not a French Churchill but a Gallic Hamlet, a tired and frustrated man who alternated between hope and despair and who, above all, was not the man to say to Weygand and Pétain—as Briand had said to Joffre—"I sack you all on the spot." The British general, Edward Spears, who was in constant touch with Reynaud during the last days of the French defeat, was a harsh critic, but he noted that Reynaud seemed "immensely relieved" when the final decision went against him and he had stepped down in favor of Pétain. "His attitude," Spears later commented, "made me think of a man receiving the condolences of friends at the funeral of a rich uncle."<sup>33</sup> Thus though the issue of the surrender did pose bedrock, fundamental questions of civil-military relations, in the last analysis the death of the Third Republic was not so much a murder at the hands of the generals as it was a mutual suicide pact.

With the passage of time, there has been a softening of the stereotypes of the "good" Frenchmen who joined De Gaulle in England and the "bad" Frenchmen who surrendered. There was, after all, such a phenomenon as "limited collaboration," an attempt to strike a balance between England and Germany. Weygand, after 1940, certainly played an honorable role in the maintenance of North Africa, and even Pétain had no intention of giving up the French fleet but used it to try to obtain better terms for his country.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, it is now easier to appreciate the fact that, for the French military leaders, any decision to fight on from North Africa involved a radical act of the will for which few, if any, were intellectually prepared. It is at least understandable that French military men, nurtured as they were in the Continental tradition, would recoil from the North African alternative, would not be ready for what they considered "a flight into the unknown."<sup>35</sup> Finally, it was not wholly irrational, in June, 1940, to think that England would also go down to defeat, notwithstanding the promises and pledges of Winston Churchill. One does not have to endorse the Anglophobe views of these French military men who spoke disparagingly of union with

Britain as a merger with a corpse, or who proclaimed, almost with relish, that England would have her neck wrung like a chicken within three weeks. Still there was logic in the belief that there was little hope in relying upon an immediate change in British military fortunes.

Thus the action of the French military leaders in forcing an armistice no longer seems so reprehensible as Americans and Englishmen once thought it was. There may have been immediate advantages to an armistice and some logical reasons for it. Yet the military cannot be completely exonerated, and there are several practical difficulties which prevent acceptance of their arguments. In the first place, far too many of their arguments are *ex post facto*, rationalizations worked out in later years to justify the actions of 1940. Secondly, and more important, the military men who advocated an armistice were defeatists, pure and simple, and theirs was the philosophy of *sauve qui peut*. To put it bluntly, they simply wanted to quit, to salvage what they could out of a war for which they had no enthusiasm. General Weygand, as Stuart Hughes has pointed out, was governed by a narrow moral code—the code of the professional soldier, according to which the honor of the Army was the foremost consideration and capitulation in the field simply a blot upon that honor.<sup>36</sup> In some respects, too, the Weygands and the Pétains bear a resemblance to the German generals who could work for Hitler while the going was smooth but who did not begin to see Hitler as wicked until Germany herself began to suffer; that is to say, the outlook of all of these men was purely nationalistic, and the nation and its interests formed the farthest horizon of their thinking. To Weygand and Pétain, for instance, the French pledge to Great Britain meant nothing; England, according to their interpretation, had deserted at Dunkirk, had failed to send the RAF, and—Pétain laid it on the line—“since England got us into this mess, it is up to us to get out.”<sup>37</sup>

Back of this attitude was, of course, the age-old distrust of French military men for the political institutions of their country.

There is neither space nor reason to rehearse the long and frequently bitter debate—running from the time of Alfred Dreyfus and before—between the officer corps and the politicians of the Third Republic. There was, it is true, agreement between the Daladiers and the Gamelins during the thirties. Still there lurked beneath the surface a military suspicion of the Republic and its works. There was loyalty to the nation, loyalty to France, but not loyalty to the Republic, least of all to the regime of the moment. Thus Weygand could cruelly ask Reynaud what possible authority the Premier could exercise from North Africa since he would represent, Weygand charged, just “one of those ephemeral governments of which the Third Republic has already had more than one hundred in the seventy years of its existence.”<sup>38</sup> In company with Pétain, Weygand muttered that the defeat should be blamed not on the generals but on the schoolmasters who had failed to inculcate proper ideals into the young men of France.<sup>39</sup> Even Gamelin, on the day before his relief from command, spent long hours preparing a report in which he blamed the disaster in large part on the weakening of the moral fiber of the nation and its youth.<sup>40</sup> In short, at the time of ultimate decision, the Weygands and Pétains were ready to ditch the Third Republic, replacing it with a new, reformed structure that would approximate Pétain’s idea of a political order based on *patrie, famille, travail*. To these men Marianne was threadbare, and a slattern; she should be replaced by a more respectable and virtuous young lady.

### AN EVALUATION

It is difficult to maintain that France’s fate in 1940 stemmed from the controversies between Reynaud and his military leaders; that is, from the failure to solve the problem of civil-military relations. Perhaps this statement merely reflects increasing cynicism about the death throes of French governments; but the current regime is, after all, the Fifth Republic, and, in the down-

fall of the Fourth, the generals—this time, ironically, already in North Africa—performed a hatchet job that puts the Pétains and Weygands to shame. It can be argued, that the French decision not to go to North Africa in 1940 had important consequences for the entire war;<sup>41</sup> but it is difficult to be positive about this, for the imponderables are great, ranging from the question of Hitler's strategy to the attitude which men like Franco and Roosevelt would have taken. On the other hand, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that the French people, as well as their generals, were through. Alexander Werth, always an acute observer of the French scene, has noted the complete demoralization of the French in June, 1940, and underscored the fact that, while a few politicians wanted to continue the fight from North Africa, "to the shopkeeper of Tours, to the farmer of the Limoges, and to the winegrower of the Midi, it was all remote and unrealistic." The disagreements between Reynaud and Gamelin, the ridiculous powers exercised by Daladier, the confusion of the Ministry of National Defense, the contradiction within the command structure—these, at best, were marginal factors in the fall of France. That defeat was sealed long, long before the spring of 1940—the product of two decades of sterile military thought, the diplomatic failures of France and Britain that stretched back over many years, the chronic weakness of the French political structure, and the tumult created by the Popular Front. The French disaster was, in short, not just a matter of civil-military relations: it was the cumulative result of the totality of French history from one World War to another.

1. New York, 1943.

2. Maxime Weygand, *Rappelé au service* (Paris, 1950), pp. 6–7, 275.

3. Adolphe Goutard, 1940; *La Guerre des occasions perdues* (Paris, 1956).

4. Jean Dutourd, *The Taxis of the Marne* (New York, 1957).

5. Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender* (Stanford, 1958), pp. 31–70, esp. 69–70.

6. Richard D. Challener, *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866–1939* (New York, 1955), pp. 257–77.

7. See Pétain's preface to Colonel P. Vauthier, *La Doctrine de guerre du General Douhet* (Paris, 1935), and to General Narcisse Chauvineau, *Une Invasion: Est-il encore possible?* (Paris, 1939).

8. Marie Eugène Debeney, "Encore l'armée de métier" and "La Motorisation des armées modernes," *Revue des deux mondes*, XXVIII (July 15, 1935), 279-95; XXXII (March 15, 1936), 273-91.

9. *Journal Officiel, Chambre des Députés, Débats*, March 15, 1935, pp. 1023-27, 1048. See also Charles de Gaulle, *The Call to Honor* (New York, 1955), pp. 20-21.

10. Challener, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-83, 215-56.

11. See Commission d'enquête parlementaire, *Les Evénements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945, Rapport de M. Charles Serre* (Paris, 1951), I, 46-54. See also *ibid.*, Témoignages et documents, III, 583, 604 ff. For other versions, P.-E. Flandin, *Politique française, 1919-1940* (Paris, 1947), pp. 195-99; Maurice Gamelin, *Servir* (Paris, 1946-47), I, 199-219; Paul Reynaud, *La France a sauvé l'Europe* (Paris, 1947), I, 353-56.

12. Ministère de la Guerre, *Instructions sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités* (Paris, 1936), pp. 17-20.

13. British Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, ed. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London, 1946-52), 3rd series, I (1938), 205-7.

14. Irving Gibson, "Maginot and Liddell Hart," in *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, 1943), p. 374; Reynaud, *op. cit.*, I, 402 ff.

15. Gamelin, *op. cit.*, III, 106-15, 135-48; Reynaud, *op. cit.*, II, 589 ff.

16. Reynaud, *op. cit.*, II, 22-43, 51-54; Paul Baudouin, *The Private Diaries (March 1940 to January 1941) of Paul Baudouin* (London, 1948), p. 25.

17. J. Vial, "La Défense nationale: Son organisation entre les deux guerres," *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, XVIII (April, 1955), 12-13; Commandant A. L., "Le Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale et la 'guerre totale,'" *Revue politique et parlementaire*, CXX (August 10, 1924), 199-218.

18. For a more extended discussion, see Challener, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-214, 234-41.

19. Vial, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19; Jean Fabry, "La Défense nationale," *Revue militaire générale*, II (January, 1938), 19-30; General Paul Azan, "L'Organisation de la défense nationale," *Revue militaire générale*, II (March, 1938), 253-58.

20. See, in addition to works previously cited, Pertinax, *op. cit.*, p. 39; Commission d'enquête, *op. cit.*, II, 254; Reynaud, *op. cit.*, I, 452 ff.; Gamelin, *op. cit.*, I, 53 ff.

21. Vial, *op. cit.*, p. 32. See also the excellent critique of Daladier in Gordon Wright, "Ambassador Bullitt and the Fall of France," *World Politics*, X (October, 1957), 63-90.

22. A. Russner, "La Réorganisation du Haut-Commandement au mois de mai 1940," *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, Nos. 10 and 11 (June, 1953), pp. 49 ff.; Gamelin, *op. cit.*, I, 67-71.

23. Baudouin, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26; Reynaud, *op. cit.*, II, 51-54.

24. Baudouin, *op. cit.*, p. 30.



### THE THIRD REPUBLIC AND THE GENERALS

25. Philip Bankwitz, "Maxime Weygand and the Fall of France: A Study in Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXI (September, 1959), 225-42. I am deeply indebted to this article, an earlier version of which was read at the meeting of the Society for French Historical Studies at Duke University in February, 1958. A companion piece, "The Taxis of the Marne and the Fall of France," read by John C. Cairns at the same meeting, was also of great value.

26. In addition to the works cited of Reynaud, Weygand, Baudouin, and others, see Robert Aron, *The Vichy Regime, 1940-1944* (London, 1958), pp. 3-67; Benoist-Méchin, *Soixante jours qui ébranlèrent l'occident* (2 vols.; Paris, 1956); Louis Marin, "Gouvernement et commandement (mai-juin 1940)," *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, VIII (October, 1952), 1-28.

27. Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 24; Weygand, *op. cit.*, pp. 155, 170-71.

28. Baudouin, *op. cit.*, p. 115; Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

29. Baudouin, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

30. For a good summary of these arguments, see Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 ff.

31. Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

32. Baudouin, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

33. General E. L. Spears, *Assignment to Catastrophe* (New York, 1955).

34. Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

35. Bankwitz, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

36. H. Stuart Hughes, "The Problem of Limited Collaboration," *Confluence*, III (June, 1954), 171-83.

37. Baudouin, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

38. Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 84; Baudouin, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

40. Gamelin, *op. cit.*, I, 357; III, 425.

41. See the excellent summary of the question in André Truchet, *L'Armistice de 1940 et l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, 1955).



## *Political Problems of a Coalition Command*

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FORREST C. POGUE

FERDINAND FOCH, who learned the difficulties of leading Allied armies more than forty years ago, once summed up his views on the subject after reading a paper by a young French officer, Charles de Gaulle, which criticized leadership in World War I. "There will never be an interallied command in a true sense," declared the Marshal, "unless you can make it a coalition of disinterested parties."<sup>1</sup> The Marshal's remarks doubtlessly reflected his reactions to the problems he met in attempting to translate the will of the various allied countries into one effective

course of action. It is probable that he would have been amazed at the tasks of the coalition commander in World War II. In addition to making decisions on operations—to an extent often underrated—the Supreme Commander also had to consider the national interests of the members of his coalition and to take cognizance of the diplomatic implications of his campaigns. To a greater extent than in the past, the allied commander had to appeal for political action by the heads of his and other governments to support his operations.<sup>2</sup>

The important contribution of General Dwight D. Eisenhower to victory in Europe has been minimized by many British and American critics in recent years. Much of this criticism undoubtedly originated in dissatisfaction with the foreign and domestic policies of Eisenhower as President, and has been expressed in terms that suggest that his role in World War II was rather unimportant, requiring mainly an easy affability and ready smile. As a result, the complexities of the problems the Supreme Commander faced and resolved so successfully have been underestimated.

In framing the coalition, Great Britain and the United States—later joined by France—agreed on the immediate objectives they would seek: the destruction of Hitler and his system, and the liberation of the occupied countries of the West. Beyond these aims each party had special interests of its own. Unfortunately, neither side made clear in advance the nature of these interests which, because they remained unsettled, became a source of misunderstanding and difficulty.

Many of the political problems relating to grand strategy were determined at levels above the Supreme Commander, who was called on, however, for statements of his requirements. At times, as in the debates over operations in southern France, he represented the United States Chiefs of Staff in discussions with the British Chiefs of Staff. Or, on occasion, he served as an intermediary between Churchill and his advisers and the Americans. These were peripheral matters so far as General Eisenhower was

concerned, but, as Ehrman has written, the "necessity on the one hand to combine Allied forces of all Services on a basis of Allied and Service equality, and on the other to reconcile Allied interests within a theatre (neither of which applied in the same degree in the Pacific), meant that many and diverse lines of responsibility converged upon the Supreme Commander himself."<sup>3</sup>

### STRENGTHENING THE INVASION

Some of the Supreme Commander's chief political problems before D-Day arose when he sought governmental approval for unpopular political measures needed to insure the success of the Normandy landings. In some cases he asked British sanction for measures which they had already declined to adopt at the request of their own commanders. Sometimes he found that his pleas, even when backed by the American Chiefs of Staff, were insufficient to move the President to accept political arrangements which he did not like.

In the spring of 1944, as the time approached for the concentration of Allied troops in the coastal areas of southern and eastern England for final invasion preparations, British and American commanders warned that operational security was threatened by the freedom of civilians to visit vital port areas. Earlier efforts to get a ban had been unavailing. In March, after General Montgomery pressed the Supreme Commander for action, Eisenhower warned the British military and political authorities that it would "go hard with our consciences in later years" if they needlessly compromised operations by failing to act promptly. In the face of possible heavy loss of lives—a possibility which was to be alluded to again on later occasions—the British War Cabinet announced that a ban on visitors would be imposed in important coastal areas of the United Kingdom.<sup>4</sup>

In asking for the visitor's ban, the Supreme Commander sought a measure which might cause great domestic resentment against the British government. In requesting a ban on diplo-

matic correspondence sent in code to and from the United Kingdom by representatives of foreign countries, and in seeking British authorization of a plan for bombing railways which might result in heavy losses of civilian lives in France, he asked for British approval of actions which might damage Great Britain's relations with France and other friendly countries for years to come. But, since he felt that both were essential to the success of his operations, he urged them on the British. The Foreign Office and the War Office, reluctant to impose censorship on coded messages of foreign diplomats, postponed a decision until the Supreme Commander described this possible source of leakage as "the gravest risk to the security of our operations." Almost at once the War Cabinet took the action required. As the Foreign Office had feared, protests flowed in and the French Committee in Algiers ordered General Pierre Koenig, its representative in London, to suspend negotiations then in progress with SHAEF.<sup>5</sup>

Political objections to the transportation bombing scheme, a plan presented and firmly backed by air leaders at SHAEF, were even stronger than those to censorship. In addition to the doubts of some British and American military and civilian leaders as to the value of the plan, there was the fear of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office that there would be serious reactions from the French population as a result. To Churchill's vigorous protests, General Eisenhower replied that the difficulties of the invasion had been accepted only because of the belief that Allied air superiority would make feasible an operation which might otherwise be considered foolhardy. When alternate plans were suggested by British officials and forwarded to President Roosevelt, the Supreme Commander countered by saying that there was no other way the air force could help his units "get ashore and stay there."<sup>6</sup> With the aid of the British Chief of the Air Staff, and the assurances of General Koenig that the French would accept twice the number of anticipated casualties to be rid of the Germans, the SHAEF leaders won Churchill's reluctant

approval. The Prime Minister insisted that casualties be held below ten thousand; and as late as the week before D-Day, he urged Air Chief Marshal Tedder, deputy commander of SHAEF, to watch the casualty reports, adding that he feared that they were "piling up an awful load of hate."<sup>7</sup> In view of this strong opposition, it is doubtful whether anything less than the firm insistence of the Supreme Commander, coupled with his dire warnings as to the consequences of failure to use the air force to prepare the way to Normandy, would have wrung this concession from the British leader.

### EARLY PHASES OF THE INVASION

The President was either not asked to express an opinion on the political matters discussed in the last section, or he declined to intervene. However, on several major political questions handled by SHAEF, such as the proposed modification of the unconditional-surrender formula and the recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as the provisional government of France, he was the chief political figure concerned. In these two matters, he proved to be more intractable than Churchill had been earlier.

As early as January, 1944, SHAEF leaders stated that their psychological-warfare organization needed something more attractive than the unconditional-surrender formula to offer the Germans. As a minimum change, they asked permission to distinguish between the German leaders and the German people in SHAEF propaganda aimed at the enemy. Prompted, perhaps, by this view, the American Chiefs of Staff in March, 1944, requested the President to restate the formula in a manner that would reassure the German people. In reply, the President simply suggested that matters be allowed to stay as they were for the moment.<sup>8</sup> General Eisenhower and his Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, took up the matter in mid-April with Undersecretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., when he



visited London. When Secretary of State Hull was informed of these views, he reported that the President was holding firmly to his position. The Supreme Commander, in urging a modification of the formula, said that he recognized fully that the terms of capitulation must include the surrender of the Axis armed forces and the handing over of designated military and political leaders for trial. Whether these or other statements influenced the President is not clear, but he did agree shortly before D-Day that a declaration be addressed to the Germans stressing mainly the inevitability of their defeat. Churchill opposed this action on the ground that any statement which failed to list German war crimes would be attacked later by the enemy as evidence of Allied bad faith, and that anything which did list them would frighten them more than the existing formula. "Justice will have to be done," said Churchill, "and retribution will fall upon the wicked and the cruel."<sup>9</sup> Thus the Allied landings in Normandy took place without any concrete statement of war aims.

After D-Day, the Supreme Commander on several occasions attempted without success to get a statement from the President and Prime Minister which would aid his psychological-warfare campaign in Germany. In matters involving ultimate war aims, however, he seemed unable to get concessions which would aid his operations. It was less easy, of course, than it had been in the cases of censorship and the bombing of railroads to show clearly that failure to adopt his recommendations might result in heavy losses. Both the President and Prime Minister felt strongly that the definition of war aims was peculiarly the province of the heads of governments, and they were not swayed by the Supreme Commander's arguments.

General Eisenhower's efforts to get the Allies to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as the provisional government of France—or at least to recognize some civil body with which he might deal in liberated France—met with similar political difficulties. The French leader's insistence on recognition for his Committee, his suspicions of President Roosevelt,



his readiness to take offense at real and fancied slights, all led to friction. The situation was made no easier by the President's irritation with De Gaulle's actions and his fear that the French Committee might be forced on an unwilling people by the Allied armies. Although General Eisenhower and many of his advisers had experienced the De Gaulle temperament in North Africa, they did not share the President's strong distrust of the French leader. In January, 1944, General Smith made clear that while he was not a Gaullist, he could see no better instrument than the French Committee for dealing with liberated France. He and other SHAEF officers were dismayed when, on the eve of invasion, De Gaulle broke off negotiations which concerned later co-operation in the liberated areas. They were annoyed when he caused difficulties over the address he was to make on D-Day in support of the Allied effort. Only after much persuasion did he agree to appeal to the French people and then in terms which stressed their obligations to the French Committee rather than to the Allied Command.<sup>10</sup>

Smarting under the Allied decision to print "invasion" currency for the use of the Allied troops in liberated France, General de Gaulle denounced the money and, as a means of protest, ordered French liaison officers who had been trained to work with Allied units not to accompany them to Normandy. General Eisenhower brought this problem and others to the attention of the American Chiefs of Staff when they visited the invasion area in early June. They immediately warned the President that the situation was unhappy at best and potentially dangerous in that it could have a bad effect on the co-operation of the French Resistance with Eisenhower's forces.<sup>11</sup> Fortunately, despite De Gaulle's tendency to exaggerate his grievances, he was willing to let French representatives such as General Koenig make working agreements with the SHAEF officials. Also, it was clear that he was able to work with the Supreme Commander. Speaking to the French Consultative Assembly in Algiers shortly after the Normandy landings, De Gaulle assured the members that the

French Committee had complete confidence in General Eisenhower "for the victorious conduct of common military operations."<sup>12</sup> The manner in which President Roosevelt came at last to accept the French Committee of National Liberation as the provisional government of France need not concern us here. But it is evident that the Supreme Commander's insistence on the recognition of some civil authority with which he could deal in the orderly development of his military operations influenced the President's final action.

## THE GROUND COMMAND AND THE BROAD-FRONT STRATEGY

Besides being involved in political decisions which were important to the success of the landings and the early phases of the invasion, the Supreme Commander was concerned with political problems which arose over command during the later course of the war. These problems accompanied shifts in the ground command and threatened to interfere with the real control of national forces committed to his charge.

National feeling over command was evident in the early planning. The final arrangement for the first phase of the invasion stipulated that General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, Twenty-first Army Group commander, co-ordinate Allied operations until it was necessary to bring an American army group to France. The Supreme Commander would then decide on the time at which it would be proper for him to assume direct control of the Allied ground forces. This was well understood and accepted before the invasion; but when the shift in command was actually carried out, controversies arose which have not yet subsided.

Field Marshal Montgomery, in his memoirs, confuses the issue relative to Eisenhower's assumption of direct command of the ground forces on September 1, 1944, by asking, "Why should we throw everything away for reasons of American public opinion and American electioneering [1944 was a Presidential election year]?" In suggesting that the command change and the broad-

front strategy, which also came into play at this time, were dictated by American politics, he assigns a motive for which there is no evidence, and he reduces the opposition to his own plans to nothing more than the requirements of a Presidential campaign. There was national feeling, but it arose from other factors. Montgomery overlooks the fact that at SHAEF and in the United States—and even in Great Britain—there was mounting criticism of his “undue slowness” around Caen. He seems unaware of American irritation over the fact that Patton’s armored drives were often publicized under such captions as “Montgomery’s armor speeds through France.” An outburst in some British papers in mid-August over the hint of a possible change in the ground command was followed by criticisms in some American papers of a command structure which purportedly reduced Eisenhower to the status of a figurehead. General George C. Marshall, the American Chief of Staff, cabled the Supreme Commander that he and Secretary Stimson, and apparently all Americans, believed it was time for Eisenhower to take direct command in the field—at least of the American forces.<sup>13</sup>

To Montgomery and his faithful adherents, the September shift in command and the adoption of the broad-front strategy prevented victory in 1944 and led to additional Allied losses. The Prime Minister was so concerned over possible British reactions to the change that he arranged in late August for Montgomery’s promotion to field marshal to be announced on the day of Eisenhower’s assumption of the ground command. He made it clear to Eisenhower that this new rank would make no difference in Montgomery’s relations with the Supreme Commander or with Bradley, adding that “it was a necessary concession to British opinion.”<sup>14</sup> The necessity for the change in command is explained by a British official historian, John Ehrman. After noting that feeling in the United States and Great Britain, “fanned by discussion at the time of Caen,” was already sensitive on the subject, he writes:

To perpetuate Montgomery's sole command of the land operations, for which the original plan had not allowed, to halt Patton in full spate, and to leave the armies from southern France with virtually nothing to do, might be to sacrifice the amity of the command—possibly of the Alliance—to a controversial venture which might well not succeed . . . .<sup>15</sup>

But the debate over command was not ended. In October, after Arnhem had failed to produce the results for which Montgomery had hoped, and when he seemed to be slighting efforts to open the Antwerp port for further operations toward the Rhine, command and strategy again became subjects for heated discussion. The British commander spoke of the unfortunate results which had followed the change in command in September, and asked not only for a northern thrust toward Berlin, but for command arrangements which would give him greater flexibility—something approaching control of a great part of the Allied effort. Eisenhower responded at length that he was well aware of the powers and limitations of an Allied command and that if Montgomery, as the senior commander in the theater of one of the great Allies, felt that "my conceptions and directives are such as to endanger the success of operations, it is our duty to refer the matter to higher authority for any action that [they] may choose to take, however drastic." Eisenhower's intimation of his readiness to submit the problem for a high-level political decision was followed by the Field Marshal's assurance that he and his subordinates would give unqualified backing to Eisenhower's wishes.<sup>16</sup>

The threat of a showdown temporarily ended talk of an overall ground command; but at the end of November, after several weeks of stalemate along much of the front, the Field Marshal proposed the appointment of one commander for the area north of the Ardennes. His suggestion was accompanied by strong reservations concerning current Allied strategy, a topic on which Churchill now voiced his fears to the President. Roosevelt, fol-

lowing his typical line in such matters, replied that "it seems to me that the prosecution and outcome of the battles lie with our Field Commanders in whom I have every confidence."<sup>17</sup> The matter was therefore dropped for the time being.

In December, the question of command was again raised sharply when the German breakthrough in the Ardennes seriously threatened to weaken the Supreme Commander's position. When General Eisenhower temporarily placed Field Marshal Montgomery in charge of all forces north of the Ardennes, including two American armies, it appeared that the British commander had won. Indeed, prolonged enemy success might have forced a permanent change in the ground command. In discussing future operations against the Germans at the end of December, Montgomery pressed his proposal for placing the offensive north of the Ardennes under one commander. Hints in the British newspapers that this suggestion might be accepted brought Eisenhower a strong protest from General Marshall, who declared:

My feeling is this: that under no circumstances make any concessions of any kind whatsoever. You not only have our complete confidence but there would be a terrific resentment in this country following such action. I am not assuming that you had in mind such a concession. I just wish you to be certain of our attitude on this side. You are doing a fine job and go on and give them hell.<sup>18</sup>

With this firm backing from Washington, the Supreme Commander informed the Field Marshal that he would leave one of the American armies with him because of military necessity and as evidence of confidence in him, but that he would go no further. He added significantly that he would deplore the development of such "an unbridgeable gulf of convictions between us that we would have to present our differences to the CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff]." Montgomery's Chief of Staff, General Francis de Guingand, aware that Eisenhower's advisers at SHAEF were urging him to force a showdown, warned his



superior that in such a situation someone would have to go and it would not be Eisenhower. Montgomery, apparently surprised at this depth of feeling, wrote Eisenhower that he was sure there were many factors which had a bearing beyond anything he had realized, and added: "Whatever your decision may be you can rely on me one hundred percent to make it work and I know Brad will do the same."<sup>19</sup> According to Montgomery, this exchange finished the issue of operational control so far as he was concerned since he knew it would be useless to open it again.

Montgomery may have been silenced on the subject, but the Prime Minister made one more effort to change the command structure. In mid-February, he suggested that Air Marshal Tedder, the deputy Supreme Commander, might be needed in another post and asked if Eisenhower would accept Field Marshal Alexander in his place. Eisenhower replied that he would be willing to have Alexander as a replacement for Tedder, but not as the commander of a separate headquarters which would be placed between SHAEF and the army group commanders. He warned that if the change were made and the newspapers described Alexander as the new ground commander, he would be forced to issue a statement which might stir new controversies. In early March Field Marshal Montgomery strengthened Eisenhower's stand by asking that command arrangements be allowed to remain as they were lest changes raise a storm which would hold everything back. On March 5, the Prime Minister agreed that the decision regarding command arrangements should belong to the Supreme Commander; and the situation was left as it had been in January—with Montgomery keeping the Ninth U. S. Army in his Army Group until the Rhine crossing, and with Bradley free to develop his offensive as he saw fit.<sup>20</sup>

Debates as to the wisdom of General Eisenhower's assumption of direct command in September, 1944, and his later refusals to accept a ground commander will probably never end. But there was far more involved in his decision than the Field Marshal has suggested in his writings. Michael Howard, in re-



viewing Montgomery's *Memoirs* in the *New Statesman*, put his finger on the main issue in this statement:

There comes a point in the conduct of strategy—and in particular in the conduct of allied strategy—when calculations valid at a lower level of command no longer entirely apply; when conditions other than military have to be taken into account and the problems of personal, party or national susceptibilities can no longer be brushed aside. To cope with such problems the qualities of a statesman, or at the very least of a diplomat, are as necessary as those of a soldier; and these qualities the Field Marshal signally failed to acquire . . . .<sup>21</sup>

Certainly the final decision was mixed strongly with national feelings on both sides—the desire of the British to have another great victory led by a British commander and the feeling of the Americans that their armies were most effectively employed by an American commander. British and American commanders found good strategic reasons for backing a major offensive on their particular fronts. After the first weeks in Normandy, the position of the Field Marshal grew weaker as the British contribution in men—which could not be increased materially—was overshadowed by the arrival of more and more divisions from the United States. It would have been possible for him to play a leading role only if the Supreme Commander, who was also the U. S. Commander of the European Theater, had allocated American troops and supplies to him for his operations. Because of some valid doubts concerning his proposals and the strong opposition of American commanders to the large-scale transfer of their units to him, Montgomery was certain to be disappointed unless the heads of government or the Combined Chiefs of Staff overrode the Supreme Commander. The Field Marshal suggests that Eisenhower's indecision led him to accept a faulty ground strategy. But one may wonder how effective a British ground commander would have been in trying to impose a narrow-front strategy on General Bradley and General Patton, who were backed by General Marshall.

## CONTROL OVER FRENCH FORCES

In the debates which arose between SHAEF and British leaders, the issues were settled within the Command. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff made representations to Eisenhower and to American officials, but they gave no orders to Montgomery, nor did he decline to accept orders which he disliked. When the debate was ended, the Field Marshal accepted the verdict. In the case of the French forces, however, the situation was quite different. General de Gaulle frequently issued direct orders to French troops that had been assigned to Eisenhower's command, and the French commanders were disposed to question some of the Supreme Commander's directives.

French troops, equipped by the United States, were placed at the disposition of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be used, under the Allied Commander in Chief, for specified operations in northwest Europe after it was agreed that they would have a key role in the operations in southern France and would be represented by at least a token force in Normandy. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were unwilling, however, to permit the French to reserve the right to intervene with the British and American governments for the purpose of making certain that French interests would be taken into account. President Roosevelt instructed General Marshall to arrange for such matters to be handled between the French and Allied military authorities, and this, in a sense, invited General de Gaulle to cause difficulties for SHAEF.<sup>22</sup>

De Gaulle's initial intervention in operational matters came, as we have seen, in the first stages of the invasion when he forbade French liaison officers to accompany Allied units to which they had been assigned. The first serious clash of authority came, however, as a reaction to General Eisenhower's order to General Devers, Sixth U. S. Army Group commander, at the beginning of January, 1945, to withdraw his forces from Strasbourg in order to shorten his line and form a reserve to meet a German attack

in Alsace. General Juin, Chief of Staff of the French Ministry of National Defense, protested the order on political and military grounds, and warned that French troops might be taken from Eisenhower's control if he insisted on his order. The French military governor of Strasbourg declined to obey without a direct order from the French authorities. Meanwhile, General de Gaulle informed the Supreme Commander that he was ordering General de Lattre, First French Army commander, to hold his position and protect Strasbourg even if the Americans withdrew. He followed this with direct appeals to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. The President replied that it was a military matter which should be taken up with Eisenhower; Churchill announced his intention of flying to Supreme Headquarters. On the afternoon of his arrival, the Supreme Commander decided to modify his order "to the extent of merely swinging the Sixth Corps back from its left resting in the Vosges and its right extending southward generally toward Strasbourg." Churchill approved the new arrangement, which resulted in Strasbourg's being held, and said that he could understand the concern of the French leaders over the possible severe political repercussions of a withdrawal.<sup>23</sup>

French pride and prestige were likewise involved in De Gaulle's intervention in military operations in and around Stuttgart. The failure of the Allied leaders in the weeks following Yalta to announce a specific zone of occupation in Germany for France both angered and alarmed De Gaulle. He pressed General de Lattre to cross the Rhine as soon as possible, saying it was of the greatest importance to the French national interest. In this state of anxiety, he created an incident over the city of Stuttgart. The city was taken by French troops near the end of April, with the understanding that it would be turned over to the Seventh U. S. Army for use in its main line of communications. De Gaulle, however, notified General de Lattre that Stuttgart had now become a political matter, and that he proposed to hold the city until the Allies gave him some satisfaction concerning an occupation zone. When General Devers invited De Lattre for a

second time to hand over the city, General de Gaulle ordered the French army commander to establish a military government in Stuttgart.<sup>24</sup>

Eisenhower was deeply concerned over De Gaulle's use of the control of French troops to gain political concessions from the British and American governments. But he informed General de Gaulle that he would accept the situation since he was unwilling to withhold supplies or take other actions which would affect the fighting strength of the First French Army. Though he was unwilling to start a quarrel that would weaken the bonds of national friendship, he added that he believed De Gaulle's issuance of direct orders to the French army commander on political grounds ran counter to the initial understanding by which the troops had been equipped and placed under his command. He felt it his duty, therefore, he told De Gaulle, to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he could no longer count with certainty on the operational use of any French troops that might be equipped in the future.<sup>25</sup>

In a firm but polite reply, De Gaulle absolved Eisenhower from any blame for the situation, but added that he had been forced to act as he did because the British and American leaders had failed to admit France to their council and had failed to consider French interests. President Truman expressed shock at this attitude, and declared that if the French Army was going to confine its actions to carrying out only the political wishes of the French, the command structure would have to be changed. Fortunately for Allied good will, the incident came so near the armistice that Stuttgart was of little importance to operations. Soon after the affair, the main reason for De Gaulle's intransigence was removed when the Allies assigned France an occupational zone in Germany.<sup>26</sup>

## CONCLUSION

From this brief study of command problems, it is evident that many difficulties arose, first of all, from the failure of the

Allies to issue political directives making absolutely clear their aims and intentions. Secondly, the delays in settling the status of the French Committee of National Liberation and in assigning France a zone of occupation in Germany virtually invited De Gaulle's intervention in army affairs. A third factor was the difference in the abilities of the three powers to make their national wishes felt in Allied councils. The British became aware that they were no longer full partners after the summer of 1944 when the proportion of men and supplies furnished by them had begun to decrease. Their only hope for controlling the course of events thereafter was to gain over-all ground command or to get a substantial portion of the Allied resources allocated to offensives led by British commanders. It was difficult under these circumstances to determine whether the British were advocating a course of action because they believed in it or because it would best serve British interests. American commanders, desiring to keep under their control as large a share of their forces and supplies as possible, tended to identify the strategy they preferred with that which would be best for the Allies. In the case of the French, there was even more at stake politically. As General de Gaulle saw it, the best possibility of getting proper recognition for France and an equal role in the postwar control of Germany lay in the use he made of the French troops that had been entrusted to Eisenhower's command.

Fortunately for the Supreme Commander and for the Allies, General Eisenhower benefited enormously from a close relationship with Prime Minister Churchill and from the tendency of President Roosevelt to leave initiative in military affairs to his commanders. More important, perhaps, was the great confidence which General Marshall had in Eisenhower, and his willingness to use his strong position in the Combined Chiefs of Staff to uphold the Supreme Commander. It was Marshall's firm stand which helped make it possible for Eisenhower to resist British pressure in August, 1944, to keep Montgomery in command of the ground forces, and their later efforts, during the Ardennes



period, to restore him to that position. Marshall also strengthened the stand of the Supreme Commander in debates on military strategy at Malta, and in discussions of Eisenhower's plans in the closing weeks of the war, when the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff were inclined to be critical, by making clear that they faced a fight if they did not go along with the Supreme Commander.

Eisenhower was also aided by the fact that General de Gaulle, since the days in Africa, felt he could work with him. Thus, although the French leader often talked vigorously for the record, he permitted his aides to make *ad hoc* arrangements with SHAEF officials that bridged over difficulties. In his letters to Eisenhower during some of the sharpest exchanges over the control of troops, there was an undertone of sympathy for the Supreme Commander's position. Perhaps the importance of this attitude was best expressed by the French leader in his description of command problems in Europe. They were difficult, he said, but they were not "tragique."

The Supreme Commander was aided in his relations with the British and French because of their realization that he, as the U. S. Commander in the European Theater, controlled the men and supplies that could furnish the margin of victory. Despite his possession of this powerful weapon, he made a real effort to respect the national interests of the Allies and the dignity of the Allied commanders. His philosophy for dealing with other nations in an alliance was stated in 1944 in an exchange of views on command and strategy with Field Marshal Montgomery. General Eisenhower declared:

It would be quite futile to deny that questions of nationalism often enter our problems. It is nations that make war, and when they find themselves associated as Allies, it is quite often necessary to make concessions that recognize the existence of inescapable national differences . . . . It is the job of soldiers, as I see it, to meet their military problems sanely, sensibly, and logically, and while not shutting our eyes to the fact that we are two different nations, produce solutions that permit effective co-operation, mutual support



and effective results. Goodwill and mutual confidence are, of course, mandatory.<sup>27</sup>

This philosophy explains why Eisenhower was able to be a successful Allied Commander in Chief. It also suggests the type of approach required to establish the unity and co-operation which Montgomery fourteen years later has said is essential to the success of the Western Alliance.

1. Quoted in an interview with General Charles de Gaulle by the author, January 14, 1947.

2. John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy* (London, 1958), VI, 360.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 358.

4. General Eisenhower to British Chiefs of Staff, March 6, 1944, and General Hollis to General Eisenhower, March 11, 1944, in SHAEF SGS file, 380.01/4, Security for Operations. All SHAEF and Department of the Army documents cited in this paper may be found in the World War II Records Division, Department of the Army, Alexandria, Virginia.

5. General Eisenhower to General Sir Alan Brooke, April 9, 1944, and General Brooke to General Eisenhower, April 17, 1944, in SHAEF SGS file, 311.7/1, Stoppage of Diplomatic Communications.

6. Prime Minister Churchill to General Eisenhower, April 3, 1944, and General Eisenhower to Mr. Churchill, April 5, 1944, in the diary of the Office of the Commander in Chief, SHAEF; Churchill to Eisenhower, with enclosures, April 28, 1944, in SHAEF SGS file, 373.24, Military Objectives for Aerial Bombardment; General Eisenhower to General Marshall, April 29, 1944, in Eisenhower's personal file.

7. General Walter B. Smith to General Marshall, May 17, 1944, in Eisenhower's personal file; Churchill to Air Chief Marshal Tedder (copy of note in possession of the author).

8. General Ray Barker to General R. A. McClure, January 27, 1944, in SHAEF SGS file, 322.01, Publicity and Psychological Warfare; interview with General R. A. McClure by the author, March 29, 1947; notes on the meeting of General McClure, Charles Peake, William Phillips, and others, on February 11, 1944, in General McClure's journal; Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, JCS 718/1, with attached papers, March 16, 1944, all in ABC 387, Germany (December 18, 1943), Section 3.

9. Undersecretary of State Stettinius to Secretary of State Hull, April 14, 1944, and General Eisenhower to General Smith, May 20, 1944, in the diary of the Commander in Chief, SHAEF; memorandum prepared for the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, March 29, 1944, with notations by Charles Peake and William Phillips, in SHAEF SGS file, 091.412/3, Psychological Warfare against Germany, I.

10. Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington, 1954), pp. 146-50.

## PROBLEMS OF A COALITION COMMAND

11. General Marshall, Admiral King, and General Arnold to President Roosevelt, S-53809, June 14, 1944, in Eisenhower's personal file.

12. Translations from French texts of addresses given on June 18 and 26, 1944, in Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages* (Paris, 1946), pp. 444-50.

13. General Marshall to General Eisenhower, W-82265, August 13, 1944, and General Surlis to General Eisenhower, August 19, 1944, in SHAEF cable log.

14. AMSSO to General Eisenhower, 4891, August 22, 1944, in Eisenhower's personal file.

15. Ehrman, *op. cit.*, V, 380.

16. General Eisenhower to Field Marshal Montgomery, October 10 and 13, 1944, and Field Marshal Montgomery to General Eisenhower, October 16, 1944, in Eisenhower's personal file.

17. Field Marshal Montgomery to General Eisenhower, November 30, 1944, in the diary of the Office of the Commander in Chief, SHAEF; Churchill to Roosevelt, December 6, 1944, Roosevelt to Admiral Leahy, and the proposed reply to the Prime Minister, December 8, 1944, in OPD executive file.

18. General Marshall to General Eisenhower, W-84337, December 30, 1944, in Eisenhower's personal file.

19. *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, pp. 284-87; Major General Sir Francis de Guingand, *Operation Victory* (New York, 1947), pp. 432-35; General Eisenhower to Field Marshal Montgomery, December 31, 1944, and Field Marshal Montgomery to General Eisenhower, December 31, 1944, in Eisenhower's personal file.

20. *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, pp. 290-92; General Eisenhower to Field Marshal Brooke, February 16, 1945, General Eisenhower to Churchill, February 25, 1945, Field Marshal Montgomery to General Eisenhower, March 4, 1945, and General Eisenhower to General Marshall, March 14, 1945, in Eisenhower's personal file.

21. Howard, "The Field Marshal," *The New Statesman*, LVI (November 8, 1958), 643.

22. M. Massigli to Ambassador Wilson, cited in cable, Algiers to Washington, NAF 578, January 4, 1944, and President Roosevelt to General Marshall, April 28, 1944, ABC 091.711, France (October 6, 1943), Section I-A.

23. Air Chief Marshal Robb's notes on conferences in Supreme Commander's office, January 1 and 3, 1945 (copy in author's possession); General Schwartz to General Patch, January 3, 1945, Seventh U. S. Army diary, Vol. II; General de Gaulle to General Eisenhower, January 3, 1945, and Ambassador Caffery to the State Department and President Roosevelt from General de Gaulle, January 3, 1945, in the diary of the Office of the Commander in Chief, SHAEF; General Eisenhower to General Marshall, January 6, 1945, and Churchill to General Eisenhower, November 8, 1945, in Eisenhower's personal file; speech of Churchill at Strasbourg, *New York Times*, August 16, 1949.

24. General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, *Histoire de la Première Armée Française* (Paris, 1949), pp. 489-91, 499, 565-70.

25. General Eisenhower to General de Gaulle, April 28, 1945, in SHAEF cable log.

## TOTAL WAR AND COLD WAR

26. Texts of the letters, from General de Gaulle to General Eisenhower, May 1, 1945, and from General Eisenhower to General de Gaulle, May 2, 1945, are cited in General Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff, May 2, 1945, in SHAEF cable log.

27. General Eisenhower to Field Marshal Montgomery, October 13, 1944, in Eisenhower's personal file.

PART II

*Organizational and Political Relationships  
in American Government*





## *Interservice Co-operation and Political-Military Collaboration \**

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LOUIS MORTON

ONE OF THE most difficult problems of civil-military relations in modern democratic society is the proper blending of the political and military ingredients of national policy. This prob-

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lem is also the one that has received most attention since World War II. The cold war has blurred the distinction between peace and war, and each recurring crisis has emphasized the indivisibility of foreign policy and military force. In the world of today there are no purely military or political solutions to the complex problems that face the great powers. To draw a sharp line of demarcation between the political and military, the economic and psychological elements of policy, to put each in a separate compartment and attempt to deal with it alone, would not only be absurd but dangerous as well. "Diplomacy and strategy, political commitments and military power," wrote Edward Meade Earle in the midst of World War II, "are inseparable. Unless this be recognized, foreign policy will be bankrupt."<sup>1</sup>

Co-ordination of the political and military factors that enter into the shaping of policy is achieved today in the National Security Council. Since its establishment in 1947, there has developed an elaborate system for co-ordinating the views of the various agencies involved in policy formulation.<sup>2</sup> Although this system may have many shortcomings and stand in need of much repair and improvement, it represents an enormous advance in the American system of planning. Indeed, there was a time—not so long ago—when the Secretary of State could deny that the Army and Navy had any right to participate in the making of policy, or that there was any need for consultation, except perhaps in a national emergency.

### THE EARLY YEARS, 1900–1919

Acceptance of the need, and development of the means, for co-ordinating the political and military elements involved in the formulation of national policy came slowly. On the military side, an organization for blending the views of the Army and Navy emerged in the years following the war with Spain; it was made possible by the establishment in each of the services of a separate body for planning and co-ordination—in the Navy, the General

Board, and in the Army, the General Staff. In the summer of 1903, the Joint Army-Navy Board, lineal ancestor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was established to consider those matters requiring the co-operation of the two services and to reach agreement on a program acceptable to both.<sup>3</sup>

Created by action of the two service secretaries, the Joint Board, during the first phase of its existence from 1903 to 1919, had limited functions and little authority in its own right. It could neither initiate discussion nor issue orders. Matters came before it by referral from one of the services, and it made its recommendations to the secretaries. Unless approved by them, the Joint Board's decisions had no force whatsoever.

Membership on the Joint Board was limited to eight, four from the General Staff of the Army and four from the General Board of the Navy, each member being appointed by name rather than by office. Thus, membership was not automatic, and unless the nomination was made, a space remained vacant. In addition, the Board functioned without a staff. Minutes were kept by the junior member, and much of the work was done by *ad hoc* committees formed from the membership of the Board. Problems that required detailed study were referred to the two war colleges with instructions that they co-ordinate their plans. The senior member of the Board until 1913 was Admiral Dewey, who presided over its meetings during the same time that he served as president of the General Board of the Navy.

During its early years, in the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, the Joint Board had the confidence of the President and enjoyed a large measure of prestige. But in the fall of 1907, it ran into trouble over the question of a naval base in the Philippines. Urged on by Admiral Dewey, the board, despite the reservations of the Army members and over the protests of commanders in the Philippines, had recommended that the base be located in Subic Bay on the west side of Bataan. On the basis of this advice, President Roosevelt had pushed a reluctant Congress for appropriations. Construction on the base was already

well advanced when, in 1907, during the crisis with Japan, the Army announced that the Subic Bay position was indefensible against land attack.<sup>4</sup> In view of these doubts, President Roosevelt suspended work on fortifications in Subic Bay in October, 1907, and directed the Joint Board to reconsider the entire problem. If it found the Subic Bay position indefensible, the Board was to consider the possibility of locating the base in Manila Bay, where the Army had always wanted to place it. The response of the Joint Board was a typical compromise: both Subic Bay and Manila Bay, it declared, should be fortified.<sup>5</sup> But since the first admittedly could not be defended against land attack, the Joint Board's recommendation amounted to a reversal of its former position and a vote for Manila Bay.

This report by the Joint Board brought from President Roosevelt a rebuke that was as revealing as it was frank. Calling first for "a well-thought-out plan" for the fortifications then under construction at Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt told the Board that he wanted it to consider the matter not as an academic exercise but as a practical problem, with "due consideration being paid to our probable military and naval resources and policies."<sup>6</sup> That the President should thus address his highest military and naval advisers was surprising enough, but his next comments were even more remarkable:

For a long time I was informed by almost every naval officer and by many Army officers that Subic Bay was the one all-important post to fortify and defend, and that it alone could be made impregnable to attack . . . . I am now informed that the recommendations are all wrong because Subic Bay could not possibly be defended from land attack; and by way of explanation I am further informed that it is not the province of the Navy to advise upon anything but naval matters. . . . Now, I have the very highest regard for officers of the Army and Navy. I think them, on the whole, about the best citizens we have and I want to back them in every way; but they justify their most trenchant critics when they act in such a manner . . . . This year a great many Senators and Congressmen have said to me they disbelieved in the General Staff for either the Army or the Navy because of the curious attitude of the Joint Board in this Philippine defense matter.<sup>7</sup>

Having thus expressed his dissatisfaction, Roosevelt directed the two service secretaries to make a full report on the Board's past actions concerning the Philippines and to show him all the studies prepared by them on this subject. "It is quite evident," he remarked, "that there is some defect in method which ought to be removed."<sup>8</sup>

But Roosevelt never got what he asked for. Admiral Dewey, the strongest champion of the Subic Bay base, was less interested in reform than in self-justification. Thus, instead of suggestions for remedying the defects of the Joint Board, Roosevelt received a lecture he scarcely needed on naval strategy, which served only to increase his irritation.<sup>9</sup>

His confidence in the Joint Board badly shaken, Roosevelt gave up his attempts to get from it a firm recommendation on the defense needs of the Philippines. A measure of his attitude is his reaction to the Army Chief of Staff's request in February, 1908, that, in view of the weakness of the West Coast ports and the Pacific garrisons, the Joint Board be asked to study the question of retaining the battle fleet in the Pacific. "I should of course be glad to have the opinion of the Joint Board on this matter," declared Roosevelt, "but I cannot say that I will follow their opinion."<sup>10</sup> And not once during his remaining year of office—from March, 1908, to March, 1909—did he call upon the Board for advice.

Under President Taft, the meetings of the Joint Board were resumed; but its influence had by now greatly declined and Taft sought its advice sparingly. President Wilson had even less use for the Joint Board, and did not look with favor on the participation of high-ranking Army and Navy officers in the councils of state. It is said that when he learned the Joint Board had plans in its files for war with England, Germany, Mexico, Japan, and other nations, he gave strict orders that the Army and Navy were to discontinue their war planning.<sup>11</sup> It is interesting to note, incidentally, that Wilson appointed a Quaker as his Secretary of War and a pacifist as his first Secretary of State. It was this



Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, who, when the Joint Board proposed a fleet movement during the 1913 crisis with Japan, thundered that Army and Navy officers could not be trusted to say what we should or should not do until we actually got into war.<sup>12</sup>

In this climate, the already discredited Joint Board withered away rapidly. In 1913, as a result of its activities during the crisis with Japan, it was again suspended with the warning that further efforts to influence national policy would lead to its abolition.<sup>13</sup> Although the Board resumed its meetings in October of that year, it was evident that its days were numbered. Finally, in April, 1914, it was suspended once more, for reasons that are not clear, and did not meet again for a year and a half. So unimportant had the Board become by this time that it met only twice during World War I. The War Department did not even make an attempt to fill vacancies on the Board as they occurred during this critical period. To all intents and purposes, joint planning had come to an end with the outbreak of war.

Though the General Staffs of the Army and Navy between 1900 and 1919 succeeded only partially in laying the foundations for co-operation and joint action, they at least recognized the problem. The civilian agencies of the government had not even this awareness, much less the will to construct the administrative arrangements to co-ordinate the military with the political elements of policy. The State Department considered itself the source of foreign policy, and had no intention of admitting the military into its deliberations. Only rarely did it request advice or offer information to the services.

Complaints from the military about the lack of policy guidance were common during this period. General Bell, for example, wrote that he had to make preparations for intervention in Cuba in 1911 on the basis of newspaper stories, although he had earnestly sought more definite information from the State Department.<sup>14</sup> When the Joint Board studied the problems of fleet dispositions in 1908, it observed that concentration of the fleet



depended on the international situation, about which it had insufficient information. Only the administration had all the facts, wrote Dewey, and until this knowledge was communicated to the Joint Board it could not intelligently make recommendations as to the specific disposition of the fleet.<sup>15</sup>

The military's conception of its role in policy formulation was scarcely defined as yet, but it is evident that the problem was already engaging the attention of officers concerned with strategic planning. Bred in the tradition of civilian supremacy and separation of the political and military, the military asked only that they be given political guidance. When Admiral Rodgers, commandant of the Naval War College, suggested that the Navy participate more actively in policy formulation, Dewey replied that "policy belongs to the Cabinet, that is, to the civil supreme authority, and must be decided by that authority."<sup>16</sup> It was enough for him, apparently, to be told what the national policy was; his job was to make the plans to carry out that policy. This was also the Army's view. "In our country," wrote the planners of the General Staff, "public opinion estimates the situation, statecraft shapes the policy, while the duty of executing it devolves upon the military and naval departments." "The work of the statesman and the soldier," they concluded, "are therefore coordinate; where the first leaves off the other takes hold."<sup>17</sup>

### THE GROWTH OF INTERSERVICE CO-OPERATION

The experience of World War I revealed many weaknesses in the American system of planning, and pointed up, for the military at least, the need for closer collaboration with the policy-makers. The postwar years saw, therefore, reforms in the internal organization of the War and Navy Departments and the establishment in the State Department of a professional staff of Foreign Service officers under the Rogers Act of 1924.

The Joint Board, too, was revived and reorganized after the war. Although it had ceased to meet and was practically defunct

when the war ended, it remained the only constituted body established to co-ordinate the planning activities of the two services.<sup>18</sup> The reorganized Board, which held its first meeting in the summer of 1919, was a far more effective organization than its predecessor. Though it had no executive functions or command authority, it had a far more effective organization and performed a much wider variety of tasks. It was given a permanent civilian secretary, and its membership was decreased to six; the members were now designated by office rather than by name, as had been the case earlier.<sup>19</sup> To it came all matters that required co-operation between the two services, either by referral or on the initiative of the Board itself—an authority that greatly enhanced its influence. Until 1939, the Board reported to the War and Navy Secretaries, and its recommendations were purely advisory. Only upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases by the President, did these recommendations become effective.

The most notable improvement of the 1919 reorganization was the formation of a Joint Planning Committee to assist the Board. Consisting of eight officers, four each from the Army and Navy War Plans Divisions, this committee performed the detailed investigation and study required for policy decisions, the preparation of war plans, and all other matters involving joint actions of the Army and Navy. It was, in effect, a working group for the Joint Board, and made its reports and recommendations to that body.

In the years that followed, the accomplishments of the Joint Board more than justified the hopes of those who had created it. Between 1919 and 1937 it considered about six hundred cases, many of which involved complex problems and delicate issues. Most of these cases were handled without serious difficulty or disagreement, with results that were entirely satisfactory to both services. "Since its organization in 1919," Secretary of War Weeks told a joint committee of Congress in 1924, "the Joint Board has considered over three hundred subjects affecting the joint action and cooperation of the Army and Navy Departments

with complete unanimity and accord, there being only one case upon which agreement could not be reached, and which was referred to the President for decision and prompt action secured.”<sup>20</sup>

The record, of course, was far from perfect. Most of the six hundred cases handled by the Board during these years were not controversial and presented no special problems. But there were some—such as the role of air power, command in joint operations, and Far Eastern strategy—that defied easy solution, and came before the Board time and again for consideration. Even on these, the Army and Navy were usually able to work out a compromise solution. Only in very rare instances were the views of the services so far apart that the planning committee, unable to reach some sort of agreement, submitted a split report to the Joint Board. When this happened, the problem was either tabled or referred to an *ad hoc* group for solution.

Despite the impressive record of interservice co-operation, there was a strong movement down to the outbreak of World War II for the establishment of a single department for national defense and the creation of a separate air force. Usually the two were related; and often the proposals for a single department were based more on the Air Corps’ desire for autonomy than on weaknesses in the existing organization. So insistent was this pressure for a separate air force that scarcely a year went by without some effort by Congress to reorganize the military services. Between 1919 and 1939, nineteen major boards or committees were formed to consider this problem, but only once, in 1932, did the matter come before Congress for a vote.<sup>21</sup>

Both the Army and Navy consistently opposed the proposals for a single department of defense and a separate air force. To every argument for a change—economy, efficiency, co-ordination, unity of command, capabilities of air power, and so on—the Army and Navy planners had a rebuttal ready, worked up over the years by a succession of staff officers. By the mid-thirties the response to Congressional and other pressures had become almost automatic. All the staff had to do was select the proper

paper from the file to meet each fresh proposal for reorganization or consolidation. Down to World War II, the Army maintained that there were no cogent reasons "to warrant the belief that either a Department of National Defense or a Department of Air would improve our organization for the nation's defense, or reduce its net cost."<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, it saw many sound reasons to support the view that the creation of either or both "would seriously jeopardize the effective employment of the armed forces of the nation in war."<sup>23</sup> It quoted with approval the 1935 findings of the Morrow Board:

If the two present service organizations were consolidated under a single secretary, it would at once become necessary to create a super staff. No secretary of national defense could operate the two organizations without subsecretaries and technical advisers. This super general staff, which would be in addition to the present service staffs, would necessarily comprise Army and Navy advisers who had been educated not only in their own particular schools but who would be required to have taken courses in schools of the service to which they did not belong. It is difficult to see how any such super-organization would make for economy in time of peace or efficiency in time of war.

By 1941, the agitation for unification of the services and a separate air force (the proposals were now indissolubly married) had reached a high peak. More and more, the Army and Navy staff found themselves fighting a defensive, delaying action. Their position was the result of a number of factors: experience in the European war, the influence of the British, and the improved position of the Air Corps after 1935. By the middle of 1941, the position of the air advocates had so improved that they were able to secure the appointment of General Arnold as a member of the Joint Board, a new regulation creating the Army Air Forces with its own general staff,<sup>24</sup> and the designation of an Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert Lovett.

If the Army and Navy were united in their opposition to a department of national defense and a separate air force, there were many matters on which they were divided. Most of these were

primarily military and naval problems, and had only an indirect bearing on national policy. An important exception was Far Eastern strategy and the defense of the Philippines. The mandate granted Japan over the German islands in the central Pacific after World War I had given that nation numerous bases astride the U. S. Fleet's line of communication and had vastly complicated the problem of defending the Philippines in the event of war with Japan. The strategy ultimately adopted in the Pacific called for "an offensive war, primarily naval," with the objective of establishing "at the earliest date American sea power in the Western Pacific in strength superior to that of Japan."<sup>25</sup> To do this, the United States would require a base in that area capable of serving the entire U. S. Fleet. Since the only base west of Pearl Harbor large enough for this purpose was in Manila, it would be essential to hold the bay in case of war, and to be ready to rush reinforcements under naval protection to the Islands in time to prevent their capture. To the Army fell the vital task of holding the base in Manila Bay until the arrival of the Fleet; but the major role in any war with Japan would be played by the Navy, for success in the final analysis depended on sea power.

This plan, designated ORANGE, was really more a statement of hopes than a realistic appraisal of what could be done. To have carried out such a plan was far beyond the capacity of either the Navy or the Army. The entire military establishment in the Philippines in 1936 did not number more than twenty thousand men, and naval facilities in Manila Bay were entirely inadequate to support the Fleet, should it ever reach the Philippines. The Fleet itself was divided between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the nearest American naval base to the Philippines that was even partially capable of supporting its major units was at Pearl Harbor, five thousand miles away.

Nothing else reveals so sharply the failure of political-military co-ordination as the ORANGE plan. The product of the best minds of a whole generation of planners, it set a task that was clearly



incapable of achievement. How was it possible for the highly qualified, professional Army and Navy officers of the Joint Planning Committee to develop, and for their superiors to approve, a war plan so obviously incapable of execution with the means at hand? The answer lies in the dichotomy between policy and strategy. American policy demanded that the Philippines were to be held, but denied the military the forces to do so. The result was a compromise strategy that reflected the contradiction between American interests and commitments in the Pacific. National policy thus set objectives beyond the capability of the nation's military forces, with consequences that can be read in the disaster at Clark Field, the death march from Bataan, and the rubble of Corregidor.

### MILITARY PROPOSALS FOR CO-ORDINATION

World War I taught the military many lessons, not the least of which was the importance of co-ordinating military planning with foreign policy. Even before the peace had been signed at Versailles, Army and Navy officers were already thinking about the problem. The first formal proposal for consultation came from the Navy Department, and was sparked by a study of Pacific strategy then under review. In an effort to find out just what American policy was in the Far East so that proper plans might be prepared, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, then Acting Secretary of the Navy, dispatched a letter to the Secretary of State on May 1, 1919, outlining an ambitious plan (complete with organization chart) for co-ordinating the planning efforts of the War, Navy, and State Departments. In brief, what Roosevelt was suggesting was a kind of general staff consisting of officers from all three departments, which would define American objectives in all conceivable situations, estimate the resources of the possible participants, and decide the size and nature of the forces needed for success.<sup>26</sup>

Roosevelt based his argument for consultation between the



Navy and the State Department on the military requirement for policy guidance in planning for war. Starting with the observation that it was "a fundamental principle" that foreign policy was the province of the State Department—an observation the Secretary of State was not likely to quarrel with—young Roosevelt asserted "that the foreign policy of a government depends for its acceptance by other nations upon the naval and military force that is behind it."<sup>27</sup> Certain policies, he declared, represented such vital national interests that they must be defended at all costs, and others clearly could not be defended if the cost involved in the use of force was excessive. On this cost-accounting basis, Roosevelt concluded that the State Department, in framing policy, needed to know how much it would cost to maintain its policies by force "in order to assign them their relative importance," and that the Navy Department needed to know which policies it might be required to support with force "in order to formulate plans and building programs."<sup>28</sup>

It is doubtful that the Secretary of State ever saw this communication from the young Acting Secretary of the Navy. If he had, he would probably have found little in it to his taste. Roosevelt's assumption that foreign policy rested on force ran counter to all the traditions of American diplomacy, with its reliance on morality and public opinion. And his blueprint for an interagency policymaking staff would certainly have struck the Secretary of State as presumptuous at the least. At any rate, nothing came of Roosevelt's efforts, and shortly afterward he left the Navy Department.<sup>29</sup>

The professional officers of the Army and Navy planning staffs, charged with responsibility for preparing joint war plans and military strategy, approached the problems of political-military collaboration from a different point of view. Since national policy was the starting point for all planning and the foundation of any war plan, the Joint Board, they argued, had every right to be informed by the State Department of political decisions. Perhaps the earliest postwar statement of this position

was a memorandum entitled "National Policy and War Plans" prepared in October, 1919, by Captain W. H. Yarnell, one of the naval planners on the Joint Planning Committee.<sup>30</sup> "War," wrote Yarnell, paraphrasing Clausewitz, "is not merely a political act but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means." The foundation of any war plan, therefore, was national policy; and the Joint Board must know what that policy was before it could draw up plans for national defense.

To illustrate his point, Yarnell took the case of United States strategy in the Pacific and Far East, a problem on which the joint planners were then working. What were America's interests in the Far East?, he asked. In the event of war with Japan, did they require that operations should be designed to defeat the enemy decisively? Or would national interests be best served by a limited war? Would the cost of the all-out effort required to hold the Philippines and support American policy and trade in the Far East be prohibitive? If so, would it be better to hold Hawaii and accept the loss of the Philippines? "These questions," declared Yarnell, "are not for the War and Navy Departments to answer, but the State Department." Until then, the Joint Board was "not justified" in proceeding with its war planning.

The solution Yarnell proposed was quite different from that advocated earlier in the year by Roosevelt. Instead of a War-Navy-State general staff, Yarnell recommended that the Undersecretary of State be appointed a member of the Joint Board and that the chiefs of the geographic divisions of the State Department be made members of the Joint Planning Committee.

Before Yarnell's proposal could reach the Joint Board as a recommendation of its planning committee, it had to receive the indorsement of the Army members. In a handwritten note addressed to Colonel J. W. Gulick, the senior Army officer on the committee, Yarnell explained the purpose of his proposal and the necessity for securing from the State Department a declaration of national policy. Even if the Joint Board failed to get such a

statement, Yarnell declared, "it would be a good thing to get some kind of a showdown out of the State Department." Moreover, it would serve an additional purpose, he thought, "in educating them as to the relation that exists between War and Policy, which in itself would be of great value."<sup>31</sup>

In due course, Captain Yarnell's proposal found its way to the Joint Board as part of a larger study on Pacific strategy. The Joint Board, in turn, raised the question of national policy with the two service secretaries. If American strategy called for a first-class naval base at Guam backed up by a suitable base at Pearl Harbor, what purpose were these bases to serve? "What is our policy," the Joint Board asked, "that demands we should dominate the Western Pacific?" The problem, it suggested, should be taken up with the State Department, the agency responsible for policy making, and then laid before the President for his action. Further, the Secretary of State should be asked to designate a responsible official from his department, not necessarily the Undersecretary, to sit in with the Joint Board "whenever questions involving national policy are under consideration."<sup>32</sup>

The proposals of the Joint Board seemed eminently sensible to the service secretaries. On December 29, 1919, they gave their approval to the Board's recommendations and soon after dispatched a letter to Secretary of State Lansing asking him to discuss with them the questions raised by the Joint Board prior to a meeting with the President. Lansing agreed, and a conference of the three secretaries was held; but the Secretary of State asked that the matter be deferred for six months. At any rate, in view of Wilson's health, it was impracticable to seek the President's approval to a change either in policy or in organization.<sup>33</sup>

More than a year went by before the problem was raised again. Then, in April, 1921, after the invitations for the Washington Conference had gone out, the joint planners made a renewed effort to establish closer relations with the State Department. None of the arguments they advanced for consultation between the political and military authorities was new; they had all been

advanced before. But the situation had changed, and the forthcoming Washington Conference promised even greater changes in the role of the military. There was an urgency now that had not existed before. "The Policy and Strategy of a nation," declared the planners, "are interrelated in many ways and neither can be carried on efficiently, without due regard for the other . . . . Conversely, the policies of the nation must be consistent with the armed forces which are available for their enforcement."<sup>34</sup> To achieve this co-ordination, the planners fell back on Yarnell's original suggestion to make the Undersecretary a member of the Joint Board and to designate one or more officials of the State Department as members of the Joint Planning Committee.

But this time the planners added some refinements that had not appeared in Yarnell's original proposal. In all cases involving national policy, the State Department's representatives on the Joint Board and the Joint Planning Committee were to have an equal voice with the military and naval members, and the Board's recommendations were to be forwarded to the Secretary of State as well as the two service secretaries for approval. Furthermore, the Secretary of State was to refer to the Joint Board all matters of national policy requiring "the potential or dynamic support of the Army and Navy." After study, the Joint Board would then indicate whether existing military forces were capable of supporting this policy, and if not, what would be required to make them so.<sup>35</sup>

Actually, this plan was not unlike that offered by Franklin Roosevelt two years earlier, and both bore the strong stamp of studies made at the Naval War College and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. But the Joint Board was still reluctant to act; and after waiting six months, the joint planners, on October 7, 1921, a month before the opening of the Washington Conference, reminded their superiors that no action had yet been taken on their recommendation. Pointing out that the reasons for regular consultation with the State Department were "even

more impelling than when originally presented," they again urged the Board to consider the matter.<sup>36</sup> This time the Board took action. After some revisions of the proposal, including substitution of the phrase "responsible official" for "Undersecretary of State," the Board approved the planners' proposal and recommended to the two service secretaries that they take the matter up directly with the Secretary of State. Both secretaries approved, and on December 7, 1921, a joint letter outlining the proposal went out to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes.<sup>37</sup>

This joint Army-Navy proposal fell on most unsympathetic ears. Secretary of State Hughes, who had succeeded Lansing, read it as an effort by the Joint Board to secure a voice in the determination of foreign policy and declined the offer politely and firmly.<sup>38</sup> He hoped his refusal would not be taken as showing a lack of appreciation or an unwillingness to co-operate with the Army and Navy; but at the same time, he felt constrained to point out that the only officials of the State Department who could speak with authority on matters of national policy were he and the Undersecretary of State, both of whom were too busy to take on this additional duty. He made it clear also that the State Department had no intention of referring any policy matters, including those that might require the support of the Army and Navy, to the Joint Board. But he softened the blow by assuring the secretaries that "should a crisis arise in our national affairs, where it may seem to this Department advisable to consult and cooperate with the Joint Board, I shall certainly avail myself of the opportunity to do so."<sup>39</sup>

This assurance could scarcely conceal the rebuff, but the two service secretaries were not so easily put off. With the example of the Washington Conference before them, they could not but believe, as their military and naval advisers argued, that the establishment of proper and adequate co-ordination between political and military planning was a matter of the utmost importance. They refused, therefore, to take Hughes's letter as final and pressed him again. If their first proposal was not practicable,



would it not be possible, they asked, for the Secretary of State or his representative to attend those meetings of the Joint Board which dealt with the international policies of the United States? In this way, the Army and Navy could proceed with their planning, firm in the knowledge "that they were working in accord with the grand policy of the United States."<sup>40</sup>

To this counterproposal, Hughes gave a reluctant consent, and promptly forgot about it.<sup>41</sup> So meager was the co-operation between the State and the War and Navy departments thereafter that almost twenty years later the Chief of the Army War Plans Division complained that the joint planners frequently had had to work in the dark with respect to national policy because of their inability to secure "authoritative expressions of fact or opinion from representatives of other Executive Departments, in particular, the State Department."<sup>42</sup>

But the years between the first and second world wars were not altogether barren in so far as the development of understanding between the civilian policymaker and the military planner is concerned. On lower levels, there was an interchange of information and a profitable association on boards and committees that gave each a better understanding of the other. In 1922, at the initiative of the Secretary of State, specially designated officers of the State Department were sent to take courses at the Army and Navy War Colleges, a practice that was continued for some years. In 1931, the joint planners proposed a College of National Defense, to be attended by students from the War, Navy, State, Treasury, Commerce, and Labor departments, to bring together in the classroom officials from the various departments concerned with policy problems. Vetoed by the Joint Board in 1931, this proposal was made again in 1934 and 1939, each time unsuccessfully.<sup>43</sup>

In addition to these contacts, State Department officials lectured regularly at the Army and Navy War Colleges, and participated in discussions at both institutions. Army and Navy officers worked with their opposite numbers in the State Depart-



ment preparing material for the various disarmament conferences during the twenties and thirties, and a variety of other matters.<sup>44</sup> Intelligence reports were regularly exchanged between the departments, and representatives of each met and measured their colleagues as members of various interdepartmental boards. In this way the basis was laid for co-operation among professional diplomats and soldiers of the twenties and thirties.

While the foundation for co-operation between the State Department and the services was being established during these years, the architects of national policy and the makers of military strategy traveled their separate ways along paths that seemed sometimes to lead in opposite directions. Before and during the Washington Conference, in 1921 and 1922, the Army and Navy sent Secretary of State Hughes long, detailed studies on the armaments of foreign powers together with their recommendations concerning the American position. The Navy was especially concerned over the discussions of naval limitations, and submitted a series of closely reasoned papers outlining United States naval policy and defense requirements. But Hughes apparently paid little attention to this advice, and over the protests of the General Board of the Navy accepted the 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships and the limitation on fortification of the Pacific islands. He insisted, perhaps wisely, that "civilian statesmanship rather than naval strategy" should prevail in the conference, a position that undoubtedly contributed to the desire of the military for a larger share in the formulation of national policy.<sup>45</sup>

In the disarmament conferences that followed, the Army and Navy played a more active role. Both maintained missions at Geneva, which supplied the American delegates with military information, and reported regularly to their departments in Washington. In 1927, when word came from Geneva that the Japanese planned to recommend to the conference of that year that fortifications at Hawaii, Singapore, and possibly the Panama Canal be maintained *in status quo*, the Army reacted promptly. The Secretary of War dispatched a letter to the Secretary of State

urging that the delegates to the conference be instructed that the United States would refuse to discuss any restrictions on its liberty of action in Hawaii and the Canal Zone.<sup>46</sup> The Navy took separate action, and referred the problem to the Joint Board, which recommended similar action. It is probable that even without this advice, the Secretary of State would have issued adequate instructions to the delegates, but it was nevertheless gratifying to have his assurances in the form of a letter to the Secretary of War.

Henry L. Stimson, a former Secretary of War, would have little to do with the president of the General Board of the Navy after President Hoover named him Secretary of State. In making arrangements for the London Naval Conference of 1930, he consistently ignored the advice of the General Board. He took with him to London only one naval officer, selected very carefully by the administration's civilian leaders, apparently on the ground that he "took a different position . . . from most of his colleagues."<sup>47</sup> Nor is there the slightest shred of evidence anywhere in the record that either Stimson or Hoover consulted his military or naval advisers as to the force required for intervention during the Manchurian crisis of 1931.

### THE APPROACH OF WAR

The election of President Roosevelt brought no change in the traditional attitude toward political-military collaboration. But during his second term there was a growing awareness of the role of force in international affairs. This change was due partly to Roosevelt's earlier experience in the Navy and his appreciation of the problem. But there were many other contributing factors, not the least of which was the growing threat from abroad. "I soon discovered," declared his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, referring to Axis diplomats, "that they were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our Army and that our diplomatic strength . . . goes up or down with their estimate of what that

amounts to.”<sup>48</sup> During the early years of his tenure, Hull avoided any show of threat of military force, but as the aggressive intentions of Japan and Germany grew clearer he became a strong champion of military preparedness. To a greater degree than any of his predecessors, he sought advice from senior Army and Navy officers, especially on Far Eastern problems. For the London Naval Conference of 1935, he carefully solicited the views of the Navy and included in the delegation a sizable group of officers, including the Chief of Naval Operations.<sup>49</sup>

It was also in 1935 that a high official of the State Department was formally designated to sit with the planners on the Joint Board to consider a major question of national policy, the first such appointment since Secretary Hughes's agreement thirteen years earlier to consult with the Board on matters of national policy. The occasion was a request by the secretaries of the War and Navy departments for political advice in a comprehensive review by the Joint Board of America's military position in the Far East. Hull responded to this request promptly, naming his Far Eastern expert, Stanley K. Hornbeck, to serve as political adviser to the Joint Planning Committee.<sup>50</sup>

During the next few months, the Committee met a number of times and prepared a large number of studies.<sup>51</sup> At the first two sessions, Hornbeck set forth at some length his department's views on the two major problems under consideration—the Philippines and China. On both, he took a position opposite to that of the Army planners, who favored withdrawal from both areas on the ground that neither area was defensible and that the United States should draw back its forces to the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama line. The naval planners found Hornbeck's views more congenial, and favored retention of American forces in both China and the Philippines. To withdraw these forces, they believed, along with Hornbeck, would lower American prestige in the Far East and encourage Japan to further aggression.<sup>52</sup>

It is doubtful that Hornbeck's advice had any effect on the planners, for the position of the Army and Navy on these ques-

tions had been fixed by two decades and more of detailed study. But the experience was not without value, for Hornbeck apparently continued to meet with a small group of Army and Navy officers on a regular basis to discuss a variety of problems relative to the Far East. Of these, perhaps the most persistent and troublesome was the presence of Army forces in China. Ever since the early twenties, the War Department had been trying to secure the consent of the State Department to withdraw the Fifteenth Infantry, the Old China Regiment, from Tientsin in northern China on the ground that conditions had so changed since the original garrison had been assigned there in 1911 that its presence served no useful purpose and even constituted a serious danger. But each time the Secretary of War raised the question of withdrawal, he was turned down. Every Secretary of State from Hughes to Hull consistently maintained the priority of State Department interests in China over those of the War Department and the subordination of the military commanders there to the American minister. Military forces were maintained in China, Hughes had told the Secretary of War in 1922, to protect the diplomatic mission at Peking, and had no separate status except "as an organization ancillary to the legation."<sup>53</sup> Fourteen years later, Cordell Hull, in rejecting another Army request for withdrawal, wrote that the original mission of preventing a recurrence of the Boxer uprising was not obsolete; it had merely been modified to make the garrison "a psychological influence of a reassuring and stabilizing character."<sup>54</sup>

In his meetings with the joint planners, Hornbeck took the same position as his superior. The presence of American forces, he declared, had done much to prevent an open conflict by serving as a deterrent to Japan. To withdraw them, especially when the situation was chaotic and hazardous, would imply fear of Japan; it would endanger American and foreign nationals, disturb the Chinese, and possibly encourage the Japanese to further aggression.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, if military forces were evacuated, American nationals and even the embassy would have to be

evacuated also. American armed forces were in China as a symbol, Hornbeck told the joint planners, and were not to fight as a part of other organized forces. He was well aware of their weakness and appreciated the fact that in the event of war with Japan they would be quickly wiped out. But to reinforce them, he reminded his military colleagues, would change their character completely. "We must think of their duty as State rather than military," he declared (and he capitalized the word State deliberately), as diplomatic troops and as a symbol of co-operation.<sup>56</sup>

The Army planners did not agree with Hornbeck. As one of them wrote, "the objectives of our national policy are, in the final analysis, incompatible with the implementation of that policy. We cannot indefinitely sustain and protect our objective against an aggressive imperialism based on force without the use of force."<sup>57</sup> To the military, force was the ultimate arbiter in the relations among nations, and a garrison that was at the mercy of any aggressor must either be removed or strengthened. But as long as the State Department continued to oppose withdrawal, the Army could do nothing.

In the fall of 1936, the Army tried another tack. If it could not evacuate the garrison, perhaps it could lessen the danger of its destruction or permit its reinforcement by altering the mission to permit the military commander greater flexibility. Again, the State Department was the main opponent. During one of his meetings with the Army and Navy planners, Hornbeck read a draft of the mission prepared in his office. A revealing exchange then followed between Hornbeck and the Army representative, Lieutenant Colonel Leonard T. Gerow of the War Plans Division.<sup>58</sup> When Gerow declared frankly that Army troops should be withdrawn from the Far East, Hornbeck asked why, if the War Department felt that way, it did not try to get the policy changed rather than seek the removal of forces assigned to support that policy. "I told him," Gerow reported, "that the War Department was not the State policy-making agency, that being a State Department responsibility. But, that the War Depart-



ment was responsible for the military aspects of any policy adopted and that it was the duty of the War Department to point out the extent to which we might become involved through military commitments and make recommendations accordingly."

In Gerow's opinion, Hornbeck's statement of the Army garrison's mission in China was designed solely to keep the regiment there. But he had the very definite impression that Hornbeck believed the Army would ultimately withdraw its forces in spite of the State Department's opposition. "He is apparently very much peeved at the War Department for its activities in this respect," Gerow observed to his chief.

In the end, it was neither the War Department nor the State Department but the Japanese who finally resolved the issue. In the summer of 1937, the Japanese attacked Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking to begin a war that did not end until the defeat of Japan in August, 1945. Again the Army tried to evacuate its troops and again it was turned down. This time the War Department refused to accept the decision. The position of the troops in a war zone was completely untenable. Clearly, the garrison must be extricated and as quickly as possible. At the least, the War Department must have a greater voice in the determination of policy in China.

In the circumstances, there was only one thing the War Department could do—appeal directly to the President. This it did on September 1, when Louis Johnson, the Assistant Secretary, laid the Army's case before President Roosevelt. "I find this action of the State Department in ignoring military advice," wrote Johnson, "has been characteristic of its attitude for many years past." Such an attitude, he told Roosevelt bluntly, was neither in the best interests of the nation nor consistent with the practice followed by other great powers. None of them, he declared, "embarks upon a foreign policy having any military implications without giving the fullest consideration to the advice of the responsible military authorities."<sup>59</sup> In the present situation in the Far East, he continued, the State Department's re-

fusal to ask for or even consider military advice was "a matter of the gravest concern." Recommendations for certain naval dispositions, presumably from British sources, were being seriously considered by the State Department, Johnson told the President. These dispositions might commit the United States "irrevocably" to the employment of large forces in the Far East; yet "as far as I can find," he declared, "no advice has been asked of the War Department upon these matters." It was a situation that no other government would tolerate, and Johnson asked the President to direct the Secretary of State "to afford an opportunity to the War Department to express its views upon all matters having a military implication, immediate or remote."

This was strong language, and the record does not disclose what action if any Roosevelt took. At any rate, within a few days the Navy ordered the evacuation of all naval dependents from China in "furtherance of Government policy," and before the month was out the Army followed suit on advice of the State Department.<sup>60</sup> But it was not until early February, 1938, that the order went out to withdraw the Fifteenth Infantry. By the end of March, the Army was out of China, after twenty-seven years of garrison duty, leaving the protection of American interests there to the Marines.<sup>61</sup>

This was the last remaining instance of a lack of co-ordination between the statesmen and soldiers before World War II. With the approach of war, the State, War, and Navy departments drew closer together and consultation became the rule rather than the exception. In April, 1938, the Standing Liaison Committee, consisting of the Undersecretary of State, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, was established primarily to deal with Latin American problems, but also to consider matters of national policy affecting the three departments. This body—the first, and at the time, only officially established agency for co-ordinating the political and military elements of policy—met about once a month and did much to bring the departments closer together. Not only did each learn much about

the other's views and plans, but there was also frequent discussion of procedures and organization for establishing interdepartmental liaison and a better understanding of common problems. "Since Admiral Stark and General Marshall have been respectively Chief of Naval operations and Chief of Staff," wrote the Secretary of the General Staff, "a point has been made of acquainting Mr. Welles, Under Secretary of State, with war plans and the three have taken plans and other matters of vital import to national defense to the President for his approval."<sup>62</sup>

Shortly before the outbreak of war in Europe, the President, in an effort to keep in close touch with his military advisers, placed the Joint Board under his "supervision and direction."<sup>63</sup> Thereafter, he dealt directly with his military and naval advisers, often bypassing not only their civilian superiors but the Secretary of State as well. With the appointment of Stimson and Knox as secretaries of the War and Navy departments in July, 1940, however, the President began to rely more heavily on the civilian chiefs of the services. By the fall of 1941, these two, plus the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, were meeting at frequent intervals as a group to consult on all important matters of national policy, forming what came to be known informally as the War Council.<sup>64</sup>

In the months before Pearl Harbor, co-ordination between the War, Navy, and State departments was closer than it had ever been before. But this collaboration was achieved very largely by informal and personal means through the agency of the President. Except for the Standing Liaison Committee, there was as yet no organizational machinery to provide for the co-ordination of policy and strategy. With the outbreak of war, leadership passed to the military, and the State Department sat on the side lines, as the War and Navy departments had done for so many years, while others made policy. "I have washed my hands of it," said Hull to Stimson when it became clear that negotiations with Japan had reached a dead end, "and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy."<sup>65</sup> Not until the last years of the war did the diplomats sit down again at the same

table with the generals and admirals, and it was the War and Navy departments rather than State that shaped the pattern of political-military collaboration which was to lead to the establishment of the National Security Council after the war.

1. *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, N. J., 1943), p. x.

2. For a description of the workings of the National Security Council, see Dillon Anderson, "The President and National Security," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXCVII (January, 1956), 42-46; Robert Cutler, "Development of the National Security Council," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV (April, 1956), 441-58.

3. Letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy, July 17, 1903, JB 301. Published as Navy Department GO No. 136, July 18, and War Department GO No. 107, July 20, 1903.

4. For an account of the Subic Bay controversy between the Army and Navy, see Louis Morton, "The Origins of Pacific Strategy," *Marine Corps Gazette*, XLI (August, 1957), 36-44; Louis Morton, "Military and Naval Preparations for the Defense of the Philippines during the War Scare of 1907," *Military Affairs*, XIII (Summer, 1949), 95-104; William R. Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLI (June, 1954), 21-40.

5. Letters from Roosevelt to the Secretary of War, October 26, 1907, and Dewey to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, January 31, 1905; minutes of Joint Board meeting, January 29, 1908, all in JB 305, Ser. 503.

6. Letter from Roosevelt to the Secretary of War, February 11, 1908, forwarded by the Secretary of War to the President of the Joint Board, February 12, 1908, Fortification of Manila or Subic Bays, JB 305, Ser. 59, March 5, 1908.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. Letter from Dewey to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, March 5, 1908, JB 305, Ser. 59.

10. Note on a memorandum from General Bell for the Secretary of War, February 7, 1908, Retention of Battle Fleet in Pacific, JB 320, Ser. 57.

11. Hermann Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood: A Biography* (New York, 1931), II, 205; Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker* (New York, 1931), I, 40-41.

12. David F. Houston, *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet* (Garden City, N. Y., 1926), I, 66.

13. For an account of this incident, see Joint Board minutes, October 9, 1913; the diary of Leonard Wood, May 19, 1913, and the diary of Josephus Daniels, May 17, 1913, both in the Library of Congress.

14. Letter from Bell to Wood, May, 1911, in the papers of Leonard Wood in the Library of Congress. The author is indebted to Richard Challenger for this reference.

15. Letter from Dewey to the Secretary of War, February 21, 1908, Retention of Battle Fleet in Pacific, JB 320, Ser. 57; Joint Board minutes, February 21, 1908.

16. Letters from Rodgers to Dewey, March 12, 1912, and Dewey to Rodgers, June 19, 1912, General Board, Letters, I, 1900-12. The author is indebted to Richard Challener for this reference.

17. Statement of "A Proper Military Policy for the United States," prepared by War College Division, General Staff, Army War College, September, 1915 (Washington, D. C., 1915), p. 10.

18. Memorandum from the War Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, May 2, 1919, Projects and Plans for National Defense . . . ; letters from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, June 2 and 27, and July 2, 1919; joint order from the Secretaries of War and Navy, July 24, 1919. All in JB 301 (1913-19).

19. The Army members were the Chief of Staff, the Director of the Operations Division, and the Chief of the War Plans Division. The Navy members were the Chief of Naval Operations, an office established in 1915, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director of the Plans Division. In 1923, the Deputy Chief of Staff replaced the Director of the Operations Division. Membership remained virtually unchanged until 1941, when the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air (General Arnold) and the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics were added.

20. Cited in a memorandum from Brigadier General Krueger and Lieutenant Colonel L. T. Gerow for the Assistant Secretary of War, August 27, 1937, Relations between the Army and Navy, WPD 3740-1.

21. The reports of the various boards and the actions taken during these years on the question of a single department of defense and a separate air force are conveniently summarized in "Study on Department of National Defense," February, 1939, 3 vols., WPD 635-17.

22. Memorandum from Brigadier General George V. Strong for the Chief of Staff, February 3, 1939, Department of National Defense, WPD 635-47.

23. *Ibid.*

24. AR 95-5, June 20, 1941.

25. Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, 1924, JB 325, Ser. 228. After numerous drafts, the plan was completed and approved by the Joint Board and the Secretary of the Navy in August, 1924, and by the Secretary of War the following month. The relevant studies are filed in WPD 368; JB 325, Ser. 207; JB 325, Ser. 208 and 209; General Board 425, Ser. 1136. For a full account of the development of ORANGE and its place in strategic planning, see Louis Morton, "War Plan ORANGE: Evolution of a Strategy," *World Politics*, XI (January, 1959), 221-50.

26. Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal* (Boston, 1954), pp. 19-20; Ernest R. May, "Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXX (June, 1955), 167-68.

27. Quoted by May, *loc. cit.*

28. *Ibid.*

29. There is no record of a reply in the State or Navy departments. When May saw the original in State, he found it in such condition that he believed the attached charts had never been opened (May, *op. cit.*, p. 168).

30. Memorandum from the Joint Planning Committee for the Joint Board, October 28, 1919, National Policy and War Plans, JB Misc. 18.

31. Handwritten memorandum from Yarnell for Gulick, JB Misc. 18. The original memorandum (cited in note 30) is attached as inclosure.



## POLITICAL-MILITARY COLLABORATION

32. Memorandum from the Joint Board for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, December 18, 1919, Strategy of the Pacific and Policy in Connection Therewith, JB 325, Ser. 28-e.

33. Minutes, Joint Board meeting, February 12, 1920. The Secretary of the Navy directed the Board to bring the matter to his attention again in April, 1920.

34. Memorandum from the Joint Planning Committee for the Joint Board, April 14, 1921, Co-ordination of the Efforts of State, War, and Navy Departments, JB 301, Ser. 147.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Memorandum from the Joint Planning Committee for the Joint Board, October 7, 1921, Co-ordination of Efforts of State, War, and Navy Departments, JB 301, Ser. 147.

37. Memorandums from the Joint Planning Committee for the Joint Board, October 18, 1921, Co-ordination of Efforts of State, War, and Navy Departments; from the Joint Board for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, December 1, 1921; from the Secretary of the Joint Board, for the Secretary of War, December 8, 1921; letter from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, December 7, 1921, all in JB 301, Ser. 147. See also AG File 334.3 (12-1-21).

38. For reaction in the State Department, see May, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

39. Letter from Secretary Hughes to the Secretaries of War and Navy, January 17, 1922, JB 301, Ser. 147.

40. Letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State, January 25, 1922, JB 301, Ser. 147.

41. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretaries of War and Navy, March 14, 1922, JB 301, Ser. 147.

42. Memorandum from the War Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, July 22, 1939, Establishment of National Defense College . . . , WPD 2500-6.

43. Memorandum from the Joint Planning Committee for the Joint Board, September 30, 1931, College of National Defense, cited in G-3/6457-312; memorandums from G-3 for the Chief of Staff, November 11, 1936, and July 22, 1939, WPD 2500-5 and -6.

44. See Memorandum G-3 for the Chief of Staff, September 8, 1939, College of National Defense (G-3/6457-312), WPD 2500-6; May, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

45. Merlo J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes* (New York, 1950), II, 460. The General Board files on the Washington Conference are voluminous: GB 438, Ser. 1088; 420-2, Ser. 1108; and 425, Ser. 1136. Army studies are filed in WPD 77, 80, and 449. See also JB 303, Ser. 169 A and 179.

46. The relevant papers are in JB 338, Ser. 291; WPD 2938; and GB 438, Ser. 1347. For an account of one aspect of political-military collaboration in the disarmament conference, see Raymond G. O'Connor, "The 'Yardstick' and Naval Disarmament in the 1920's," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLV (December, 1958), 441-63.

47. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1947), p. 168; May, *op. cit.*, p. 170-71.

48. "Pearl Harbor Attack," *Hearings*, 79 Cong., 1 Sess., Part II, p. 455.

## TOTAL WAR AND COLD WAR

49. May, *op. cit.*, p. 172; Alexander De Conde, *Isolation and Collective Security* (Durham, N. C., 1957), pp. 57-58.

50. Joint letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State, November 26, 1935; letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, November 27, 1935, JB 305, Ser. 573.

51. JPC Development File, JB 305, Ser. 573. These studies constitute one of the largest and most valuable military files dealing with the Far East.

52. Memorandum from Stanley Hornbeck (no date), Objectives of American Foreign Policy; Appendix A to a memorandum initialed SDE [Stanley D. Embick], Military Aspects of Retention of Philippine Islands; letter from the Joint Planning Committee (Commander A. S. Carpender) to the Joint Board, February 6, 1936 (Inclosure B); letter from the Joint Planning Committee (Colonel Walter Krueger) to the Joint Board, March 5, 1936 (Inclosure A), all in JB 305, Ser. 573, JPC Development File.

53. Letter from Hughes to the Secretary of War, November 8, 1922, WPD 938-3.

54. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, February 7, 1936, WPD 3533-4. For a full account of U. S. military policy in China, see Louis Morton, "Army and Marines on China Station: A Study in Politico-Military Rivalry," *Pacific Historical Review*, February, 1960.

55. Memorandum from Hornbeck (no date), Objectives of American Foreign Policy, JB 305, Ser. 573, JPC Development File.

56. Statement by Hornbeck at the first Joint Planning Committee meeting, JB 305, Ser. 573, JPC Development File.

57. Memorandum from Colonel Sherman Miles (no date), U. S. Military Position in the Far East, JB 305, Ser. 573, JPC Development File.

58. Memorandum from Gerow for the War Plans Division, November 24, 1936, Monday Conference at State Department, WPD 3533-8.

59. Memorandum from Johnson for the President, September 1, 1937, Far Eastern Situation (OCS 20571-18), WPD 3533-11.

60. Memorandums from Eichelberger for the War Plans Division, September 15, 1937; from the War Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, September 15, 1937, from CinC Asiatic Fleet to All Asiatic Stations, 0906, September 6, 1937, all in WPD 4026.

61. Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff, February 3, 1938, Return of 15th Infantry from China, WPD 3533-11.

62. Memorandum from the Secretary of the General Staff for Record, September 11, 1940, Miscellaneous Conferences, Binder 3, Chief of Staff file. The work of the committee is briefly covered in Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, 1950), pp. 89-91.

63. Military Order, July 5, 1939; memorandum of Secretary of Joint Board, July 20, 1939, JB 346, Ser. 646.

64. Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

65. "Pearl Harbor Attack," *Hearings*, 79 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 46.

*The Popular Desire for Peace as a  
Factor in Military Policy*

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—ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR.

THE POPULAR DESIRE for peace reached its greatest intensity in the period between the two World Wars. Never before had the organized peace movement in the United States seemed so strong.<sup>1</sup> In the reaction against World War I, the American people in large part came to share the traditional liberal-pacifist indictment of all war and militarism. For the first time in American history, not only peace, but a vigorous pacifism, was popular.

Yet this widespread longing for peace could not prevent

American entrance into World War II, and it had only a limited and indirect effect on American military policy. In the first place, neither military men nor State Department officials shared the popular confidence in the possibility of a lasting peace. The citizens' desires were something that had to be catered to and, at the same time, evaded. In the second place, when, on occasion, statesmen became wholly converted to the peace goals that they had originally espoused without much enthusiasm, they were still unable to agree on the proper means or method. Thus the way to peace was constantly confused by the divergent alternatives of isolationism and collective security. From the start, American opinion was divided over the League of Nations and the World Court. Later, all but a small and steadfast minority of radical pacifists yielded their earlier dreams and retreated into acceptance of the militarists' age-old prescription of peace via preparedness for war.

### ARMY POLICY AFTER WORLD WAR I

At almost the very moment of popular rejoicing over the armistice which brought to a close the war to end wars, the United States Congress was confronted with administration plans for the continuance and expansion of American military might.<sup>2</sup> A President and a Secretary of the Navy who had originally opposed preparedness now urged a naval building program designed to give the United States supremacy over the rest of the world. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, a former pacifist, supported Army plans for universal military training and a standing force of 500,000 Regulars. Although President Wilson seems to have thought of these militant measures as weapons to strengthen his bargaining power at the Paris Peace Conference, there was still something incongruous in the juxtaposition of the continued American preparedness program and the President's appeal to world opinion in terms of a peace without victory according to his Fourteen Points.

Despite the popular desire for peace, it soon became evident that the postwar nationalistic mood of Europe would not permit the disarmament of Germany to be followed by that of the Allies. In the United States, President Wilson, in his fight to gain Senate approval for the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, confronted the American people with the alternative possibilities: the League or increased military and naval spending. But many liberals refused to accept the League or the Versailles Treaty as consonant with Wilson's own peace ideals, and conservative critics also questioned the President's sincerity. Henry Cabot Lodge, a foe of the President but always a friend of the Navy, told his fellow Senators, ". . . It seems to me extraordinary that we should enter on a scheme for eternal peace throughout the world by proposing to build a Navy which in seven years is to be equal to that of England. . . . How it fits in with the policy of reduction of naval and military forces or with the high objects of a league of nations I can not conceive."<sup>3</sup>

Congressional opposition prevented passage of either the administration's naval building program or any measure for compulsory military training. Over three million men were quickly mustered out of service. As compared with that in the post-World War II years, demobilization was rapid. It is easy to conclude, therefore, that the popular desire for peace, the liberal hostility to militarism, and the business demand for economy, had all combined to force a cutback in military spending. Certainly, there is little doubt that churches and peace organizations, together with farm, labor, business, and educational groups, were able to marshal public sentiment behind the call for disarmament.<sup>4</sup>

The important point, however, is that despite all the postwar popular enthusiasm for peace and "normalcy," little actually was to be accomplished along these lines. If we look at military policy in terms of 1913, rather than from the vantage point of the 1950's, it becomes apparent that the post-armistice mood was not translated into military and naval policy. Demobilization and



disarmament applied only to the recent wartime establishment; otherwise, the Army and the Navy were larger and more powerful than they had been theretofore. It is true that the Army Act of June 4, 1920, was in many ways a defeat for the administration and the War Department. It did not provide the Regular Army of 500,000 men requested by Secretary Baker; and complete centralization and federal control of the National Guard were defeated. On the other hand, the Army General Staff was now given administrative as well as advisory duties,<sup>5</sup> and under an aggressive Chief like General MacArthur in the 1930's, the civilian Secretary of War receded into the background.<sup>6</sup>

Although reduced in size from War Department goals, the Regular Army, fluctuating at around 125,000 men in the 1920's, was larger than the pre-World War I force of less than 100,000 men. More importantly, the Army was strengthened by the continuance of the wartime Citizens' Military Training Camps and by the expansion of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps in colleges and universities. Thus the total Army including reserves stood at 212,837 men in 1913, while ten years later it comprised 371,770 men.<sup>7</sup>

The Regular Army after World War I was an elite corps, a standing army of professionals with a high ratio of officers to men. It could be expanded to meet an emergency, and in peacetime it served as an educational and training force for the CMTC and the ROTC. Through these programs the number of individuals receiving military training was increased despite the economies of the Harding-Coolidge era. Secretary of War Weeks found the solution to the general demand for economy in this growth of a citizen army, and his successor, Dwight F. Davis, pointed out that "the Regular as a component of the Army of the United States has become to all intents and purposes a great institution of military instruction." "But," he added, "the instructional role played by the Regular Army in the present scheme of national defense has not been sufficiently understood."<sup>8</sup> The misunder-

standing stemmed from the fact that observers who noted only the small size of the Regular Army could deduce that it was merely a national, or at most a Western Hemisphere, police force. But viewed as the nucleus for an expanded army of reservists, volunteers, or draftees, the Regular Army organization looked to full-scale aggressive war and not to defense alone. The cost of such an army, according to Secretary Weeks, was a necessary part of preparedness for the competition of life and the protection of vital national economic interests.<sup>9</sup>

### NAVAL POLICY

Though the Army was stronger than most Americans realized, it was the Navy that was the chief object of the popular demand for disarmament. The Army was small by European standards, while the Navy "emerged from the war incomparably stronger and more powerful than ever before—second only to that of Great Britain and far in advance of any other foreign navy, in ships, in men, and every element of strength."<sup>10</sup> Despite the demobilization of over 400,000 men, by the close of 1919 the Navy had twice as many enlisted men in uniform as there had been in January, 1917. According to Secretary Daniels, the large American Navy and the large building program of 1919 were forces for peace.<sup>11</sup> This, however, was a somewhat questionable assumption, in view of the naval race with Great Britain and Japan that was touched off by American construction. Compelled to forego its new three-year program by Congressional opposition, the Navy was able, nevertheless, under the 1916 act, to build many more ships of war in the three years after the armistice than the rest of the world combined.<sup>12</sup> When the Washington Disarmament Conference became a reality, Secretary Edwin Denby noted that the Navy Department "was entirely in sympathy with the purpose of this conference and lent its wholehearted aid to the success of this endeavor." But Denby

also cited with approval the continued American naval policy, as formulated by the General Board of the Navy, "to create, maintain, and operate a Navy second to none."<sup>13</sup>

The significance of the Washington Conference was probably exaggerated by both the advocates and the opponents of naval disarmament. The conference was successful in placing a limitation on future construction, and in so doing it stopped the race in capital ships, but it did not secure any great over-all reduction in existing total strength except in terms of ships that were overage or were still being built. As Senator Borah and others pointed out in the debate on the treaties, large armaments still existed on land and sea. The senator was appalled by the haggling among the delegates to make certain that each nation suffered no loss in fighting strength, and he later observed, unhappily: "Insincerity in disarmament has been reduced to a science."<sup>14</sup>

Following the Washington Conference, a new naval race developed in cruisers and other categories not covered by the 1921 pact. Congress, therefore, appended to the annual naval bills, beginning in 1922, requests that the President call a conference to consider further disarmament on land as well as sea. In introducing such a resolution in 1924, Senator Claude Swanson, later to be Franklin D. Roosevelt's first Secretary of the Navy, told his colleagues: "The strongest nation in the world, the most threatening nation so far as potential political power is concerned, is the United States. The rest of the world will not consent to disarm either in aircraft, in naval armament, or in military armament of any kind, until they have an understanding with the United States."<sup>15</sup>

As Senator Swanson pointed out, if world disarmament was to have any reality, the United States would have to co-operate or even to assume leadership. Although not a member of the League of Nations, the United States participated informally in the League's efforts for disarmament. The Geneva Disarmament Conference called by President Coolidge in 1927 proved a failure, but the Kellogg-Briand Pact signed the following year and the

new naval agreement reached in London in 1930 brought the disarmament movement to its peak of success. In the midst of these achievements, President Hoover told Secretary of State Stimson: "It seems to me that there is the most profound outlook for peace today that we have had at any time in the last half century . . . it occurs to me that the dangers of war during the next six or ten years . . . are inconceivably less than they have been at any period since the Great War."<sup>16</sup>

Secretary Stimson, in turn, belabored those naval officers who criticized the London Treaty as men imbued with the war system. "They are handicapped by a kind of training which tends to make men think of war as the only possible defense against war."<sup>17</sup> Stimson appealed to the force of public opinion to persuade the Senate to ratify the London Treaty. A military-minded civilian throughout most of his career, he had nevertheless become, at least temporarily, a part of the optimistic climate of peace that characterized the early years of the Great Depression. Yet despite the enthusiasm for disarmament and the outlawry of war engendered even among those who had originally been skeptical of such causes, it was still an open question whether the treaties' significance was not principally symbolic. The agreements tended to appease public opinion, assuaging collective guilt feelings over the late war, and concealing the extent to which the world continued to rearm. Thus the pacts always had an air of tragic unreality.<sup>18</sup>

In practice, neither Kellogg Pact nor London Treaty had any marked effect on American military policy. The Kellogg Pact and a bill to authorize the construction of fifteen additional cruisers were on the United States Senate agenda at the same time. This strange coincidence prompted one historian to remark: "It was a miraculous chamber, debating the rosy-tinted pledges for the renunciation of war and in the next moment urging appropriations for fighting ships."<sup>19</sup>

Although the London Treaty and action by the Hoover administration halted cruiser construction, naval rebuilding was

only temporarily interrupted. Since Americans traditionally thought of the Navy as a defensive force, perhaps large naval appropriations did not contradict their desire for peace. Actually, the military's plan ORANGE, blueprinting a possible war with Japan, was not based on relative naval strength according to treaty agreements, but on the existing strength of the two countries. Neither the United States nor Japan, in 1930, possessed offensive capabilities beyond its own area of the Pacific. An American movement westward from Hawaii would have required a political decision by the President. Otherwise, if both the United States and Japan built up to treaty strength, their prevailing comparative strength would not have been altered. A War Plans estimate in 1930 viewed the United States Navy as superior in light cruisers and destroyers and equal in submarines although the Japanese submarines were the more modern ones. In any case, the submarine was largely a defensive weapon, giving Japan an advantage in the Western Pacific. For the United States, the London Treaty affected ORANGE only in terms of launching an offensive west of Hawaii.<sup>20</sup>

From the time of the first Hague Conference in 1899, disarmament meetings seldom occurred without a full complement of military advisors at the side of the diplomats. Nor did the results of these conferences weaken American national security. In 1931, when the League of Nations proposed a truce on rearming, Secretary of State Stimson reassured military leaders. Even if invoked, he pointed out, the "truce does not apply to construction which had been begun or for which contracts had been let prior to its entry into force." He added, "in so far as can be seen, the proposed truce does not seriously affect the Navy. It permits the completion of ships building or contracted for; it permits replacement building; and it would seem, by omission of any provision to the contrary, that it permits authorization and appropriation for other vessels provided they are not begun before November 1, 1932."<sup>21</sup> When the last of the League of Nations disarmament conferences began its sessions at Geneva in 1932,



General MacArthur, in discussing its work, told the War Department's official observer: "I am very much pleased at the general way in which the entire matter is shaping up. Mr. Stimson is conferring with me at every step,—a condition which is most desirable from every standpoint." <sup>22</sup>

### ARMY-NAVY ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZED PEACE MOVEMENT

In the generation between the two World Wars, another measure of the lack of correlation between the popular desire for peace and American military policy can be seen in the Army and Navy's attitude toward the organized peace movement. The respective positions conflicted, of course—over means, if not long-range goals. Usually, it is assumed that during the twenties and thirties it was the military point of view and leadership which were on the defensive. Actually, however, for most of the period this was not the case. In respect to mere external considerations and, at times, in regard to publicity and propaganda, the military seemed to suffer; but beneath the surface, military policy remained unchanged. Indeed, both the War and Navy departments became adept at turning peace propaganda to their own advantage. When this was not possible, the patriotism of the advocates of peace was questioned, and the individuals concerned were attacked as dangerous radicals.

"Please secure if practicable some of the propaganda which is being sent out by the National Council for Limitation of Armaments. The Secretary would like particularly to see some of the objectionable bolshevist stuff." <sup>23</sup> This note from the Deputy Chief of Staff to the Acting Chief of Staff, G-2, was written while the Senate debated ratification of the treaties of the Washington Disarmament Conference. It expressed a War Department attitude under which peace groups were investigated by Army Intelligence or by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Since it was hardly expedient or legal for the Army to divulge

the information gathered by its investigators, it adopted the interesting device of referring inquiries to such conservative, patriotic organizations as the Daughters of the American Revolution. The DAR was, in the meantime, supplied with the confidential data which enabled it to give out unofficial and, of course, also highly unfavorable reports on the peace societies.<sup>24</sup>

In the nation's colleges, the War Department carried on a running propaganda battle with church, educational, and peace groups that were attempting to eliminate compulsion in the ROTC programs. Even though these groups, under the co-ordinating leadership of the Committee on Militarism in Education, made considerable headway in modifying ROTC programs on college campuses, the Army was still able to offer military training to an increasing number of American youths. The War Department was reluctant to attack the CME directly and suggested instead the use of Reserve Officers to counter pacifist propaganda.<sup>25</sup>

With regard to the closely allied program of military instruction provided in the Citizens' Military Training Camps, the War Department took effective steps to overcome organized labor's traditional hostility. The Army's semiofficial observer at conventions of the American Federation of Labor after the war was able to secure a provisional endorsement in principle of the CMTC. Labor's concern was whether the camps were militaristic devices, but after William Green and the executive committee of the AF of L were entertained at Plattsburg, they recommended an unqualified approval of the camps to their next annual labor convention.<sup>26</sup> Major General C. P. Summerall, in reporting the visit, wrote to his superiors in Washington:

No doubt you have read the published reports of the expressions of approval of Mr. Greene [*sic*] and his associates of the C.M.T.C. at Plattsburg. The results have been gratifying beyond our highest expectations. Mr. Greene's address at the Labor Union dinner on Friday was quite the noblest and most fervent expression of patriotism, loyalty and good citizenship that I have ever heard. Every mem-

## THE POPULAR DESIRE FOR PEACE

ber of his Council arose and publicly expressed the most hearty approval.<sup>27</sup>

By close co-operation with various patriotic groups, the Army and Navy were often able to present their point of view to the American people in a non-official way. Thus the American Legion commanded a large, and the Navy League an influential, membership. Navy Day, first celebrated the year after the Washington Conference, became the first event to be broadcast over a nationwide radio network. Like Navy Day, Armistice Day soon became an occasion for advocating greater military preparedness, and the original significance of the day as a celebration of peace declined until it was lost almost entirely after World War II.<sup>28</sup>

## EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC DEPRESSION

With the economic collapse of 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression, the peace movement in the United States became more isolationist, while American military policy became more aggressive. At first, the Depression enforced a kind of timidity upon statesmen, strengthening earlier demands for economy and disarmament. President Hoover continued the Coolidge policies along these lines, emphasizing the large amount of the national budget that was devoted to war and preparedness. But the situation quickly changed as the deepening economic collapse placed pressures on all governments which dictators and democrats alike sought to alleviate through greater military spending. The hope of disarmament by international agreement collapsed at the Geneva Conference in 1933, and the American people turned accordingly to the alternative of an isolationist peace. Instead of preventing war in the world, the emphasis now was to be upon keeping America out of a coming struggle that seemed all but inevitable. Congress, therefore, began a serious study of the problem of war profits and their relation to American neutrality.<sup>29</sup>

Legislation to curb wartime profits was originally supported as a peace measure in the 1920's by both the American Legion and

pacifist-liberal groups. Presented to Congress as a universal-draft bill, the legislation was also associated with the War Department's Industrial Mobilization Plan. This latter tie gradually disillusioned peace leaders who felt that legislation to limit profits, instead of preventing war, would merely facilitate the conscription of American industry and manpower. If preparedness was encouraged by being made economical and efficient, war might become more, rather than less, likely an outcome. In 1930, Congress, in response to conflicting pressures in regard to war profits, created a joint Congressional-Cabinet committee under the title, a commission "to promote peace and to equalize the burdens and to remove the profits of war." Headed by the Secretary of War, Patrick Hurley, and generally known as the War Policies Commission, there is little doubt that the abbreviated title was a better description of the commission's major interest and function. As former Congressman Richard Bartholdt told its members, the absence of State Department officials, and the deference paid to War Department spokesman at the hearings "seems to indicate that you are concerned in preparations for the eventuality of war rather than those for peace."<sup>30</sup>

Modern war, as both militarist and pacifist realized, was total in scope and required the full mobilization of the nation's economic resources and manpower. Disillusioned over the prospects of preventing war by eliminating profits or by cutting armaments, the popular desire for peace by the mid-thirties rallied behind the neutrality legislation that was passed in the wake of the Nye Committee's investigations. The idea of an embargo to enforce American neutrality and peace went back to the presidency of Thomas Jefferson. But the hope for an isolationist peace for the future was short-lived. The neutrality laws were gradually revamped to give the President a greater measure of selective discretion in their application. So modified, the legislation could serve the purposes of American intervention and participation in the effort to achieve collective security against Germany and Japan.

Already the Kellogg Pact, later so bitterly denounced as an

example of pacifist wishful thinking, had been used by Secretary of State Stimson in his protests against the Japanese march into Manchuria. Never wholly accepted in peace circles as a realistic measure since it froze the international status quo and did not provide for peaceful change, it is important to note that the pact was more useful as an instrument of American diplomatic and military policy than as a means of preserving world peace. Its final service came at the Nuremberg war-guilt trials when the Allied Tribunal was forced to use it as a basis of prosecution. All wars, preventive or defensive, just or unjust, were conveniently regarded as illegal only if they were waged after the Kellogg Pact. Thus the pact found a belated and rather unintended utility.<sup>31</sup>

Meanwhile, neither Kellogg Pact nor neutrality legislation hampered American national security. In the early 1930's, when the Army was at its lowest ebb, there hardly seemed much necessity for greater preparedness. Even the American Legion, at its convention in 1933, called for only a modest expansion of the Regular Army to 14,000 officers and 165,000 enlisted men, plus National Guard and reserves.<sup>32</sup> The chief problem for both the Army and the Navy was to persuade the people and Congress to support preparedness beyond the scope of mere continental defense. As late as 1939, an official Army historian wrote: "It was wiser to ask Congress for support in defending the South American approach to the Canal than in providing resistance to Hitler elsewhere; it was more visibly a 'defensive' measure." Hemisphere defense also "helped materially to provide an escape from the old idea of 'national' defense and a basic change in concept from passive defense to a dynamic defense designed to go into action before the enemy could launch his attack, and this was a vital change."<sup>33</sup>

The Navy, traditionally regarded as the first line of defense, had little trouble in gaining support for its rebuilding program in the 1930's. With the coming of the New Deal, Congress authorized construction to the full limits allowed by the Washington



and London treaties. In 1934, after Japan gave the required two-year's notice that it would no longer be bound by earlier treaty limitations, the naval race was resumed in earnest. At first, naval construction in the United States was regarded largely as a Depression measure, and the diversion of NRA and PWA funds for battleships concealed the true size of the military budget. Secretary of the Navy Swanson, in his initial report, hailed the use of NRA money to construct thirty-two naval vessels as the "outstanding event of the year for the Navy." The Secretary declared that "the benefits of a progressive building program would be many," and that "its economic effect would be Nationwide. . . . Most important of all, it would permit us, at greatly reduced cost to taxpayers, to maintain a Navy of modern ships, second to none, as provided for by the naval treaties."<sup>34</sup> With the help of the New Deal, the Navy circumvented the pacifism of the thirties. At the end of the decade, the United States was outbuilding Japan by a considerable margin in battleships and submarines, and the outbreak of the war found the United States well on the way to having a two-ocean Navy. A Foreign Policy Report of April, 1941, asserted: "The scope of the Navy's plans for expansion can scarcely be depicted without the use of superlatives."<sup>35</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The popular desire for peace that characterized the two decades following World War I had not been able to prevent the coming of another great world struggle. But neither had peace sentiment interfered significantly with American military and naval policy, nor had it prevented the mobilization of American strength before Pearl Harbor. It was a curious generation, aptly described by Carl Becker as "Loving Peace and Waging War."<sup>36</sup> The Army had a trained nucleus and plans for its increase via Selective Service. The Navy had been rebuilding since 1933. The Air Force, despite seeming unreadiness because of rapid expan-

sion and the diversion of production to England, was ready for combat and fully capable of protecting the continental United States.

For good or ill, therefore, the popular American desire for peace played a minor role in the determination of American military policy. The desire for peace had, instead, been influenced by military considerations to the point where peace by moral force or suasion yielded almost completely to the theory of peace by armed force and power. If this theory seemed at odds with the average individual's moral code, it was perhaps because, as Reinhold Niebuhr has observed: "A rational society will probably place a greater emphasis upon the ends and purposes for which coercion is used than upon the elimination of coercion and conflict."<sup>37</sup>

Only such a philosophy of ends justifying means can explain today's nuclear weapons and the changed point of view of the American people as compared with a generation ago. On all matters involving war and preparedness—including a Navy and Air Force second to none, peacetime military training, and skepticism of any peace teaching—there has been a drastic shift from the opinions held in the 1920's and 30's.<sup>38</sup> Whether the present cold-war generation is wiser than the earlier postwar generation of its fathers, is a question that awaits the verdict of history, however. It is hardly fitting for us to say that old faiths were wrong because, in a true sense, they were never really applied.

1. Merle Curti, *Peace or War* (New York, 1936), chap. ix, *passim*; Robert Bowers, "The American Peace Movement, 1935-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1949); Robert H. Ferrell, "The Peace Movement," in *Isolation and Security*, ed. Alexander De Conde (Durham, N. C., 1957), chap. iv.

2. Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *The Civilian and the Military* (New York, 1956), pp. 195 ff.

3. *Congressional Record*, December 21, 1918, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., p. 727.

4. C. Leonard Hoag, *Preface to Preparedness: The Washington Disarmament Conference and Public Opinion* (Washington, D. C., 1941), chaps. v-vi.

5. John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (New York, 1922), p. 363; Howard White, *Executive Influence in Determining Military Policy in the United*

*States* (Urbana, Ill., 1925), pp. 261-65; B. G. Franklin, "The Military Policy of the United States, 1918-1933" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1943).

6. For example, the *Report of the Secretary of War . . . 1933* (Washington, D. C., 1933) contains only three short paragraphs by Secretary Dern as compared with General MacArthur's forty pages.

7. *Report of the Secretary of War . . . 1923* (Washington, D. C., 1923), p. 11.

8. *Report of the Secretary of War . . . 1924* (Washington, D. C., 1924), pp. 1, 27; *Report of the Secretary of War . . . 1925* (Washington, D. C., 1925), p. 4.

9. *Report of the Secretary of War . . . 1923* (Washington, D. C., 1923), pp. 9, 19.

10. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy . . . 1919* (Washington, D. C., 1919), pp. 4-5.

11. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy . . . 1920* (Washington, D. C., 1920), pp. 2-8, Appendix A.

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*Interservice Competition and the Political  
Roles of the Armed Services*

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THE ARMED SERVICES lead many lives—administrative, tactical, bureaucratic, military, professional, and political. This paper deals only with the political. It focuses specifically on the armed services. It is not concerned with the political role of the military in general in American society, with the impact of politics on military professionalism, with whether the advice of the Joint Chiefs is political or military, or with the conflicting allegiances of the military to President and Congress. The service is the unit of investigation. The generalizations which are



advanced concern this one type of organizational unit within the military establishment, not the military establishment as a whole. It is entirely possible, for instance, that the services could decline in importance at the same time that the military in general increased in importance.

It is also assumed in this paper that the armed services have significant political roles and that these roles can best be understood by analyzing a service as a political-interest group, just as one might analyze the Farm Bureau Federation or the National Association of Manufacturers. The concept of a political-interest group is a well-developed one in political science, and for several years, political scientists have approached civilian bureaucratic agencies in these terms.<sup>1</sup> An armed service, like other executive agencies, has certain interests, and it engages in a certain minimum amount of political activity to further those interests, to carry forward its program, to ward off its enemies, to arouse support from its friends, and to secure the requisite appropriations from a sometimes reluctant Congress. This assumption does not imply that service interests necessarily conflict with the public interest. By and large, the armed services have a highly developed sense of loyalty and duty to the public good. Necessarily, however, they must interpret that good; and, necessarily, the interpretations of any one service differ from those of other groups. The conflicting interests of the services and other agencies represent, not alternatives to the public interest, but aspects of it. Politics is the process of resolving by conscious human decision these opposing claims on scarce resources, and a service becomes a political-interest group to the extent that its claims conflict with the claims of other groups. The more "controversial" the issues with which it is involved, the more the service tends to cohere and to act as a political unit: the more important its political life becomes in the total fabric of its existence. Conflict, potential or actual, is the essence of politics; and it is appropriate, therefore, to begin with the changes in the nature of service political controversy during the last quarter century.

INTERSERVICE CONTROVERSY AND CIVIL-MILITARY  
RELATIONS

Service political controversy between the World Wars had at least two distinguishing characteristics. First, in most issues, a military service plus perhaps a few satellite groups opposed a number of reasonably strong civilian groups. Each service waged a continuing struggle in defense of its interests against a variety of civilian isolationists, pacifists, and economizers. The Navy and the shipbuilding industry fought a lonely battle against dominant groups in both political parties in the struggles over naval disarmament. The Army lost its fight for universal service after World War I, but throughout the twenties clashed with educational, labor, and religious groups over the compulsory aspects of ROTC and with various other groups over the requirements for industrial-mobilization preparation. Even more significant were the annual budget encounters where the issue was usually clearly drawn between service supporters who stressed preparedness and associated values, and their opponents who decried the necessity and the legitimacy of substantial military expenditures. To the extent that the services were in politics, they were involved in conflicts with civilian groups. Behind each specific opponent of the moment was that broad and deeply ingrained antimilitary sentiment which had characterized American society since the eighteenth century.<sup>2</sup>

A second crucial aspect of prewar service political battles was that each service waged its own independent of the others. Throughout the 1920's and 30's, the services co-operated with a reasonable degree of success in strategic planning through the Joint Board and in a small number of other enterprises. Since strategic planning involved no immediate claims upon scarce resources, however, it did not produce any real political conflict. The most significant intramilitary controversies involved the efforts of the two semi-services, the Air Corps and, to a lesser extent, the Marine Corps, to achieve greater autonomy and *de*

*jure* recognition as services. This was a foretaste of the future. The two major services, however, seldom fought each other politically and virtually never helped each other. They were distinct departments. Separate pieces of legislation, handled by separate Military and Naval Affairs committees, established and organized them, authorized their strengths, prescribed their systems of promotion and recruitment. Separate appropriations subcommittees provided their funds in separate supply bills.<sup>3</sup> The political successes and failures of one service had little implication for the other: the National Defense Act of 1920 boded neither good nor ill for the Navy; the Vinson Acts of the 1930's neither assumed nor precluded an increase in the Army. Each service struggled along in its own world with its peculiarities and preoccupations, its own friends and enemies.<sup>4</sup>

In some respects the prewar pattern of relationships persisted into the postwar period. The traditional service-civilian conflict reappeared in the struggles between the Navy and the State Department over the Japanese mandates, the military and the scientists over the control of atomic energy, and the Army and a number of civilian groups over universal military training. These conflicts, however, were but holdovers from a previous era. The primary locus of service political activity shifted drastically. World War II had destroyed the separate political universes of the services. The development of new weapons and the emergence of a new role for the United States in world affairs meant a change in the old functions and activities of the services. Each had reason to view its future with concern, and their futures were now interdependent. The new role of the Army would reflect not only its new weapons and responsibilities, but also what happened to the Navy and Air Force. The concerns which each service had for the future tended to focus into a fear of how the other services might affect its future. A unified defense organization meant competition over organizational position and strategic doctrine. A unified appropriations process meant competition for funds. The interservice battle over unification between 1944 and

1947 was not only a model for the future, but it also shaped the nature of that future. Interservice rivalry, in short, was the inevitable result of unification, its child and its consequence. Together, both reflected the unity and complexity of modern war, and without the one, the other would never have come into existence.

After World War II, interservice controversy replaced civilian-service controversy as the main focus of service political activity. The transition is graphically illustrated in the battle over universal military training between 1945 and 1948. The lines of battle were initially drawn between the Army and certain patriotic and veterans groups, on the one hand, and various civilian educational, religious, pacifist, and farm groups on the other. The Army took its case for UMT to the country, employing press, radio, pamphlets, civilian advisory committees, the Fort Knox demonstration unit, organizational contacts, and all the vast panoply of modern public-relations techniques. Its state of mind was reflected in General Collins' angry declaration in March, 1947, that "we are constantly being attacked in the Army today by elements, dissident elements, communistic or extreme left-wingers in civil life who are taking shots at the Army, primarily because they are trying to tear it down."<sup>5</sup> UMT's opponents replied in kind with dire warnings of the dangers of militarization. Here, indeed, was a conflict in the classic pattern of the 1920's and 30's with all the familiar arguments, clichés, and symbolism. The resolution of the issue in 1948, however, reflected not so much the relative strength or persuasiveness of the two coalitions as it did the relative appeals of the Army and Air Force strategic doctrines. The issue was redefined from "UMT vs. no-UMT" to "UMT vs. a seventy-group Air Force." "The effect of the Finletter report and of the Brewster-Hinshaw Board," Forrestal noted in his diary for March 8, 1948, "has been to convince the country that by a substantial increase in appropriations for Air, there would be no necessity for UMT."<sup>6</sup> Reflecting this sentiment, Congress added \$822 million to Air

Force appropriations, and the UMT legislation died in committee.<sup>7</sup> The conflict between the military and a few affiliated groups and an extensive coalition of civilian groups had become a conflict of one service against another.

Interservice rivalry thus became a permanent fixture of the situation in which the services found themselves after World War II. It was built into the structure of the Department of Defense. Of necessity, the services became natural rivals, and their rivalry continued, now latent, now exploding, irrespective of changes in public policy or shifts in military strategy. The big controversies over strategies, budgets, organization—not to mention most of the minor ones—all involved conflicts among the services. Conflicts between one bureau and another are not unknown in other departments of government, but nowhere else was intradepartmental conflict institutionalized in quite the way it was in the military structure.

Interservice controversy also had a direct impact on civil-military relations. Potential conflict between civil and military institutions was sublimated and deflected into conflict among the military groups. Interservice controversy substituted for civil-military controversy, and became a key aspect in the maintenance of civilian control. The two classic foci of civil-military relations in modern states have been between the foreign-affairs office and the military, on the one hand, and between the military and the budgetary agencies on the other. Foreign offices make demands upon defense establishments for military support. The military make demands upon the budget agencies for the resources that they judge necessary to maintain the forces required by foreign policy. In a sense, the military are continuously between the upper and the nether millstones. American civil-military relations in the postwar decade, however, were characterized by the relative lack of sharp conflict between the military as a whole, on the one hand, and the State Department and Budget Bureau, on the other. Conflicts there were, but no major head-on collisions between a united Defense Department and these other agencies.



Why was this? The reason lies partly in the extent to which potential conflict among the military, State Department, and Budget Bureau was deflected into conflict among the services. In effect, service rivalry permitted the civilian agencies to pick and choose. When the State Department wanted to reinforce Europe in 1950, the Air Force took a rather skeptical attitude, but the Army moved in to help develop and merchandise the policy. Conversely, when the Secretary of State enunciated a policy of massive retaliation, the Army dissented, but the now-favored Air Force congratulated the diplomats on their military common sense. Similarly, when the budget was reduced in Fiscal 1955, the Air Force was pleased with the new emphasis, and the Army fought alone against the cuts. In short, interservice competition added an extra dimension to the policy-making process which drastically moderated the potential clashes across the civil-military boundary.

Nowhere was this tendency more clearly illustrated than in the commonplace observation that the intensity of interservice rivalry tended to vary inversely with the size of the military budget. One has only to think of how different civil-military relations before and after the Korean war would have been if the frustrations and anger generated by the Johnson and Wilson budgets had not in part been dissipated on other services and other strategic doctrines. Indeed, at no point in the history of military policy after World War II were the President and his Budget Bureau confronted with a truly joint, integrated military program, publicly announced and supported by all military men as the indispensable minimum for national security. The imprimatur which the Joint Chiefs bestowed upon force-level recommendations was seldom more than *pro forma*. The minimum programs were service minimum programs for 70, 143, or 137 wings; for one *United States*, ten *Forrestals*, or a series of nuclear carriers; for 12, 24, or 27 divisions. The oft-commented-upon failure of the American military to have a distinctive "military viewpoint" on national policy after World War II was

perhaps not unrelated to the presence of distinctive service viewpoints.

Interservice controversy rendered unlikely any military rejection of the civilian world and civilian values such as had occurred in the latter part of the nineteenth century and between the two World Wars. Each service now was impelled to adjust its outlook to the prevailing political and social ideas or risk falling behind its rivals. Interservice conflict thus tended to draw the military out of their service shells so far as civil-military relations were concerned, and then to drive them right back with respect to intramilitary relations. Politicization of the military meant both a less military attitude in dealing with civilians and more sophisticated political techniques in dealing with other military groups.

In almost every modern state, the division of the military forces into two or more separate groups has been used to bolster civilian control. Totalitarian states create SS or MVD troops to check their regular forces. The Founding Fathers provided for both a militia and a regular army. After World War II, interservice rivalry played a similar role. "I want competition," Representative Vinson is quoted as declaring,<sup>8</sup> and Congressional and civilian executive groups, at times without recognizing it, profited from its presence. On the one hand, interservice rivalry furnished the civilian agencies with leverage against the Defense Department.<sup>9</sup> On the other, it gave those same agencies a whipping boy upon whom to blame deficiencies in the military establishment for which just possibly they might be held responsible. The civilian deprecations of interservice rivalry were without doubt sincere and well-meant, but couched in generalities, they seldom resulted in concrete remedial action.

So, too, with civilian attitudes toward service political activities. The latter were devoted not so much to challenging civilian values and interests as they had been previously, but rather to demonstrating that the values and interests of one service more closely resembled those of the civilians than did those of another.

The civilian group was more frequently an arbiter than an opponent. Thus in one sense, service political activities enhanced rather than challenged civilian control. In 1946 and 1947, when the War Department clashed directly with a number of powerful civilian groups, it was investigated and soundly denounced by a Congressional committee for using public funds for its "military propaganda" promoting UMT legislation. The National Education Association and other anti-UMT organizations had every reason to focus attention on the alleged military misuse of public funds. Service political activity directed at other services, however, inspired no such exposé. In interservice controversy, neither private groups nor Congressional ones stood to gain by drastically reducing the service activities, and after the B-36 investigation in particular, it would be an extremely virtuous or an extremely foolhardy service which charged another with illegitimate political techniques.<sup>10</sup> In the nature of things, the sporadic Congressional and executive efforts to curtail service politics seldom succeeded. Implicitly, service activity directed at other services was more acceptable than service activity directed at civilians. The services themselves undoubtedly found it easier and perhaps more virtuous to tangle with each other than to challenge civilian groups and arouse the hallowed shibboleths of civilian control.

### THE INTERSERVICE RATIONALE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

After World War II, service political activities expanded tremendously in size, scope, variety, and intensity. In part, this expansion was the natural result of the new importance of the military in American society. In even larger part, perhaps, it was closely associated with interservice competition. The involvement of military men and military institutions in national politics was probably greater in the late 1940's than it was in the late 1950's. The proliferation of service political instrumentalities and techniques, however, continued unabated throughout the decade. Similarly, in the middle 1950's, proprietary issues were replacing

existential and strategic issues in interservice debate, yet the intensity of the debate did not subside. Competitive emulation provided the impetus for the multiplication of service political activities. "The Jupiter," as Wernher von Braun who was defending the Army's missile program explained at the trial of Colonel Nickerson, "involves several million dollars of the taxpayers' money. One hundred percent security would mean no information for the public, no money for the Army, no Jupiter. . . . The Army has got to play the same game as the Air Force and the Navy."<sup>11</sup> A new step by any one service was matched by comparable steps from the others. In the winter of 1955-56, for instance, the Air Force prepared an elaborate press campaign to celebrate the tenth anniversary of SAC. In addition to an "extended world-wide campaign lasting through mid-'58," an intensive campaign was scheduled to begin March 21, 1956, and to last several months. The program was designed to be "full of vitality" and to "implant logical conclusions" in the public mind rather than aimed simply at "flooding the public with facts." The intensive campaign, in the words of one newspaper account, was supposed to be a "'true and inspired publicity effort' focusing on a 'decade of global security through air-power' to show the Air Force as 'the dominant, decisive force' in 'all forms of conflict.'"<sup>12</sup> Not surprisingly, almost simultaneously the Navy announced that it was adding to its "long range" public-relations program a special six-month campaign beginning April 1, 1956, and designed to stress three themes: "(1) The U. S. depends on the Navy more today than ever before; (2) in global war the oceans become a giant, interconnected battlefield surrounding all continents; (3) the U. S. Navy is more important than ever."<sup>13</sup> The activities of the other services, particularly those of the Air Force, necessarily led to Army replies, which included the leaking to newspaper correspondents of staff studies with such titles as "A Decade of Insecurity through Global Air Power," "The Facts Versus Billy Mitchell," and "A New Great Debate—Problems of National Security." The latter declared

that: "The air power concept, unless modified, can only lead the United States to disaster; it is an unflexible, unrealistic philosophy of war . . . ." <sup>14</sup>

Interservice competition was a justification for, as well as a cause of, service political activities. Traditionally, and again immediately after World War II, service appeals to their officers to be public relations-conscious stressed the close interrelation of political and military affairs and the general responsibility of military officers to enlighten the public on the needs of national security: statesmen had to be informed about and had to direct military affairs; military officers had to be informed about and had to participate in political activities. Gradually, however, the stress on the public-relations responsibility of the officer came more and more to assume a service-oriented approach. Exhortations to political action were couched in terms of putting the service view across—informing the public of the indispensability of sea, air, or land power to national security.<sup>15</sup>

From this concern it was only one step to justifying service political action directly in terms of the relative political position and status of the services. Each service, with the notable exception of the Marine Corps, developed an image of itself as the "silent service," politically underprivileged, misunderstood by the public, and incapable of competing in the public arena with its more articulate and dramatic rivals. The ritualistic deploring of its inferiority furnished a perfect rationale for, and incentive to, service political action. Each service's feeling of inadequacy was undoubtedly real, and in this respect it was but another manifestation of the uncertainty and lack of self-confidence which lay at the root of interservice competition.

One might expect that the weaker a service was, the more frequently it would lament its poor public standing. In actuality, however, the reverse relationship appears to be closer to the truth. The stronger a service was, the more often it tended to deplore its inadequate influence. Perhaps the greater its power and the more extensive its activities, the more the service felt the need to justify them by stressing how weak it was. Con-



ceivably, too, feelings of inadequacy derive more from the gap between a service's power and its aspirations than from its power compared with that of its rivals. Or it may be that bemoaning the state of one's public relations is itself an inherent part of public-relations activity, and it increases as the latter increases. In any event, by almost any standard, the Air Force was the strongest service politically during the postwar decade. It consistently outscored its rivals, for instance, in public opinion polls; and after 1951, it regularly received the lion's share of the Defense Department budget. Yet the Air Force undoubtedly complained the most about its political weakness. The Air Force, one of its generals declared, had "a special problem in public relations" because most Americans did not understand the basic concepts of strategic air power and believed air power to be too expensive.<sup>16</sup> "The Vice Chief of Staff," an Air Force journal reported in 1954, "is convinced that the Air Force has failed to keep the public properly informed."<sup>17</sup> At the same time, an outstanding civilian supporter of air power declared bluntly that after World War II the Air Force had "loused up its public relations" and the result was that "the public, with deep-set convictions on the subject of air power, had no convictions about the Air Force itself."<sup>18</sup> Another leading air-power spokesman, a distinguished lawyer and a brigadier general in the Air Force Reserve, compiled an imposing list of obstacles to the development of American air power:

Air power is the victim of cultural lag. . . . The military commentators were brought up in the older services. . . . The Air Force lacks representation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. . . . The Congressional relations of the Air Force are inferior to those of the other services. . . . The Air Force is really the silent service. Its senior commanders do not write books and articles. . . . Those responsible for the development of national air power have not made use of the basic instrumentalities of information and enlightenment to get the public behind them.<sup>19</sup>

In a survey of Air Force informational activities, the *Air University Quarterly Review* endorsed these conclusions and went on to point out other deficiencies. Both the Army and the Navy had

regular television programs; the Air Force had none. And fewer movies were made about the Air Force than about the other services. The *Review* found just one area of Air Force superiority. "Only in the mass medium of the comics does the Air Force come out ahead, with 'Steve Canyon' and 'Terry and the Pirates' far outstripping any competition in that field of communication and public relations."<sup>20</sup>

By and large, the complaints of the other services differed only in quantity, not quality, from those of the Air Force. The Army naturally felt that it was more likely to suffer from public misunderstanding because it was not romantic, clean, and technical like the Navy and Air Force.<sup>21</sup> In the fall of 1955, in a letter to all top officers, General Taylor declared that the Army's senior commanders were outstanding in producing quality within the Army, but that they "have been slow and relatively inept in discharging the corollary responsibility of making the Army known at its true worth." Expressing the hope that his letter would be read "not like a sermon or a public relations lecture, but as a combination of a little of both," Taylor urged that the Army's generals make sure that the Army maintained its standards and that it "gets due credit therefore from the Nation, which it deserves."<sup>22</sup> The public, the Army's Chief of Information also declared, "is better acquainted with the roles of those two services [the Navy and the Air Force] than with the Army and has a better understanding of these roles." Among the disadvantages faced by the Army were that in war it suffered more casualties than the other services and that, in war or peace, its life was more rugged: "It is not simple to glamorize a foxhole." In addition, Army equipment could not catch the popular imagination "in the same degree as the range of the atomic submarine, the speed of a jet or the size of a super carrier."<sup>23</sup> Because the Navy and Air Force "absorb the entire output of many individual corporations," it was argued, they "both benefit from a great deal of commercial advertising."<sup>24</sup>

In a similar vein, the Navy fairly consistently maintained that

## INTERSERVICE COMPETITION

it was on the short end of service public relations. "Whether or not the Navy is at fault for this lack of understanding," Admiral Radford declared in the B-36 hearings, "the fact is that we failed in our efforts to bring to our sister service—and to the American public at large—an effective, clear picture showing how further development of the aircraft carrier as a type, as well as the improved aircraft associated with it, would add to the future offensive power, not only of the Navy, but of all the armed services as a fighting team." Almost nine years later, Admiral Burke warned that the country must not "lose the benefit of sound naval thought by the default of an advocate's ability to put a point across." <sup>25</sup>

## POLITICAL CASTELLATION OF THE SERVICES

The expansion of service political activities in all their various forms during the postwar decade in a sense resembled a process of castellation. Building out from the inner keep of the service itself, political, institutional, and legal battlements and escarpments were slowly constructed in executive agencies and Congress, industry and public opinion. Eventually, each service came to resemble an elaborate medieval castle with inner and outer walls, watchtowers and moats, parapets and barbicans to protect itself against its actual and potential enemies.

### *Expansion of Public and Congressional Relations*

Public relations, the services emphasized, had now become a function of command and extensive efforts had to be made to improve their standing with the public and Congress.<sup>26</sup> Every major unit was expected to have a public-relations officer on its staff, and it was stressed over and over again that this was a critical position which could be properly discharged only by able and experienced officers. The parallel between the military services and the large industrial corporations was pointed out, and the

military were urged to adopt the public-relations philosophy of industry. General Ridgway's call in 1954 for the "creation of a public relations-conscious Army" symbolized the concern, and, of course, had its counterparts in similar exhortations on the part of the other services.<sup>27</sup>

Service emphasis upon reaching the public was concretely reflected in the elevation of public-information offices in the formal administrative hierarchy. During the 1920's and the 30's, the Army and Navy public-information sections had occupied subordinate positions in the Intelligence branches of the services. Inevitably, the outlook and values associated with the collection and interpretation of intelligence were not those which encouraged the collection and dissemination of news to mass media of communication.<sup>28</sup> In February, 1941, Secretary Stimson created a War Department Bureau of Public Relations; two months later Secretary Knox followed suit with a separate Office of Public Relations for the Navy. After the war, the Navy Office of Public Relations remained directly attached to the Office of the Secretary. The Army Bureau of Public Relations was at first demoted in the administrative hierarchy, but then almost immediately began to climb back up, and by 1955, Army public information was also handled in the Office of the Secretary. After achieving its independence in 1947, the Air Force similarly established a Directorate of Public Relations that was directly attached to the Secretary, a position in which it has remained except for a brief two years (1950-52) when it was in Headquarters, U. S. Air Force.

The elevation of the public-information offices to positions directly under the service secretaries was accompanied by an expansion and diversification of their activities. The Army Chief of Information, for instance, opened a branch office in Los Angeles in 1952 to improve relations between the Army and the movie industry, and another in New York in 1956, designed, in the words of the Chief of Staff, to "assist in getting its story across to the public" through all the available news media. At

the same time, the Chief of Staff pointed with pride to the award by the American Public Relations Association of three citations to Army organizations for outstanding public relations. Public relations was included in the Army Program System. Public-information objectives were established quarterly, covering "those critical areas for which the Department of the Army particularly desires emphasis during the period." Guidance was sent to major commands in the form of information plans and speakers' fact sheets.<sup>29</sup>

Like the public-information function, legislative liaison tended to move to the top of the administrative structure after World War II. Prior to 1950, Army Congressional relations had been handled by an office under the Director of Information, who was also in charge of public information and troop information and education. In that year, a separate Chief of Legislative Liaison was created directly under the Chief of Staff. In 1955, this office was transferred from the Army Staff to the Office of the Secretary of the Army.<sup>30</sup> The Air Force also initially combined the functions of public information and legislative liaison. In 1949, however, a separate office for the latter was established directly under the Secretary of the Air Force. In the Navy, the responsibility for Congressional relations was at first widely dispersed. In 1955, however, an Office of Legislative Affairs was established directly under the Secretary. Thus by the middle 1950's, all three major services had similar organizational arrangements for public information and legislative liaison: two distinct offices at the highest level directly responsible to the service secretary. Increased activities meant increased funds, and, reportedly, total military expenditures for legislative liaison doubled between 1953 and 1958.<sup>31</sup>

The executive and Congress attempted at times to control and limit service public-relations and legislative-liaison activities. The struggle was a never-ending one, however, and not infrequently the two branches of government worked at cross-purposes. In his first annual report in 1948, Forrestal had identified public



relations as the area where the control of the Secretary of Defense most needed to be strengthened, and the following March, in one of his last official acts, he directed that the Office of Public Information in his office be the "sole agency for the National Military Establishment at the seat of government for dissemination of information to media of public information."<sup>32</sup> As one of its top officials declared, the object of this new office was

not merely to suppress the unilateral public appeals of three services. Rather, it is to bring their stories and claims into a proper perspective—the perspective of national security, not the perspective of single service advantage.<sup>33</sup>

In 1953 and 1954, Secretary Wilson further attempted to consolidate and to subordinate service public-information activities. Nevertheless, a decade after Forrestal, in reorganizing the Pentagon in 1958, President Eisenhower still confronted the same problem: ". . . A principal outlet for service rivalries is the public affairs and legislative liaison activity within each of the military departments. . . . We do not want defense dollars spent in publicity and influence campaigns in which each service claims superiority over the others and strives for increased appropriations or other Congressional favors."<sup>34</sup> Inevitably, however, the moves toward centralization of public information stirred up opposition in the services and, in some cases, from Capitol Hill.<sup>35</sup> Similarly, in 1958, President Eisenhower's attempt to consolidate the legislative-liaison offices into a single office under the Secretary of Defense was stopped by a Congress determined to maintain its separate lines into the services.<sup>36</sup> Congress did make an effort to limit public-information expenditures that was somewhat successful. Beginning in Fiscal 1953, Congress annually imposed a budgetary limitation upon the public-information activities of the military establishment, and the years after 1952 showed a sharp decline in expenditures by the individual services. The decrease in service public-informa-

tion expenditures, however, did not appear to be matched by a corresponding decrease in service public-information activities.

*"Backstop" Associations and the Articulation of Service Interests*

Another aspect of the growth of service political activities in the postwar decade was the increase in the number, membership, and activities of service "backstop" organizations, private associations concerned with the support of the services and the articulation of their programs. The Navy League, oldest of the major associations, was formed by a group of civilians in 1902 to counterbalance the reaction against the Navy in the years after the Spanish-American War. Its aim was to support the continued expansion of the Navy; its targets were public apathy and hostility toward all things military. Throughout the period prior to World War II, the Navy League was an active and devoted, loyal advocate of the Navy, but never a very large, affluent, or influential one.<sup>37</sup> In 1945, there appeared to be little reason to think that it was on the verge of a new lease on life. Its great battles had been fought decades earlier in supporting the programs of Theodore Roosevelt and opposing those of Calvin Coolidge. The unification controversy of 1945-47, however, gave the League a new role to play, not in fighting anti-Navy midwesterners, but rather in fighting anti-Navy soldiers and airmen. Again, in June, 1949, just as the B-36 controversy was coming to a head, the League embarked upon a large-scale program to "establish the Navy and Naval Aviation as an essential element of National Defense."<sup>38</sup> In 1958, the League once more took the lead in opposing the reorganization of the Defense Department. Meanwhile, comparable groups had developed for the other services. The Air Force Association was organized in January, 1946, by a group of Army Air Force veterans to promote the cause of air power. The following year, it took over the publication of the monthly magazine *Air Force*, previously published

by the Army Air Force. Within a decade it had 50,000 members. The Association of the U. S. Army was formed in 1950 by the merger of the Infantry and Field Artillery associations, and in 1955 it assimilated the Antiaircraft Association. By 1958, it also had a membership of 50,000 and almost a hundred chapters.

Perhaps even more than among the services themselves, competitive emulation played a role in the development of the "back-stop" organizations. "We can't flatter ourselves," the Secretary of the Navy told the Navy League in 1952, in comparing its membership to that of the Air Force Association, "that one Navy League member is worth five Air Force Association members."<sup>39</sup> The case for organizing an Army Association was put on a similar basis,<sup>40</sup> and the Army Chief of Information declared in 1955 that the Army had "a great need" for an organization like the Air Force Association and Navy League to help present its case to the public.<sup>41</sup>

The formation of the Army Association also reflected a tendency toward unification within the Army itself. Much more so than the other services, the Army had been traditionally divided between regulars and reserves, combat forces and technical services, and between the various arms and services.<sup>42</sup> Throughout the ten years of evolution between 1945 and 1955, the constant theme of those arguing for an Army Association was the need for the "inner unification" of the Army. Originally, the Army Association was designed primarily for officers in the combat arms; the technical services, it was explained, had their own associations which linked them with the appropriate industrial and civilian groups. In 1951, however, the Army Association added representatives from the technical services to its executive council, and four years later, it achieved full recognition as the official unofficial Army-wide group. The "unification" of the Army and the emergence of the Army Association as the "one strong voice" of the Army reflected a variety of factors. Important among them, however, was the pressure of interservice competition:

here, indeed, was almost a classic Simmelian case of stress and conflict furthering integration of a group.

The development and vitality of the "backstop" associations indicated that they met a real need. Their rise was particularly relevant to one major problem of service behavior in the postwar period: the definition and articulation of service interests. This was not an entirely new problem, but the increased political importance of the services after the war gave it new dimensions. Normally, one thinks of the leaders of a group as its natural advocates and defenders. With respect to the services, however, this is not necessarily true. To be sure, the role of the service secretary differs little from that of the secretary in a civilian department. He is free to articulate service interests and to advance those interests except when they conflict with those of the administration as defined by the President or the Secretary of Defense. In most civilian agencies, the definition, articulation, and promotion of the agency's interests are also a function of the top career leaders of the agency, those whose work-lives are continuously identified with it. The freedom of the military leaders to perform this function, however, is restricted by their presumed instrumental character. The Department of Agriculture, for example, is usually assumed to be responsible for and to the farmers of the country as well as responsible to the President and Congress. The military, on the other hand, are assumed to be responsible only to the higher political authorities of government; their representative role is minimal if not nonexistent: this is the essence of "civilian control." Thus the top military leaders of a service—those who might be presumed to be most active and influential in the defense of its interests—are normally among those who must act with the greatest circumspection in this area. Hence the problem arises: How are the interests of the service to be articulated and promoted?

One method is by subordinate groups within the service, which are less authoritative and responsible than its leaders. The inter-

nal structure of the service, however, frustrates and complicates this type of action. It is difficult for the military leadership of the service to disclaim responsibility for the demands or the tactics of subordinate officers. The commanders, of course, cannot be held responsible for the conclusions of Indian-level staff studies or the opinions of their subordinates, but they can be held responsible for allowing the staff studies to be made and for not disciplining the subordinates if they express their opinions in public. In many organizations, the leaders are probably more moderate in articulating and promoting the organization's interest than the non-leaders think desirable. In formally democratic organizations, such as labor unions, this may result in continuous pressure upon the leaders to adopt an "extreme" position, and may lead to a variety of subterfuges by which the leaders appear to press hard for union demands while in actuality they pursue action which they deem to be more desirable and realistic for, if unjustifiable to, the membership. The authoritarian structure of a military service, however, leaves the leadership relatively free of such membership pressure, except in so far as it has to consider service "morale." On the other hand, the leadership is also deprived of a possible source of strength in negotiations with other groups. In conflict situations, the effectiveness of a group is enhanced by centralization and discipline; in other types of situations, particularly those involving bargaining, discipline can be disadvantageous. Thus the very characteristics which enhance the combat effectiveness of a service may reduce its political effectiveness. The egalitarian structure of the Senate has its benefits in conference committees; and if, in foreign negotiations, the State Department did not have the Senate, it might well want to invent one. A Chief of Staff, on the other hand, has no organized opposition and cannot invent one. Nonetheless, his subordinates may well have a more positive view of the service interest than he does. The military leaders are thus placed in an extremely difficult position. The problem is not one of an apathetic membership or treacherous followers: it is one of



compromised leaders. In a labor union, the rank and file may expel leaders who do not represent the group's interests aggressively enough. In a military service, the leaders may have to discipline subordinates who advance the group's interests too aggressively.

An alternative to subordinate action is what might be called "peripheral compensation." Like other interest groups, an armed service can be thought of as the core group of a service political system or coalition. Each service has its allies in the executive branch, Congress, the press, industry, and among the public. The extent to which the peripheral groups identify with the service varies in intensity and scope: some identify on a few issues, some on many. Usually, the effectiveness of service demands on the other groups for support depends upon the extent to which the service can help these groups in the achievement of their goals. In each case, it would seem, the allied group would be a less ardent proponent of service interests than the service itself. In actuality, the reverse is sometimes true: allies and supporters are not infrequently more royalist than the king. They do not necessarily identify more intensely with service interests than do the members of the service, but they do have a greater freedom to articulate those interests and to promote them through a wider variety of political means. Journalists, businessmen, retired officers, speak and act with a freedom denied to those on active duty. The most ardent proponents of air power usually have not (with the exception of Billy Mitchell) been members of the Air Force. A private group can openly criticize the administration while service leaders limit themselves to oblique suggestions under the prodding of sympathetic congressmen. Among the allies of a service, the backstop association is unique in its ability to act on its behalf. The interest of the association is to further the interests of the service. The Chief of Staff speaks for his service but also for the administration and the Department of Defense. The service association speaks only for the service.

The association thus performs an important function in ex-

pounding the true needs of the service in a manner which may be barred to the service itself. In addition, the association can engage in political tactics and methods which are denied to the service. The Regular Army, for example, in its struggles with the National Guard Association and the Reserve Officers Association is, as one scholar has pointed out, handicapped "by its inability to throw charges—either reckless or responsible charges—into the headlines as its opponents frequently do."<sup>43</sup> Service associations are under no such restraints, and the less directly associated they are with the service, the greater freedom they will have. On the other hand, they cannot become completely detached. If they are too close to the service, they lose their freedom of action; if they are too distant from the service, they decrease their authority and responsibility and may misjudge the service's interests. A precarious balance must be maintained.

Preserving the balance poses problems with respect to membership. From the start the Navy League protected its freedom of action by barring from membership military men on active duty. The Air Force Association permitted active personnel to be members only in a non-voting, non-office-holding capacity. In contrast, the Army Association was originally composed largely of active officers. In 1956, however, it was reorganized, and the leadership was transferred to individuals not on active duty "so that the Association may exercise its right to express its own independent opinions."<sup>44</sup> Although they thus may have the freedom to do so, rarely, if ever, do the service associations take stands opposed by the leaders of their service. Through its long history, the Navy League disagreed only occasionally with the views of high-ranking officers and of agencies of the Navy Department. "The League's stated mission was to popularize and spread before the public the estimates and appraisals of the experts; to carry out Navy Department policy was the League policy."<sup>45</sup> Throughout most of the post-World War II period, the League position was generally a somewhat more extreme and fully developed version of the Navy position. Similarly, in 1959,

the administration advocated an Army of 870,000 men, the Chief of Staff one of 925,000 men, and the Army Association one of a million men. Normally, the resolutions and programs adopted by the service associations at their annual conventions undoubtedly represent approximately what the leaders of the services would ask for if they were in a position to enunciate a formal and concrete set of goals.

Usually, the service does recognize the unique position of the service association and the special relations which exist between them. At the same time, it also stresses the independence of the association. The Navy League, the Secretary of the Navy declared in 1958, is "the civilian arm of the service." Two months later, however, Admiral Burke emphasized to a Navy League audience that the Navy "has absolutely no control over your fine organization."<sup>46</sup> Air Force sources have informally referred to the AFA as "our lobby," and in the B-36 hearings, General H. H. Arnold even described the Association as "Air Force-controlled." Yet its private character is also emphasized.<sup>47</sup> The Secretary of the Army has declared that the relationship between the Department and the Association "although unofficial, must be close and cooperative." The "success of the Association," he said, "is a matter of vital interest to the Department of the Army."<sup>48</sup>

### *Exploration of the Grass Roots*

The postwar period was marked not only by increased service concern for their public positions in general, but also by increased service activities designed specifically to reach public opinion at the grass roots. As national and highly centralized organizations, the services faced difficulties in operating effectively at the local level. Service installations and activities, of course, were spread across the face of the land. A clear distinction existed, however, between the interest of a community in a particular installation and its interest in the service as a whole. The congressman from

Charleston is an ardent supporter of the Navy—until the Navy proposes to cut its operations at the Charleston Navy Yard. Unlike many private associations and a fair number of governmental agencies, the services could not easily mobilize sentiment across the country in support of a national program. The problem which they faced was not dissimilar to that confronted by the large industrial corporations. Both the corporation and the service are essentially national institutions. Political power in America, however, is to a large extent channeled through local organs. Individual political influence depends upon prolonged local residence: the employees of the corporation and the service are continually on the move. On the one hand, the economic health of the local community may depend upon decisions by a General Staff in Washington or a board of directors in New York. On the other hand, the small community normally possesses direct access to state and local governing bodies and frequently to Congress in a way which is denied to the national organization.

Corporations have attempted to adjust to the decentralization of political power by supplementing their general public-relations activities with other efforts specifically designed to reach local publics. The armed services have done likewise. Among them, the Army has perhaps been most active; more than the other services, it tends to be concerned with issues where grass-roots support is important. Shortly after World War II, for instance, when confronted with the need to stimulate recruiting and to arouse support for UMT, the Army sponsored the creation of Army Advisory Committees in numerous communities, each of which was made up of leading local figures in business, religion, education, the press and radio, and civic organizations. "We are asking these groups," the Army's Chief of Information declared in 1947, "to present for us our plan for Universal Military Training. We furnish them information sheets from the War Department . . . . In that way, information on our actual policies and actual plans can be disseminated down through these advisory

committees to all the various agencies that affect public opinion right out of the 'grass roots.' That is very important."<sup>49</sup> The Advisory Committees continued in existence after the initial post-war years and helped the Army in a variety of ways. Antedating the committees, but subsequently closely associated with them, was the system of civilian aides to the Secretary of the Army. Originally developing from the Military Training Camps Association formed in 1916, the number and activities of the civilian aides were greatly expanded by Secretary Pace in 1950. Their duties included advising the Secretary on matters relating to the public standing of the Army, investigating specific problems at his request, and co-operating with the local Army commanders in furthering their programs.<sup>50</sup> The Navy's counterpart to the Army Advisory Committees was the Advisory Council on Naval Affairs. Sponsored by the Navy League, the members of the Advisory Council were appointed by the commandants of the various naval districts and furnished the Navy with a means of reaching local opinion groups.<sup>51</sup> In addition to these more broadly purposed programs, all the services emphasized the importance of "community relations" to the commanders of their posts and installations, and urged them to carry on an active program of visits, support of local charities and projects, and sympathetic consideration of local interests.

The services also stressed the desirability of maintaining contact with national organizations through which the service viewpoint might be disseminated to local groups. The Navy, for instance, created an Office of Civil Relations in 1946. Its director, in the words of the Secretary of the Navy,

directs liaison with civil organizations in stimulating public good will and interest in the Navy. A program of establishing contacts with the national headquarters of organizations which are located in Washington was adopted and assistance was rendered these organizations in preparing naval matters for the agenda of their programs. Liaison contacts were made throughout the country with numerous veterans', women's patriotic, youth, and other organizations both at the national level and at the local and state levels. Innumerable re-



quests for naval speakers, representatives, sponsors and statements were evaluated and processed. The greatest problem was that of limited personnel in a field of constantly expanding activity.<sup>52</sup>

A year later, the Secretary reported that naval contacts were maintained with 140 veterans' groups, as compared with 5 previously, and that liaison existed with 291 civilian organizations of all types.<sup>53</sup> Similarly, in 1947, the Army embarked upon an extensive campaign to present its program for a 1,750,000-man M-day force to industrial, labor, press, farm, and educational groups. The effort, according to the Chief of Information, was designed to reach every representative group in the country.<sup>54</sup>

Besides these new efforts, the services also devoted additional attention to the use of the reserve structure as a means of reaching local public opinion. The reserve units were, of course, in many ways a natural vehicle by which to attempt to bring the service viewpoint into small communities. The reserve organizations, and, to an even greater extent, the National Guard were influential with Congress simply because they were organized for local political action. As more than one congressman has noted, the reserve organizations, in contrast to the service "back-stop" associations, "have the votes." "Because the National Guard Association represents the fifty-one states and territories," as one National Guard leader put it, "and is able through its membership to bring considerable pressure to bear on Congress, it has consistently enjoyed a high respect from Congress." The strength of the Guard, he continued, lies both "in the state representation" and in "the potential vote represented by the 500,000 and their families."<sup>55</sup> Army spokesmen and supporters frequently urged that efforts be made to utilize the reserves to put across the Army viewpoint.<sup>56</sup> The very power of the reserve organizations, however, made them less susceptible to use by the service leadership and more likely to have interests different from those of the service. The Guard, for instance, was politically stronger than the reserve, but also more independent of the Regular Army.<sup>57</sup>

In short, the services became well entrenched in the American political scene, as countless numbers of other interest groups, private and public, had done before them. The process of castellation, moreover, appeared to continue irrespective of the services' loss of combat functions or the decline in their administrative significance.<sup>58</sup> In one sense, the immediate effect of the interservice competition was to weaken the voice of the military vis-à-vis other groups. At the same time, however, a long-run effect was to strengthen the services. Interservice rivalry, by challenging the services, also toughened them and forced them to develop the mechanisms and support necessary for survival in the pluralistic world of American politics. In the process of constructing defenses against each other, the services also strengthened themselves against potential threats from the outside. Interservice competition thus tended to promote the continued existence of the services themselves.

The continuation of interservice controversy implies the continuation also of the political castellation of the services. The construction of service political castles, however, proceeded simultaneously with two other apparently conflicting tendencies: the decline in the military functions of the services and the increased centralization of power in the military establishment. Militarily and administratively, the services became less important at the same time that they became more deeply entrenched politically. It would be foolhardy to attempt to predict how these tendencies will resolve themselves. Perhaps, however, instead of coming to a head-on collision, the tendencies will simply go their separate ways. Unification may continue in and around the services without abolishing them. The unified and specified commands may assume more and more of the military functions. Yet the political castles of the services may also continue to stand, with their storied keeps of service loyalty and tradition, their inner and outer walls in the executive and Congress, their towers and barbicans in industry, their moats flowing with the currents of public opinion. Perhaps, at some point, a major

political or military innovation may, like gunpowder, bring these political structures down in a heap of broken masonry. The experience of other established interests in American politics, however, suggests a different fate: that the castles of the services, like many of their medieval counterparts, will remain in existence, invulnerable and untaken, long after the decisive battles—both political and military—have shifted to other fields.

1. For the most systematic and definitive statement of the theory of political-interest groups, see David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), *passim*, but esp. chaps. xiii–xiv, dealing with executive agencies. On the political roles of bureaucratic groups, see Pendleton Herring *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York, 1936); Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York, 1950), chaps. xviii–xix; Harold Stein (ed.), *Public Administration and Policy Development* (New York, 1952). Representative studies of particular agencies include: Arthur A. Maass, *Muddy Waters* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951); Charles M. Hardin, *The Politics of Agriculture* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952); S. P. Huntington, "The Marasmus of the ICC," *Yale Law Journal*, LXI (April, 1952), 467–509.

2. On the ROTC battles, see Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *The Civilian and the Military* (New York, 1956), chap. xiv; and on naval policy, see George T. Davis, *A Navy Second to None* (New York, 1940), chaps. xii–xiv. For interwar relations between the military and society in general, see Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War* (New York, 1941), chap. viii, and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 282–312.

3. "In the 10 years I have been on this subcommittee here, and I am the oldest man on the subcommittee, we never knew what the Navy Subcommittee on Appropriations was doing, and the Navy Subcommittee on Appropriations never knew what we were doing."—Representative Engel, *Hearings* before the House Appropriations Committee on the Military Establishment for Fiscal 1947, 79 Cong. 2 Sess., p. 18 (1946).

4. This, to repeat, is not to argue that there were no interservice dealings and no interservice differences. It is simply to say that by and large neither the latter nor the former involved much in the way of politics. On interwar interservice relations, see Lawrence J. Legers, Jr., "Unification of the Armed Forces" (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1951), chaps. ii–iii; and Louis Morton's essay in this volume, *passim*.

5. *Hearings* before the House Committee on Appropriations, Military Establishment for Fiscal 1948, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 1464–65 (1947). One War Department consultant on UMT declared that its chief opponents were "parents, church groups, educators, subversive groups and a large section of the public which does not think" (*Hearings* before House Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments on War Department Publicity and Propaganda Relating to Universal Military Training, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 31, 38 [1947]).

6. Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), p. 388.

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7. Other factors, of course, were also involved in the failure of UMT. Forrestal himself considered it of secondary importance to the re-enactment of selective service. No one can read *The Forrestal Diaries*, however, without being impressed by the extent to which conflicting service programs supplemented Budget Bureau pressure in determining the outcome of the 1948 rearmament effort. The second death of UMT in 1951 and 1952, on the other hand, was the result not of interservice competition, but rather of changed perceptions of strategic requirements, decreased enthusiasm on the part of the Department of Defense, and a legislative strategy on the part of its backers which misfired.

8. J. L. McConaughy, Jr., "Congressmen and the Pentagon," *Fortune*, LVII (April, 1958), 162.

9. See William R. Kintner, *Forging a New Sword* (New York, 1958), chap. vi.

10. Truman, in *op. cit.*, pp. 466-67, points out that Congress normally investigates and restricts administrative lobbying in order: (a) to end a violation of the rules of the political game; (b) to protect a legislative group; or (c) to serve as a means of attack or defense for a private group. The latter two reasons are inapplicable to interservice controversy, and, apparently, in their absence, service political activities may be viewed as within the rules of the game.

11. Quoted in Douglass Cater, "Government by Publicity," *The Reporter*, XX (March 19, 1959), 15. See also the comments of the public-relations experts: "Interservice rivalry for talented recruits and for public support has been one of the sharpest spurs in advancing public relations in the armed forces" (Scott M. Cutlip and Allen N. Center, *Effective Public Relations* [New York, 1952], p. 396). "The rivalry of the Services for public good will set up competition and building up one Service with the public and Congress at the expense of another. New weapons are touted, accomplishments exaggerated, in the strategy of rivalry. Abuses by one Service lead to abuses by another" (Edward L. Bernays, "Public Relations," *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XC [January 17, 1953], 539).

12. Thomas Winship, in *Boston Globe*, May 19, 1956, p. 3.

13. *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XCIII (April 14, 1956), 1008.

14. *Boston Globe*, May 19, 1956, p. 3; *Time*, LXVII (June 4, 1956), 20-23.

15. For typical examples, see: General J. L. Collins, "The War Department Spreads the News," *Military Review*, XXVII (September, 1947), 15; Lieutenant (j.g.) P. W. Raiden, "Navy Public Information," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXIII (January, 1947), 47; Lieutenant Commander J. L. Howard (SC), "The Navy and National Security," *Ibid.*, LXXVII (July, 1951), 753; Colonel T. M. Smith, "Air Force Information at the Grass Roots," *Air University Quarterly Review*, V (Spring, 1952), 63; and the Army brochure, *Know Your Army: Pocket Guide*, DA Pamphlet No. 360-1, March 15, 1957.

16. Lieutenant General E. W. Rawlings, USAF, "Public Opinion and Air Force Dollars," *Army Information Digest*, VIII (April, 1953), 58.

17. "The Big Look," *Air University Quarterly Review*, VI (Winter, 1953-54), 133.

18. Gill Robb Wilson, "The Public View of the Air Force," *ibid.*, pp. 3, 6.

19. W. Barton Leach, "Obstacles to the Development of American Air Power," *Annals*, CCXCIX (May, 1955), 71-74. In 1949, Admiral Denfold argued that the Navy had not been given "adequate and appropriate representation in key



positions within the Department of Defense" (*Hearings before the House Committee on the Armed Services on the National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy*, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 350 ff., 361 [1949]). In 1955, Leach pointed out that no Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or Assistant Secretary of Defense, with one exception (Lovett), had ever had any Air Force background and further declared: "The Army is only a little better off. Men with an orientation toward the Navy have consistently held most of the important posts, a legacy from the days when Secretary of Defense Forrestal simply imported his staff from the Navy Department. The all-important office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense is essentially a Navy office containing no responsible personnel with Air Force background" (*op. cit.*, p. 72). For similar complaints, see T. K. Finletter, "A New Look at Air Policy," *Atlantic Monthly*, XCII (September, 1953), 29; E. M. Emme, "Some Fallacies Concerning Air Power," *Annals*, CCXCIX (May, 1955), 19–20.

20. "Approaches to Air-Age Education in American Schools and Communities," *Air University Quarterly Review*, VIII (Summer, 1956), 116. See also Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

21. See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Kintner, "The Team of Decision," *Infantry Journal*, LXIII (March, 1948), 15–16.

22. Letter from General Maxwell D. Taylor to senior Army commanders, 15 September 1955, *Army–Navy–Air Force Journal*, XCIII (September 24, 1955), 91.

23. Cf. Leach; *op. cit.*, p. 71: "A battleship or a carrier is different. You can see it, even visit it on the Fourth of July. A division is different too; it marches—with guns. But a B-36 flies above visual observation, nobody is permitted to board it, and its crew is unimpressive in a parade."

24. Speech of Major General Gilman C. Mudgett, *Army–Navy–Air Force Journal*, XCII (May 28, 1953), 1156.

25. *Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee on the National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy*, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 49 (1949); *Army–Navy–Air Force Journal*, CXV (July 5, 1958), 1312.

26. For an informative early postwar analysis of service efforts in this area, see Hanson W. Baldwin, "When the Big Guns Speak," in *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, ed. Lester Market (New York, 1949), pp. 97–120; for a later account, see W. S. Fairfield, "PR for the Services—In Uniform and in Mufti," *The Reporter*, XVIII (May 15, 1958), 20–23.

27. General M. B. Ridgway, "Army Troop and Public Relations," *Army Information Digest*, IX (August, 1954), 5. The Army's concern with public relations was reflected in the bibliographies it issued on subjects of special interest to it in 1957 and 1958. These included titles on *Mobility in Modern Warfare*; *Limited War*; *Guided Missiles, Rockets and Artificial Satellites*—and *Community Relations and Public Relations*.

28. Significantly, perhaps, the Marine Corps, unlike the Army and Navy, never subordinated public information to Intelligence. A Publicity Office was established by the Corps in 1925 and a full-blown Public Relations Section in 1933. Robert Lindsay, *This High Name: Public Relations and the United States Marine Corps* (Madison, Wis., 1956), p. 46.



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29. General M. D. Taylor, "Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff," *Army Information Digest*, XII (September, 1957), 61; Ridgway, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

30. "Congress and the Army," *Officer's Call*, V, No. 2, (1953); *Army Information Digest*, X (May, 1955), 23; Charles D. Story, "The Formulation of Army Reserve Forces Policy: Its Setting Amidst Pressure Group Activity" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1958), p. 80.

31. McConaughy, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

32. *First Report of the Secretary of Defense*, 1948, p. 9; Memorandum of March 17, 1949, quoted in *Hearings* before the House Committee on Government Operations on Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies, 84 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 926 (1956).

33. William Frye, "Unifying Public Information," *Army Information Digest*, IV (August, 1949), 37.

34. Message to Congress on Reorganization of the Department of Defense, April 3, 1958, *New York Times*, April 4, 1958, p. 7.

35. See *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XCI (March 20, 1954), 854.

36. *Ibid.*, XCV (August 2, 1958), 1436.

37. See Armin Rappaport, "The Navy League of the United States," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LXIII (April, 1954), 203-12.

38. Quoted by Paul Y. Hammond, "The B-36 Controversy," a manuscript prepared for the Twentieth Century Fund, p. 79.

39. *New York Times*, December 6, 1952, p. 35.

40. "When the Navy or the Marine Corps or the Air Force gets a reasonable deal and the Army doesn't, it isn't a question of jumping on them because they have it so good.

"It's a question of saying—in a good loud voice which everybody knows is completely representative of the Army—that if it's a good deal for another service, it should be the same deal for the Army."—"A Stronger Army Needs a Stronger Association of the United States Army," editorial, *Combat Forces Journal* (June, 1952), facing p. 1.

41. *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XCII (May 28, 1955), 1156.

42. Cf. Secretary Brucker, *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XCII (May 28, 1955), 1156: "Prior to 1955, the Army's interests had been divided and its efforts distributed between the narrower interests of branch, service, and component."

43. Story, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

44. Secretary of the Army, *Army*, VII (December, 1956), 79.

45. Rappaport, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

46. *Congressional Record*, CIV (May 1, 1958), A4026 (daily ed.); *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XCV (July 5, 1958), 1312.

47. *New York Times*, December 29, 1956, p. 2; *Hearings*, National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy, p. 70.

48. *Army*, VII (December, 1956), 79. The Secretary went on to say: "Without prejudicing the independence of the Association, I desire that commanders at all echelons render the Association the maximum support and encouragement. During the organization of regional chapters, the Association will have the greatest need

for assistance in connection with the organization of membership, the provision of meeting places, the provision of qualified speakers, and the attainment of local recognition . . . . I therefore urge that no effort be spared by any member of the Department in supporting the Association and its objectives to the maximum extent of his abilities."

49. Collins, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

50. Lieutenant Colonel T. J. Cleary, Jr., "Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army," *Army Information Digest*, VII (November, 1952), 13-18.

51. Members of the Council, for instance, were urged to inform their congressmen of their "deep opposition" to the President's Pentagon reorganization plan in the spring of 1958 (*New York Times*, April 13, 1958, p. 12; *New York Herald Tribune*, April 15, 1958, p. 9).

52. *Annual Report*, 1946, pp. 64-66.

53. *Annual Report*, 1947, p. 82.

54. Collins, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

55. Letter from Major General James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff, New York National Guard, July 23, 1957; quoted in Story, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-11.

56. See, for example, Major General E. S. Bres, "The ORC, Too, Can Tell the Army's Story," *Army Information Digest*, I (October, 1946), 3-5. "Representatives of National Security," *Infantry Journal*, LIX (July, 1946), 54-55; Colonel S. Legree, "We Must Get Together," *ibid.*, LX (May, 1947), 25-29.

57. Another source of contact between the Army and the public was through retired officers. In 1956, a Retired Activities Unit was established in the Adjutant General's Office and a monthly bulletin started, which was designed to keep retired personnel up to date with Army activities and thinking. As the Chief of Staff said, this "makes available a large group of qualified personnel who are interested in interpreting the Army to the members of their civilian communities" (Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 61).

58. This suggests, perhaps, a corollary to Parkinson's Law to the effect that the means and intensity of service political activity tend to increase at a fixed rate independent of the importance of the services and of the significance of the issues at stake in the competition.

*American Civil-Military Relations in the  
Occupation of Germany*

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HAROLD ZINK

PRIMARY ATTENTION will be given in this paper to civil-military relations in the field. This is not to minimize the importance of what went on in Washington, and it need hardly be pointed out that there can be no rigid separation of the field from Washington. However, policy formulation on the Washington scene has already received a good deal of attention,<sup>1</sup> whereas some of the more practical matters of day-to-day behavior which influence organizational effectiveness and policy products have

been neglected. The Washington story will therefore be mentioned only when essential to an understanding of events across the Atlantic. The occupation of Germany, extending from 1944 to 1955, may be broken down into three phases: (1) the planning stage, (2) the military-government period, and (3) the High Commission years.<sup>2</sup> Though analysis of certain civil-military relationships may not lend themselves particularly well to such a breakdown, the varying organizational pattern makes it convenient to subdivide consideration of occupation problems into the period prior to May, 1945, when the Germans surrendered; the years from 1945 to the autumn of 1949; and the final years from 1949 to May, 1955.

### THE PLANNING STAGE

Planning for the occupation of Germany had to be carried out under unfavorable circumstances imposed by the war itself. While the fighting lasted, the emphasis, both in the field and in Washington, was understandably placed on the immediate goal of winning the war. Nevertheless, as the war proceeded, it was realized that some effort must be made toward working out arrangements for the post-surrender period. Ideally, a single planning agency with representatives from the interested civil and military departments should have been set up to deal with the many complex aspects of the occupation of Germany. But the relationships between the several civil and military departments concerned were not at the time such as to lead to such a logical arrangement. Instead, various offices in Washington began individual and unco-ordinated efforts; and in the field, the German Country Unit, activated early in the spring of 1944 at the Civil Affairs Training Center in Shrivenham, was charged with preparing a handbook for military government in Germany.<sup>3</sup> This handbook was to be a guide for military government teams and was to contain operating directives. Although the German Country Unit was not at a sufficiently high level to establish

basic policies, it was confronted with the task of drawing up precise instructions based on what it could obtain in the way of basic policy from higher levels. An Anglo-American agency, it was supposed to have equal representation from the two countries, but because the British were unable to furnish their share, the United States contributed the greater part of the approximately one hundred fifty officers and several hundred enlisted personnel that composed the unit. At various times the organization was a special staff section of the Allied Supreme Headquarters and a unit of the European Civil Affairs Division of the U. S. Army. When, in the fall of 1944, it appeared that the Russians would not join such a group, the German Country Unit was dissolved. During its lifetime, however, it was an active agency, and despite the severe handicap of lack of basic policy decisions, carried on much of the pioneer work in making plans for the post-surrender administration of Germany.

The German Country Unit was one of the few organizations (if not the only one) concerned with the occupation of Germany that was wholly military in character, although its American staff was very largely composed of civilians turned soldier, the products of Charlottesville and Fort Custer schools of military government, rather than professional soldiers. Most of the British staff were non-professional too, but a key group was drawn from the War Office. There were no specialists from the State Department or the Foreign Office to advise on economic, fiscal, manpower, and other problems. This was particularly unfortunate since both the State Department and the Foreign Office had personnel on their staffs who had seen considerable service in Germany before the war and could speak with a good deal of authority on German problems, whereas the military staff of the German Country Unit, with a few notable exceptions, had had relatively little experience in Germany.

By far the most important civil-military relations in which the German Country Unit was involved were those with the Morgenthau group in the Treasury Department in Washington. Recog-



nizing the military character of the German Country Unit, the Treasury Department managed to place on its staff a colonel who had previously been a senior treasury official. Colonel Bernard Bernstein was formally assigned to the Finance Division of the unit, but it soon became apparent he was interested in far more than the fiscal plans and directives. Realizing the importance of direct communications, the Morgenthau group was influential enough to secure standing orders for this colonel to visit Washington at his discretion. Thus, at a time when transatlantic transport was very hard to come by, Colonel Bernstein was able to make journeys to Washington and to carry with him the latest drafts of plans for the occupation.

When the third revised edition of the plans had been completed and was awaiting authorization for official publication and circulation among the military-government teams, which, in some instances, had already taken their positions on German territory, Colonel Bernstein took off with a copy for Washington. Through the influence of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Handbook for military government was brought to the personal attention of President Roosevelt who reacted sharply and decisively. The President informed the Secretary of War that he considered the Handbook "pretty bad," and ordered it withdrawn if it had not been sent out to the troops. Particularly objectionable were those parts which called for retaining the highly centralized German administrative machinery, and statements that military-government officers would be responsible for seeing that needed commodities and stores were imported. "The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them," Roosevelt said to the Secretary of War, "that the whole nation had been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization."<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that this incident occurred just before the second Quebec Conference, which saw the President largely in agreement with the Morgenthau plan of harsh economic policies for Germany.

The practical results of the President's personal intervention

in the matter of the Handbook were far reaching. General Bedell Smith, the SHAEF Chief of Staff, would not authorize publication of the Handbook as an official document; but in view of the urgent need for instructions, an unofficial version was issued. Eventually, military government returned in large measure to the position drafted by the German Country Unit, but this required the passage of two or more years. In the meantime, American military government was forced to proceed with a denazification program that eventually proved a fiasco, and an economic strangulation policy that resulted in the expenditure of vast amounts of American money to get the German economy going again.<sup>5</sup>

As noted before, the German Country Unit was wholly military in composition and did not contain representatives from the State Department or the Foreign Office. Not only did the absence of political guidance constitute a practical handicap in planning, it established a most unfortunate pattern. Instead of working together as a team representing the United States, military officials and State Department officials tended throughout the extended occupation to remain apart, rarely taking each other into full confidence and at times displaying distinct signs of working at cross-purposes. After dissolution of the German Country Unit in the fall of 1944, a good many of the staff of this pioneer organization went to the U. S. Group Control Council for Germany and, later, to the Office of Military Government of the United States in Germany. Had these military-government officers developed close working relations with State Department staff during the planning stage, it is conceivable that such a pattern might have carried over to the subsequent organizations.

A second agency of considerable importance in the planning of occupation policy was the European Advisory Commission. If the German Country Unit was exclusively military in character, the European Advisory Commission, commonly known as EAC, was largely a civil agency. Set up in London in 1944, EAC was a tripartite body representing the United States, Great

Britain, and the Soviet Union. The United States member was the ambassador in London, John G. Winant; the British government was represented by a senior Foreign Office official, Sir William Strang; and the Russian representative was F. T. Gusev, the Soviet ambassador to the Court of St. James. The EAC staff was made up largely of officials drawn from the State Department and the British and Russian foreign offices, but the American, British, and Russian military services contributed military advisers.<sup>6</sup> Since many American military officials believed that the decisions concerning the over-all Allied occupation of Germany, as well as other European problems, were primarily military in character and should be made by military agencies, they acquiesced in the establishment of EAC only reluctantly.

Directing its attention to basic political questions rather than to the details of planning, EAC decided that Germany should be divided into national zones rather than be administered as an entity by the Allies. Only three general agreements relating to Germany were finally completed by EAC and approved at Yalta. The first, entitled "Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany," which was intended to be issued by the Allied Commanders in Chief after the defeat of the Germans, provided for the division of Germany into zones and for recognition on the part of the Germans of the unlimited control of the Allies in political, military, economic, financial, and other matters.<sup>7</sup> The second provided for the almost absolute authority of the American, British, and Russian commanders in their respective zones, subject only to their unanimous agreement in matters involving Germany as a whole. The third agreement dealt with the boundaries of the zones and the establishment of Berlin as an area apart within the Russian Zone, to be administered by the military forces of the occupying powers.<sup>8</sup>

It is apparent from the descriptions of the three agreements that much of the work of the EAC involved high-level military matters as well as top-level political questions. The representatives of the various national military departments, therefore, took

a keen interest in the negotiations; and this was notably the case as far as the American military staff was concerned. The question of whether Germany would be administered as a whole or by zones involved both political and military considerations—some American military officials particularly liked the extensive authority they would exercise in a zone. But the American military representatives in EAC were perhaps even more interested in the boundaries of the zones, insisting that lines be drawn in such a way as to protect American lines of communications rather than according to patterns of German political, economic, and social organization. After the decision had been made to allot a zone lying some distance from the sea to the United States, the American military representatives were especially interested in a Bremen enclave through which supply lines and communications could be maintained.

As pointed out earlier, it had been decided in 1944 that national planning groups should succeed the bipartite German Country Unit in planning for the occupation of Germany; and it was intended that these groups, at the time of their activation, should serve as national military-government headquarters in their respective zones after the surrender of Germany. The United States group, Control Council for Germany, was set up in the late summer of 1944 in London, using the facilities vacated by the Allied Supreme Headquarters at Bushey Park. General Cornelius W. Wickersham was sent from the United States to head this group, which started out with some one hundred fifty officers and two hundred fifty enlisted men, and later grew rapidly until, in May and June, 1945, when it moved to Höchst, near Frankfurt, it consisted of some two thousand officers and more than four thousand enlisted men. Although the European Theater recommended that this group be organized to parallel German government, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided otherwise, and no provision was made in the beginning to deal with such fields as regional and local government and civil service. However, unlike the German Country Unit, it included a political subdi-

vision (later called the Office of Political Affairs), and, as if this were not sufficient, later added an Office of Political Adviser.

The U. S. Group CC, as it was commonly known, was primarily an agency of the Army, but it carried Navy personnel on its rolls, even to the point of maintaining a Navy Division. Its Political Division was mainly staffed by Foreign Service officers and clerical personnel assigned by the State Department. From an early date, civilians from Washington were assigned to the U. S. Group CC, and, as time passed, the number of these increased rapidly. The Board of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Economic Administration were especially active in sending civilians to be attached to the U. S. Group CC.

The problem of civil-military relations in the U. S. Group CC was to some extent similar to that already spelled out in the case of the German Country Unit. There was the relation with various civil departments of government, primarily with American departments since the U. S. Group CC was an American military organization, but to some extent with British governmental agencies because of the location for some months near London. The Morgenthau group in the Treasury displayed much less interest in the U. S. Group CC than in the German Country Unit because it had succeeded in obtaining policy decisions at the highest level that placed the former in a kind of strait jacket. The instructions coming to the U. S. Group CC during its early months were somewhat nebulous, but they made relatively clear what had been decided at the second Quebec Conference. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067, which reached the U. S. Group CC in the spring of 1945, was heavily influenced by the Morgenthau point of view, although by the time it reached Germany the official thinking in Washington had been materially modified in the direction of a more realistic policy.

There were two special civil-military problems confronting the U. S. Group CC that had not been so noticeable in the German Country Unit. One was the problem of obtaining specialists in political affairs, public-personnel administration, police admin-



istration, economic areas, and the like. Obtaining political-affairs specialists was a comparatively simple matter. Arrangements were made with the State Department to furnish the staff of a Political Division; and the State Department must be given credit for carrying out its commitment well. The Foreign Service officers, secretaries, and others sent in relatively large numbers by the State Department naturally varied in ability and experience, but the general quality was high. The names of Robert Murphy, who later held various ambassadorships as well as an undersecretaryship in the State Department, Donald R. Heath, later ambassador to Bulgaria, Indo-China, Lebanon, and other missions, John J. Muccio, later ambassador to Korea and Iceland, and J. D. Beam, later ambassador to Poland, will give some idea of the caliber of men sent to staff the Political Division of the U. S. Group CC.

Obtaining specialists in other areas was more difficult. The vast military forces of the United States must have included experts in almost every conceivable field, but the personnel system was not able to sort these out, or, if they were found, to get them moved to the U. S. Group CC. At this stage the War Department did not seem to be able to handle the problem of supplying civilian specialists. At a critical juncture the State Department agreed to assist in this matter by seeking out and bringing to the U. S. Group CC ten top specialists in such areas as civil service, German political institutions, and the like. The full commitment could not be carried out for various reasons; but it was under this scheme that E. H. Litchfield, James K. Pollock, and Roger Wells were recruited as civilians and brought to Germany where they rendered valuable service, particularly in the military-government stage of the occupation. Washington agencies such as the Foreign Economic Administration wanted to get its representatives in the field and, without being asked to do so, sent a number of civilians to be attached to various divisions of the U. S. Group CC.

The second problem at this stage was that of fitting the civil-

ians into the military organization. It was comparatively simple to place the Foreign Service officers and staff corps people in a Political Division; Foreign Economic Administration people were given niches in the Political Division and elsewhere. But to make it possible for these civilians to work effectively and with a fair degree of satisfaction was a much more difficult proposition. The military agencies seemed to lack experience in such a task, and there often seemed, at least to the civilians, little or no genuine interest in attempting to cope with the problem. Official channels were difficult enough for military personnel to follow; civilians not infrequently gave up in despair. The top officials in the U. S. Group CC were usually broad enough in outlook to appreciate civilian service, if it deserved recognition, but many military persons in lower positions, through whose hands the papers of the civilians had to pass, often were less appreciative of it. The result was that civilians frequently felt badly frustrated and some had little or nothing to occupy their time.

Military organizations, by their very nature, place a high emphasis on conformity. The military insisted that civilians in the U. S. Group CC wear uniforms without insignia, that they observe military rules and regulations which often seemed stupid, and that they be graded in a system of assimilated rank which determined where they could eat, what sort of housing they received, and what travel facilities they were entitled to. All of this resulted to a varying extent in friction. Ambassador Murphy wanted his own private Buick for personal use although he also had State Department cars at his disposal. The Army wanted this car painted army drab to conform with military vehicles, but Mr. Murphy fought a successful battle on this issue. Almost without exception, the civilians felt they deserved a higher rank than the military authorities wished to confer. For example, a young Foreign Service officer claimed to be at least the equal of a full colonel in the army and pointed to the protocol lists used in diplomatic circles to prove his point. The military authorities

were unable to see why such a person should outrank many of their officers who were not only much older, but had put in long and arduous and often dangerous military service. There was a running skirmish on this point which seemed never to be completely settled.

Quite important in fitting the civilians into the U. S. Group CC was the image that the State Department had of its role. The Foreign Service officers came to Europe with the idea that the military regime would give way to a civil regime very shortly after the surrender. The tense relations with the Russians, the difficulty encountered by the enormously expanded State Department in setting up an effective system of administration in Washington, and other factors rendered such a development impossible; but the mere expectation had its impact on civil-military relations in the U. S. Group CC. For one thing, it gave the State Department officials something of a feeling that they were only nominally, rather than integrally, a part of the military U. S. Group CC and that they would shortly have their own show. This, together with an attitude that it was not desirable for the State Department to take too strong a role in the military occupation, led the State Department representatives during this early stage to remain aloof. Ambassador Murphy, head of the State Department staff and later political adviser, seemed to want to avoid close contact with the working heads of the divisions of the U. S. Group CC, though he shared lodgings and messed with General Wickersham in England. He was in his office only a few hours a week, and when senior military officials sought to confer with him in regard to problems with political implications, he was rarely available.

Bringing with them their school-tie psychology, the Foreign Service officers often constituted a little coterie. As a tightly knit circle, they naturally tended to hold themselves aloof even from other civilians; and in the conferences of the Political Division, only Foreign Service officers were usually included, leaving the military personnel and other civilian staff out in the cold. It was

the feeling, at least on the part of some military officers, that only Foreign Service officers were included in the social events of any moment. Although petty, perhaps, such a feeling led to deep resentment in some quarters and caused the personnel officers of the U. S. Group CC more than once to threaten to pull out all military personnel from the Political Division, leaving the Foreign Service officers to do their own housekeeping work.

Inevitably, it proved impossible to integrate civilians, especially State Department representatives, fully into the U. S. Group CC. Military mores are different from diplomatic mannerisms, and both groups are proud of their own systems. Efforts were made to bring about a degree of conformity, especially as it became apparent that a civil administration would not be forthcoming in the near future. Thus, after sending Foreign Service-officer generalists, unfamiliar with the details, to conferences dealing with such matters as the division of the American Zone into states, and discovering that this irked the military officials who had given much consideration to the intricacies of the problem, the Political Division heads adjusted to the practice of sending, on occasion, non-Foreign Service officers who had specialized in such matters.

### THE MILITARY-GOVERNMENT PERIOD

The military-government period proper began with the surrender of the German Wehrmacht in May, 1945; but military-government operations had started earlier as American military forces began to take over German territory. When the surrender came, the U. S. Group CC claimed the position of military-government headquarters, while G-5 of United States Forces in the European Theater (USFET) maintained that it was responsible for military-government operations in the American Zone, with the G-5 sections of the armies responsible to it. For some months a running battle went on between the U. S. Group CC and G-5

of USFET—a conflict between two military organizations rather than a civil-military affair. At the end of 1945, it was decided that the U. S. Group CC should be combined with the larger part of G-5 of USFET, and that an Office of Military Government of the United States in Germany, commonly known as OMGUS, should be established with headquarters in Berlin.<sup>9</sup> The most important scene of civil-military relations during the years 1945–49 was in OMGUS, but one cannot ignore the lesser problem of USFET, the Third and Seventh Armies, and the lower-level tactical units under the armies. The general picture of civil-military relations in the U. S. Group CC remained much the same after May, 1945, although various problems assumed greater proportions as large numbers of staff were added and an increasing number of civilians came to join its subdivisions.

At the end of December, 1945, when it attained its maximum size, OMGUS reported a staff of approximately twelve thousand officers, civilians, and enlisted personnel. As a headquarters organization it was, therefore, a very sizable staff, though it never reached the numbers of the British Element, Control Council for Germany, which at its peak included some 20,000 persons.<sup>10</sup>

As the months passed, OMGUS became increasingly dependent upon civilians, although it remained until its dissolution a military organization. One of the chief problems, consequently, was the recruitment of the numerous civilians required. In the U. S. Group CC, the State Department had furnished most of the civilian staff, with the Foreign Economic Administration and other governmental agencies in Washington taking the initiative in sending the remainder. Under OMGUS, the State Department continued to staff the Office of Political Affairs and the Office of the Political Adviser. But OMGUS found itself faced with the difficult task of finding and appointing large numbers of civilians for various positions on its staff for which qualified military personnel could not be discovered or for which it seemed preferable to have non-military persons. General Eisenhower has pointed out that in view of the expectation that a military occupation



would be succeeded by a civil administration, it was decided at an early stage that OMCUS should not be a regular military organization, but rather an organization which, without too much reconstruction, could be transferred to a civil administration.<sup>11</sup>

The War Department in Washington performed most of the routine work of recruiting civilians, and handled their security clearance. But OMCUS ordinarily had not only to decide what positions should be filled by civilians, but also to prepare the job description and, if it had persons in mind who might be suitable, to forward such names to Washington. The process was a cumbersome one which often seemed to function poorly. After a decision had been reached by OMCUS to use a civilian for a given position, many months usually elapsed before all of the paper work, the recruiting, and the security clearance had been completed and the civilian had arrived in Germany. This long delay constituted a serious obstacle. The salary scales which Washington approved for civilians were not generous, and in many cases it proved impossible to attract people with more than the minimum qualifications. The security clearance became more and more of a barrier as time passed and the clearance required more time and involved stricter application of tests.

It was alleged in certain quarters that the military personnel in OMCUS and in Washington who were responsible for recruiting civilians feared the competition that might be offered by first-rate civilians, and that they consequently saw to it that poorly qualified civilians were recruited. It was also believed by some that military personnel sought to bring their friends and relatives into these civilian posts, even if they were not well qualified. How much truth there may be behind these allegations is difficult to determine. A good many of the civilians recruited certainly did not possess outstanding qualifications; but to what extent this was the result of manipulation on the part of military-personnel officials and to what extent it grew out of low salary scales and shortages in manpower is not entirely clear. There is reason to conclude that the military personnel officers were not

always familiar with the problem of civilian recruitment and that they frequently lacked imagination.

After a long delay in securing a civilian for a position in Germany, it not infrequently happened that the official who had made the request had been succeeded by another and the work to be done was no longer essential. There was also the even more difficult problem of fitting the civilian into an organization which still had military officers in key positions and which employed military methods of operation. General Clay not infrequently pointed to the large number of civilians employed by OMGUS and during the latter period of its existence noted that the staff was predominantly civilian in character. This could not be disputed; but what General Clay did not sufficiently stress was that OMGUS remained a military organization until its dissolution in the middle of 1949.<sup>12</sup>

Civilians on the staff of OMGUS often resented what seemed to be their classification as second-class citizens. Even if their salaries compared favorably with those of their military equals (which they often doubted), they maintained that they did not receive the services and the perquisites which played so important a role in daily life in occupied Germany. This became a very sore point at times when the wives and children of civilians felt that they were made inferior to military families of the same level. More important was the difficulty civilians experienced in getting a job done. General Clay was probably as open to recommendations from civilians as to those coming from the military staff, but lower military officers were often suspicious of civilians and even resented their presence. Only a very few civilians had access to General Clay; the great majority had to send their requests, recommendations, and the like through the maze of channels which were part of a military headquarters. Action frequently came only after a long delay and was often not what the civilians desired. Papers seemed to get lost. The net result was a serious frustration on the part of many civilians and a considerable problem of morale.

During the greater part of the military-government period, the official policy of omcus was to keep civilians other than those on the staff of the military organizations out of Germany. Newspaper men were tolerated if not welcomed; representatives of business interests and religious groups with substantial influence in the United States were permitted in small numbers. But scholars, students, tourists, relatives, and most others were excluded. Military authorities pointed to the serious housing shortage and the lack of food as sufficient reasons why American civilians could not be permitted to come to Germany. Behind this, however, there seemed to be a deep-seated feeling that occupied Germany should be under a sort of quarantine and that the military did not want civilians underfoot.

To meet the increasing demands of various circles in the United States for access to Germany, a scheme for bringing visiting civilian experts was drawn up. Divisions of omcus could request that civilians in various fields be brought to Germany for periods ranging from a few weeks to six months or more. If such a request was approved, the civilian, after a security check by Washington, was brought at public expense to Germany, paid a per diem, and lodged and fed in military installations. This scheme was employed particularly in the fields of education and cultural and governmental affairs, and did something to break down the isolation in which the Army occupied Germany. The record of the visiting civilian experts was most uneven, and both military and civilian officials of omcus were not infrequently sharply critical of the results achieved. A usie Survey Mission in 1949 concluded: "The performance of United States experts who have come to Germany has been extremely uneven. Some have done excellent work with German groups . . . . Other United States experts have been poorly selected and briefed. Some have come with no clear conception of what they were expected to do."<sup>13</sup>

Another problem of omcus in civil-military relations was that of formulating and, particularly, forwarding policy decisions from

Washington to Germany. The early policy decisions, notably JCS 1067, were drafted by the military, though as pointed out before, they were significantly influenced by the Morgenthau group in the Treasury Department. After the German surrender, it was increasingly recognized that policy decisions relating to Germany could not be exclusively military. Arrangements were made, therefore, to set up in Washington civil-military boards, such as the State, War, and Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC), to canvass the opinions of the various government departments, both civil and military, and to work out policies for the occupation of Germany. To obtain agreement from the departments concerned was no easy matter, and the time factor was important. But what was perhaps even more of a problem was the task of transmitting the policy agreements to the Joint Chiefs of Staff where directives were drafted for the Commanding General of American Forces in Germany, getting these decisions embodied in directives, and sending them to OMCUS in Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had many other responsibilities, and they conceived of their responsibility as going beyond the simple transmission of policy decisions of the civil-military boards to Germany. By the time they got around to completing directives and sending them to Germany, drastic changes may have taken place; and at the least, OMCUS was frequently greatly handicapped by the delay.

The most spectacular example of this involved the drafting and transmission of a substitute for JCS 1067. This much discussed directive, as noted earlier, embodied the Treasury Department's punitive policy in large measure; and by the time it reached Europe in the spring of 1945, it no longer embodied the attitude of the President, the State Department, or the War Department as represented by Secretary Stimson.<sup>14</sup> In September, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes visited Germany and delivered his much publicized speech at Stuttgart in which he revealed a more liberal American policy toward Germany. General Clay shortly thereafter went to Washington and found that the senti-

ment in the War Department and State Department apparently agreed on a more workable policy.<sup>15</sup> Although he expected a new policy directive very shortly, it was actually July, 1947, before JCS 1779 was received in Germany. In other words, it required more than two years for a significantly modified American policy relating to Germany to get to omcus in the form of an official directive.

When policy directives reached omcus, they did not always fully reflect the thinking of the civil departments even if the civil-military committees had agreed. Increasingly, as the German surrender receded into the past, American policy relating to Germany became more a matter of political considerations as part of the over-all foreign policy of the United States than of strictly military factors. The State Department naturally came to be very much concerned with American policy in Germany as part of the larger picture. Yet under the existing system, it had no way of communicating effectively with omcus. True, in contrast to the situation in Japan where political-affairs officers were captives of General MacArthur and could not communicate directly with Washington, the Foreign Service officers in Germany were permitted to send reports directly to the State Department, and through the political adviser, the State Department could make its point of view known to the American commander and military governor in Germany; but, as a military man, this officer was bound in the last analysis by the instructions which he received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With these instructions so long delayed in transmission and often so far removed from existing policy thinking in Washington, it is not strange that a serious situation developed.

Aside from omcus, the only organizations in which civil-military relations played a significant role during the military-government period were the headquarters of the United States Forces in the European Theater and the subordinate military headquarters in Germany. The former was located at Frankfurt and dealt mainly with Germany, although its jurisdiction ex-



tended throughout the European Theater. This large organization, headed first by Eisenhower, then by Generals McNarney and Clay during the military-government period, was predominantly military in character, at least as far as American personnel was concerned. During its initial activities in Germany, when it vigorously asserted the responsibility for all military government in the American Zone, it employed civilians such as Calvin Hoover of Duke University and Walter Dorn of OSS to advise in the economic and denazification fields respectively. These men operated at a comparatively high level and were given a considerable degree of freedom. The influence of the latter was significant over a considerable period of time, whereas specialists such as Hoover remained only briefly, soon concluding that there was little they could accomplish. Apart from these few civilian specialists, there were the political advisers in USFET and in the army headquarters. These were Foreign Service officers assigned by the State Department to Germany, and they were familiar with German affairs both through service in the Office of Political Affairs of the U. S. Group CC and OMCUS and frequently as a result of prewar experience in Germany.

The role of the political advisers was a rather nebulous one, depending in large measure on the character of the commanding general of the particular headquarters as well as on the personality of the Foreign Service officer. Since OMCUS had responsibility for military-government affairs in occupied Germany, there was technically not a great deal of leeway which could be exercised by the commanding generals. Actually, however, the established pattern of giving such high-level officers rather wide discretion, which carried over from the war period, made them far from cogs in a machine. To begin with, they undertook to redraft the directives coming from Washington or from above, not infrequently making changes which represented more than routine shifts. This system was later tightened up, but the commanding generals continued to exercise considerable influence. Their sphere lay in the tactical field rather than in matters relating

to the occupation, and consequently, political questions did not arise very frequently. Whether they called on their political advisers in those instances in which there were political implications depended upon their own initiative. Even if they called on the political advisers, they were not bound to accept the advice tendered. It seems probable that the political advisers served a useful purpose, particularly when they maintained cordial personal relations with the military staff; but there is little evidence that they exerted any considerable influence on the course of events. General Clay could recall no instance in four years when any political adviser, even the senior adviser Robert Murphy, had disagreed with his decision.<sup>16</sup>

### THE HIGH COMMISSION PERIOD

Although civil-military relations played an important role during the planning and military-government stages of the occupation, it seems probable that it was during the final stage that they came into the greatest prominence. During the first two stages, the basic organizational pattern, except in the case of the European Advisory Commission, had been that of a military agency in which there might be a few or a good many civilians. In the High Commission period this pattern gave way to one involving two major types of organization: civilian and military. These two types of organization found themselves in more or less constant contact with one another and their relations frequently reached a complex stage. There remained to some extent the earlier problem of a mixed military-civilian staff within a single organization, but this was less prominent than during the military-government period. There was also the problem of relations with Washington agencies, but these were not primarily of a civil-military character during the High Commission period.

The chief civil-military problem of a formal character during the third stage was that of the division of authority between the top political and military representatives of the United States in

Germany. This apparently was not a difficult problem for the British, who assumed that the overriding authority in a High Commission period would reside in the political representative, with the military occupying a subordinate role as supporting staff. For various reasons, which are not entirely clear, the situation was different for the United States. The role of the military had been unusually prominent during the war years, with the President seeing the Joint Chiefs of Staff almost daily and the State Department falling more or less into the background, even when political matters were involved. The prolonged character of the military-government stage of the occupation doubtless contributed to the pattern that made the military pre-eminent in Germany and reluctant to adjust themselves to a new dispensation under which political representatives of the United States would assume decisive responsibility. At an early stage, General Eisenhower and other high-ranking military officers had issued statements in which they took the position that the military was not well suited to handle the complex problems of the occupation of Germany and that a civil administration should eventually take over such a task.<sup>17</sup> Had such a transfer been made after a few months, as was originally contemplated, it is possible that it could have been achieved without undue difficulty, though even at this stage there were many military persons vigorously of the opinion that the responsibility for the occupation should be primarily military. After the military had been accustomed to exercising authority for more than four years, it was obviously not easy to adjust to a new dispensation.

After extended discussions in Washington in which military representatives and State Department officials participated, an executive order was finally drafted which provided that the U. S. High Commissioner should be the supreme United States authority in Germany.<sup>18</sup> This seemed to place the political aspects of the occupation above the military, but such a precedence was not recognized by numerous military leaders. The Commander of U. S. Forces in Germany was made responsible for military

matters, including security; the High Commissioner was to handle political affairs. The executive order did not stipulate what should happen when the High Commissioner and the Commander found themselves in conflict on security or military matters; and this was apparently not an oversight but the result of inability to reach a clear agreement in Washington. The executive order did confer on the Commander of U. S. Forces in Germany the authority to take any action which he deemed essential to safeguard his troops if an emergency arose. The term "emergency" was not defined; and this seemed to some, at least, to give the military man the upper hand, since he could declare any situation in which there was conflict an "emergency" and take steps accordingly. Inasmuch as no emergency was declared, it might seem that this problem of civil-military relationships was largely academic in character. Actually, its implications went far beyond the academic. When the Commanding General of U. S. Forces in Germany declared, in 1951, at a conference between civilian and military representatives of the United States, that the GI was the most important personage in Germany, he was saying in effect that the military forces occupied a position above that of the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner, the civil agency. And this attitude was widely held among military personnel from the top to the bottom, with the rank and file of the military frequently describing the High Commissioner's staff as carpetbaggers who contributed little and came to Germany to fatten themselves off the land.

Much of the difficulty probably resulted from chauvinism on the part of many military officials. Various conferences were held to promote better understanding between the military and the civil representatives of the United States in Germany. Material was prepared for circulation among the military to furnish information regarding the political goals of the United States in Germany and the work of the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner. But there remained until the end a great deal of misunderstanding and lack of understanding of the role of the civil

agency. In general, the situation was held under control, though it always remained sensitive. Had John J. McCloy, the High Commissioner during the early years, been less expert in smoothing over matters, it is possible and indeed probable that the whole problem might have reached the boiling, if not the explosive, point. As it was, the competition and the lack of full cooperation, growing mainly out of the military attitude but no doubt supported to some extent by a corresponding attitude on the part of the HICOG staff, weakened American efforts in Germany.

Although the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner was definitely a civil agency, it included various military representatives and a large number of carry-overs from OMCUS. The first Deputy High Commissioner, George P. Hays, was a major general in the Army who had served earlier in OMCUS and later took over command of the American forces in Austria. The special assistant to the High Commissioner, H. A. Gerhardt, was a colonel in the Army assigned to HICOG. The *Land* Commissioner for Württemberg-Baden, C. P. Gross, was a retired major general in the Army. C. R. Jeff, the *Land* Commissioner for Bremen, was a retired captain in the Navy. The Military Security Board of HICOG carried a sizable military staff. The representative of the Central Intelligence Agency at HICOG was another retired general. Perhaps even more significant than the presence of these professional soldiers was the large number of HICOG staff that had been taken over from OMCUS, a good many of whom had originally been military personnel though later civilianized. Various observers were of the opinion that this transfer from OMCUS contributed to a certain pattern in HICOG which occasioned difficulty. OMCUS staff brought to HICOG an attitude of mind and a way of doing things which were not always assets to the civil agency. Instead of taking a fresh approach and avoiding certain defects characteristic of OMCUS, HICOG, according to some, in many instances merely continued the earlier record. In other words, it was felt that certain weaknesses manifest in HICOG were the re-



sult of military patterns and ways of thinking. The exact role of such patterns and attitudes is difficult to determine.

Various problems of a practical nature may be noted as examples of the civil-military relations of American agencies in Germany. Military support of the civil agency in the form of commissary, PX, and other privileges was forthcoming, but they were often granted reluctantly and with a churlish spirit. Much of the time of the resident officers who represented the Office of the High Commissioner in the field prior to 1952 had to be spent smoothing the ruffled feelings of military officials and protecting the local population from the excessive demands of American military personnel. A great deal of time was devoted by high officials in the Office of the High Commissioner, even by the High Commissioner himself, to listening to the complaints of military personnel arising from the return of requisitioned properties to their German owners and the curtailment of fishing and hunting privileges that the American officers had formerly enjoyed. The almost fanatical insistence of American military installations on chlorinating all water supplies within their territories enraged the German population, especially in the beer-brewing and wine-producing areas.

While there was frequently competition rather than close cooperation, and formal rather than cordial relations between civilian and military staffs, the general situation was kept under control mainly, perhaps through the skill of the first High Commissioner in avoiding an open break. As noted before, no emergency arose which would have required the exercise of measures on the part of the Commanding General to safeguard his troops. Perhaps the nearest approach to a showdown between the civil and military organizations of the United States in Germany resulted from the continuing insistence of the West German Federal Government that the occupation costs be reduced. The Office of the High Commissioner had the responsibility of negotiating the American occupation costs with the Germans, and it felt that political considerations impelled it to co-operate with

them in cutting such costs. In order to bring about this end, it proposed in 1951, among other things, that German servants no longer be provided out of occupation costs to serve American households in Germany. The military vigorously objected to such a step as far as its own officers were concerned, maintaining that the proper position of the American military forces in Germany required household servants and insisting that the officers could not reasonably be expected to meet such costs out of their own pockets. The Office of the High Commission proceeded to cut out such services for its own officials, but it did not see fit to overrule the military position despite its apparent legal authority to do so, and military personnel were permitted to continue to enjoy such perquisites.<sup>19</sup>

### CONCLUSIONS

In no country has more emphasis been placed on the supremacy of civil power over the military than in the United States. Yet the conflict between the civil and military authorities in the occupation of Germany, especially in the last phase, leads one to wonder how well this time-honored principle will bear up under stress. Although it is admitted that much of the unwillingness of the military to take a subordinate position resulted from the rather unusual pattern established during the early years of the occupation, and doubtless much more from a lack of understanding of over-all American policy and responsibilities in Germany, these explanations do not appear to be sufficient to account for the unsatisfactory relations between American civil and military representatives. The quite different record of the British may be cited to bear out this conclusion. It would be inaccurate to state that there was no friction between the civil and military agencies of Great Britain in Germany; but it does seem clear that the British military recognized soon after 1949 that the primary responsibility was held by the civil agencies, and that they contented themselves with giving security support

to the efforts of the political representatives. The contrasting conflict between military and civil agencies of the United States poses the fundamental question whether the point has been reached in the development of American institutions at which the military agencies are no longer willing or able to fit themselves into a pattern that many regard as essential to the maintenance of genuine democracy.

To raise this question is not to deny that there is a positive side to the picture. The contribution of the State Department representatives in military organizations such as the U. S. Group CC and OMCUS was substantial. Likewise, the accomplishments of the interdepartmental committees in which both civil and military agencies participated, such as SWNCC, deserve commendation. And, despite the varying points of view and the temperamental behavior of both civil and military representatives, the general record deserves praise. Indeed, the German occupation was probably the most successful occupation in which the United States has been involved.

1. See, for example, Walter Dorn, "Debate Over American Occupation Policy in Germany in 1944-1945," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXII (December 1957), 481-501; C. J. Friedrich and Associates, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York, 1948); Paul Y. Hammond, "The Origins of JCS 1067" (typescript, 1955); Hajo Holborn, *American Military Government—Its Organization and Policies* (Washington, 1947); "Military Government," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXVII (January, 1950).

2. General treatments of the Allied occupation may be found in M. Balfour and J. Mair, *Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria, 1945-1946* (London, 1956); Eugene Davidson, *The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation* (New York, 1959); Alfred Grosser, *The Colossus Again, Western Germany from Defeat to Rearmament* (New York, 1955); E. H. Litchfield et. al., *Governing Postwar Germany* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1953); J. L. Shell, *Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma Over Germany* (New Orleans, 1959); Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955* (Princeton, N. J., 1957).

3. Harold Zink, *American Military Government in Germany* (New York, 1947), pp. 130 ff.

4. Quoted by Forrest C. Pogue, in *The Supreme Command* (Washington, 1954), p. 355.

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5. Dale Clark, "Conflicts Over Planning of Staff Headquarters," in C. J. Friedrich and Associates, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-37; J. H. Herz, "The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXIII (July, 1948), 569-94; M. M. Knappen, *And Call It Peace* (Chicago, 1947).

6. Much of the work for the American delegation was in charge of Philip E. Mosely, who has written the following valuable articles: "Dismemberment of Germany" and "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," in *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII (April, 1950), 487-98; (July, 1950), 580-604.

7. For a discussion of the plan to divide Germany into four zones, see J. Viner, "Treatment of Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII (July, 1945), 567-81.

8. See *Report on the Work of the European Advisory Commission* (London, 1945); State Department, "The Conferences at Malta and Yalta," *Foreign Relations of the U. S.*, *Diplomatic Papers*, 1945 (Washington, 1955).

9. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-26.

10. For a study of the British organization in Germany, see W. Friedmann, *The Allied Military Government of Germany* (London, 1947).

11. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York, 1948), pp. 434-35.

12. Zink, *The United States in Germany*, pp. 29-31.

13. Quoted in H. P. Pilgert, *The Exchange of Persons Program in Western Germany* (Frankfurt, 1951), p. 66.

14. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service* (New York, 1948), pp. 568-70.

15. Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York, 1950), pp. 72-73.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

17. Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, pp. 434-35.

18. Executive Order 10,062, June 9, 1949.

19. Such services, however, were dropped the following year.





PART III

*Generals and Party Leaders in Communist States*



*The Marshals and the Party: Soviet Civil-Military  
Relations in the Postwar Period*

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RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS in the United States and elsewhere have been discussed in considerable detail in previous essays. In the democratic countries, historians, journalists, and participants, using official records, interviews, and personal observation, have laid the record bare. A large part of the German official record was seized and published by the victors; and, in addition, there has been a constant stream of books by the defeated German generals. When we turn to the matter of civil-

military relations in the Communist totalitarian states, however, no such embarrassment of riches faces us. For example, such focal issues in the West as the effect of annual budget debates and of appeals to public or legislative opinion either are completely absent in the Soviet Union and Communist China or assume very different forms. In the analysis of the Soviet Union which follows, aspects of factional maneuver, in particular, can neither be complete nor accurate in every detail. The institutional aspects of this account are more fully established, though again there are elusive gaps in our knowledge.

As the "Great Fatherland War" drew to a close in 1945, a new era in Soviet policy opened. It was not, however, the shining new era which many in the Soviet Union had come to believe would emerge from the ashes of the war. It was, perhaps, to blunt popular dissatisfaction that would result from renewed conflict—this time with yesterday's allies as the foe—that Stalin permitted a brief respite. In the early months after the war, homage was paid to the new heroes with whose names the great victories of the people and their army had been associated. From May through September, 1945, the papers almost daily carried accounts of awards, promotions, and honors for the marshals and officers of the Red Army. True, Stalin instituted the new rank of Generalissimus for himself alone, and Beria was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union. But it was Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov on his white charger to whom the crowd turned in victory celebration. Unfortunately, there is almost no reliable information on the role played by the military leaders in this brief period. The temporary wartime political and military high commands, the State Defense Committee (GKO) and the military Stavka of the Supreme Command, were abolished soon after the close of hostilities. Marshal Zhukov himself remained in Berlin; Stalin retained the post of People's Commissar of War.

References to the military leaders, and their appearances, soon became less frequent. More was heard of the role of the Party and of Comrade Stalin. In January, 1946, the leading marshals

were included in the lists of nominations for the first postwar elections to the Supreme Soviet,<sup>1</sup> but within a year a number of these same marshals were in virtual banishment or in disgrace, and some were even in prison.

### THE YEARS OF STALINIST SUPPRESSION (1946-52)

Stalin's Supreme Soviet "election" speech on February 9, 1946,<sup>2</sup> marks reasonably well a massive shift of line. It launched the Soviet people again into socialist construction for the sake of greater power of the state, and the Soviet state onto a path of belligerence and isolationism. At about the same time the organs of government were renamed to correspond to the stress on the state. The "peoples' commissariats" became "ministries," and the "Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" became the "Soviet Army." On March 21, 1946, Decree No. 629 established the structure of the High Command in a newly unified Ministry of Defense. Stalin remained for the time being as Minister in order to groom his erstwhile First Deputy, Party stalwart, and now "General of the Army," Nikolai A. Bulganin, as his successor. Marshal Aleksandr M. Vasilevsky remained as Chief of the General Staff, and Marshal Zhukov was brought back from Berlin to serve as Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces. Admiral of the Fleet Nikolai G. Kuznetsov was retained as Commander in Chief of the Navy; Chief Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr A. Novikov was removed and replaced by Marshal of Aviation Konstantin A. Vershinin. General of the Army Andrei V. Khrulev remained as Chief of the Rear Services, and the sixth of the deputy ministers. Thus, on the whole, the wartime military leadership was retained, though the Air Force command was shaken up and several leading air marshals disappeared. Also, Bulganin now assumed a senior and more prominent "military" position.

A scant few months later, Zhukov was replaced by Marshal Ivan S. Konev and sent to command the distant and unimportant



Odessa Military District. In March, 1947, Stalin stepped down and was succeeded as Minister by Bulganin, who now became a Marshal of the Soviet Union. (With the sole exception of Sokolovsky, who replaced Zhukov in Berlin in 1946, there were no other promotions to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1955.) Also in 1947, there occurred a more widespread purge of wartime military leaders. Chief Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy A. Golovanov, wartime chief of the heavy-bomber force, and several other senior airmen were removed. Admiral Kuznetsov, chief of the Navy since 1939, was court-martialed for allegedly telling the Western allies more than had been necessary during the wartime alliance, and was reduced two ranks in grade, in addition to being removed as chief.<sup>3</sup> In the same year, the Council of Ministers approved "Theses on the Political Organs of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.," which increased the importance of these control bodies within the military establishment.<sup>4</sup> Finally, a new State Secrets Act in June, 1947, made it very difficult for military men to say anything on those relatively rare occasions when they expressed themselves in public.<sup>5</sup> Within two years of the close of the war, the marshals had lost the legacy of power and popularity which had been their spoils of war. While the Soviet military men were gradually being removed from positions of potential political temptation, publications—from children's history primers to General Staff treatises—were falling silent on the wartime services of the military leaders. Military doctrine, as well as military history, became set in an impersonal mold.<sup>6</sup>

Two years passed before the military leadership began to break out of this mold. In March, 1949, Marshal Vasilevsky replaced Bulganin as Minister of Defense; several months later Colonel General of Aviation Pavel F. Zhigarev replaced Vershinin as Commander in Chief of the Air Forces; in February, 1950, a separate Ministry of the Navy was established; and in mid-1951 Kuznetsov was placed again at its head, though still not restored to his wartime rank. In 1950 and 1951, Marshal

Zhukov was permitted two brief public appearances, which served at least, after an absence of five years, to remind the world of his existence.<sup>7</sup> Evidently, Stalin had decided to resuscitate a competent military leadership. One manifestation of the increased desire for efficiency of the military machine was a secret decree in the fall of 1951 re-emphasizing the policy of unified command.<sup>8</sup> Although political officers were retained as deputy commanders, their subordination to the commanders in professional military matters was more clearly defined. At the time of the Nineteenth Party Congress in October, 1952, an unprecedented number of senior professional officers were given membership on the Central Committee of the Party. Vasilevsky, Sokolovsky, Konev, and Kuznetsov were named members; and twenty-six other professional marshals, generals, and admirals (including Zhukov) were given candidate status.<sup>9</sup>

A final development of the Stalin period was the revelation on January 13, 1953, of the so-called doctors' plot.<sup>10</sup> This allegation of medical murder by a group of Kremlin doctors touched off a vigilance campaign that promised to develop into a major purge. The announcement of the plot was so worded as to be a veiled indictment of the secret police. Significantly, the alleged objects of the plot were all military men: Marshal Vasilevsky, the Minister of War; Marshal Konev, then publicly believed still to be a Deputy Minister and Inspector General; Marshal Leonid A. Govorov, Deputy Minister; General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko, Deputy Minister and Chief of the General Staff; and Admiral A. V. Levchenko, Deputy Minister of the Navy. Even the two alleged victims—Zhdanov and Shcherbakov (who died in 1948 and 1945 respectively)—had been wartime generals, although they were primarily leading political figures. Were the military being pointedly told that they would benefit from acquiescence in the coming purge of the Party and the Police? Was the military leadership itself divided? Conspicuous by their absence were such names as Marshal Zhukov, now secretly returned to be Deputy Minister and Inspector General; Marshal Sokolovsky, who ap-

peared in February as Chief of the General Staff; and Admiral Kuznetsov, Minister of the Navy. With all these questions still unanswered, the purger died with the purger.

Another important problem of the postwar Stalin years was the effect on the military leaders of factional intrigues in the Kremlin. It is beyond the scope of this paper—and probably of our knowledge—to analyze the political maneuvering among Stalin's associates as it affected individual military leaders. But it is clear even from incomplete data that there was a vast and complex arena of such action. If we cannot trace all the detail, we can sketch much of the outline. Moreover, many of the vague outlines become clearer in the post-Stalin period.

The main cause of the entrance of the military into the factional drama was the new relationship between political and military leaders brought about by the war. A few of the marshals, to be sure, were of as high standing on the Party rolls as many of the political leaders. But the war brought new, and sometimes deep, relations based on personal acquaintance, and even lasting friendship or hostility. Moreover, friendships and cliques existed and evolved within the senior officers corps, too; and in some cases whole groups developed ties—or antipathies—to one or another political figure with whom they served in the field or dealt in the capital. Although there was, of course, a shifting of senior commanders, two main categories developed: the Army group and Army commanders at the front, and the Stavka or Supreme Headquarters planners in Moscow. The chief Stavka strategists, however, did not plan only in Moscow; they were also sent to the field to assume temporary over-all command for major operations. Let us take one example—Stalingrad—probably the key one in its general importance and in its long-run effect on personal relationships. (This example also illustrates differences which arose between the political leaders on the State Defense Committee [GKO] in Moscow and those serving in the field as political advisers to the Army groups.) As we shall see, this historical case is relevant to current alignments.

In the field, the Army group most directly involved in the defense of Stalingrad was the Stalingrad Front, under Colonel General Yeremenko. Under his command were four armies, commanded by Generals Chuikov, Malinovsky, Shumilov, and Moskalenko. General G. Zakharov was Chief of Staff of the Front, General Krylov was Chief of Staff of the Sixty-second Army under Chuikov, and General M. Zakharov was Chief of Staff of the Sixty-fourth Army under Malinovsky. Generals Bagramian, Golikov, and Popov also served in this front. The senior political adviser and member of the Military Council of the Front was Lieutenant General N. S. Khrushchev.

As the battle of Stalingrad reached a climax and the crucial counteroffensive phase drew near, Stalin sent down not only the plans for the operation, but also an echelon of senior commanders and advisers to carry it out. General of the Army Zhukov, Deputy Supreme Commander, and Colonel General Vasilevsky, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, were given over-all command. Colonel General of Aviation Novikov was placed over all air forces, and Colonel General of Artillery Voronov was later put in charge of eliminating the encirclement. Moreover, Malenkov was dispatched as the representative of the State Defense Committee to oversee the whole operation. Not unnaturally, a certain resentment was felt by most of the senior field commanders there. Moreover, Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Novikov, and Voronov were all soon thereafter promoted to the rank of marshal for their services at Stalingrad; none of the field commanders were promoted to this rank.

During the following two years, the generals who formed the core of the field command at Stalingrad generally assumed commands in the four Ukrainian Fronts of the armies which swept across the southern part of Central Europe. The Stavka marshals frequently assumed command of the various northern Belorussian and Baltic Fronts. Thus was perpetuated, to a considerable extent, a rivalry which arose in the Stalingrad campaign. Moreover, it so happened that a disproportionate number of the com-

manders and the political figures whose wartime service was centered in the Ukraine were themselves, by birth or political career, associated with that region.

During the postwar Stalin period, some of the "Southern" political and military leaders, including Khrushchev, returned to that area. The military district command in Kiev was first under Chuikov, and later Grechko; Popov was in the Crimea. Moskalenko not only served with Khrushchev there from 1945 to 1949, but also, like Khrushchev, went to Moscow in 1949. Many other generals from this clique saw service in Siberia: Malinovsky commanded the Maritime District, Krylov the adjacent Far Eastern Military District, Zakharov and Yeremenko the East and West Siberian Military Districts, respectively. To be sure, as we have observed, Zhukov was himself for many years in a distant and minor command. But the core of Stalin's senior military command was the Stavka-GKO leaders on whom he had learned to rely during the war years: Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Kuznetsov, Antonov, and Shtemenko. Even the field commanders and staff officers who were in favor—Konev and Govorov, Sokolovsky and Malinin—were men who were not part of the "Southern" clique.

Though some mystery surrounds the doctors' plot on the eve of Stalin's death, with its involvement of certain military leaders, and though there may have been other political controversies in the preceding five years that affected military men, on the whole the history of civil-military relations in the postwar Stalin period offers little of significance. Perhaps we should say that there was, on the whole, little such history. For the main point is that under the personal dictatorship of Stalin the military had been reduced to administrators of the military bureaucracy. They were subjected to the autocrat's own method of periodic juggling of senior personnel to avoid the creation of the kind of cliques or subdomains which perforce he had had to allow during the war. Although some of the military leaders were personally suppressed in the early postwar years, the period from 1946 to 1953



especially deserves to be termed the period of Stalinist suppression because the military were not only cut off from politics but were even denied initiative within their own realm of competence.

### THE EARLY STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION (1953-55)

With the death of the autocrat Stalin, all other major Soviet institutions automatically increased in importance.<sup>11</sup> Within a week, the Ministry of War under Marshal Vasilevsky and the Ministry of the Navy under Admiral Kuznetsov were combined in a new Ministry of Defense under Bulganin. Marshal Zhukov joined Vasilevsky and Kuznetsov as First Deputy Ministers in the new establishment. But the primary reason why the armed forces acquired increased importance in this period is to be found in the change in the relative weight, and in the relationship, of other Soviet institutions.

The first major step was the drastic reduction in the role of the secret police following the purge of Beria in July. It has been rumored that Marshals Zhukov and Konev personally played a role in Beria's arrest.<sup>12</sup> Whether the rumor is well founded or not, the role of these officers is secondary to the fact that the military did acquire new stature after the decline of the police. The same plenum of the Central Committee which sanctioned the arrest of Beria named Zhukov to his vacated seat on the Central Committee. In the next three months, at least ten senior generals and admirals were promoted, the first in a series of belated promotions. Military men in disgrace were rehabilitated; Chief Marshal of Aviation Novikov, for example, was released from a labor camp. Finally, the role of the political officers in the armed forces was gradually curbed. All this, however, did not necessarily mean a change in real political power. Such a change did occur between 1953 and 1955, but it was a consequence of the struggle for power between two political factions favoring divergent policies.

Malenkov, Stalin's successor as Prime Minister, sought to in-

crease the power of the governmental and managerial bureaucracy at the expense of the Party bureaucracy. He pursued a course aimed at increased investment in consumer-goods industries and agriculture. Khrushchev, Stalin's successor as Party Secretary, came to lead the opposition to Malenkov's policies. Among the first indications of divergence from the Malenkov line were two discussions in a restricted General Staff journal in September and October, 1953, which emphasized the heavy-industry requirements for defense and gave only passing reference to the new consumer-goods policy.<sup>13</sup> By late 1954, Khrushchev and his associates had launched a campaign against the new policy and for a return to higher investment in heavy industry. The military press supported this campaign, and introduced the additional theme that heavy industry was required in order to raise the level of armaments.<sup>14</sup>

In 1953 and 1954, Malenkov reduced the announced military budget, and estimated actual military spending fell still further. Late in 1954 as deliberations on the 1955 budget began, the conflict was intensified. Military men began to emphasize in public speeches the need for constant attention to military preparedness, while Malenkov and several of his associates, in March and again in November, 1954, pointedly and unprecedentedly failed to do so.<sup>15</sup> These and several other issues were resolved by the January, 1955, plenum of the Central Committee, which removed Malenkov from the premiership. The new budget, adopted at the same time, raised the military appropriation by 12 per cent and restored the larger investment in heavy industry. Another issue arose over the practice that Malenkov had adopted of dipping into the state reserves (stockpiles) to accelerate the popular consumer program. This policy too was reversed upon his fall. "Reserves comprise our might and strengthen the defense capability of the country," Bulganin reassured the military in his debut as Prime Minister, "to increase the state reserves is . . . our most important task."<sup>16</sup>

With the triumph of Khrushchev and Bulganin over Malenkov,

Marshal Zhukov became Minister of Defense. A month later, twelve generals and marshals were promoted, including six to the highest rank, Marshal of the Soviet Union. Soon after, six more were promoted to General of the Army. Among those promoted in 1955 were several former close associates of Zhukov and of Konev, but also a conspicuously large number of members of the "Southern" clique, who may have been included at the instance of Khrushchev. Thus Moskalenko was promoted both in 1953 and 1955, becoming Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955; Grechko (who was not at Stalingrad, but who was a Ukrainian and a long-time close associate of Khrushchev) was also twice promoted; Chuikov, Yerenenko, and Bagramian became Marshals; and Krylov, Popov, M. Kazakov, and G. Zakharov were among the new Generals of the Army. Most of these generals, it should be noted, were fully deserving of promotion on the basis of their records.<sup>17</sup>

By early 1955, at the close of the initial or Beria and Malenkov period of the struggle for the succession, the military seemed to have won its place in the new post-Stalin order and to have gained acceptance of its requirements. A new era in which there was a renaissance in military doctrine was flourishing as well.

### THE KHRUSHCHEV-ZHUKOV AXIS (1955-57)

The period from February, 1955, to October, 1957, may best be understood in terms of an alliance between Khrushchev and Zhukov, which lasted until Khrushchev concluded that Zhukov was usurping more than his due role. It was not, of course, a question of equal or shared power; Khrushchev was always the more powerful. But it was an alliance of mutual convenience, born in the early post-Stalin period, in which each enjoyed the support of the other in consolidating his hold on matters of his own direct concern. Khrushchev was building his personal power within the Party, and the power of the Party within the state; Zhukov was exercising his authority in developing Soviet military

thought and training, and in building a modern military establishment. Ultimately, they clashed over the issue of defining the dividing line between the authority in the Party of the one and the authority within the military sphere of the other.

Various maneuvers by military and political figures were undertaken during the period of Khrushchev's rise. One was an effort to rewrite history in such a way as to highlight his wartime role. During the first half of 1955 in particular, political figures sent by the Party "to the front" during the war were singled out for praise—a device intended, among other things, to divert attention from the wartime State Defense Committee in Moscow, of which Malenkov and Beria had been key members. Most often this listing was restricted to the names of Khrushchev and Bulganin, in so far as it included those of living persons. But of the senior marshals only Konev, and on one occasion Chuikov and Bagramian, participated in this essentially Party effort (supported by Colonel General A. V. Zheltov, Chief of the Main Political Administration). On the same occasions that Konev and the political officers made their ingratiating statements,<sup>18</sup> Marshals Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Sokolovsky, Biriuzov, and Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov studiously avoided any reference to living political figures.

Another example was the appearance in political articles—and in the writings of some junior members of the "Southern" clique—of references to Khrushchev's role at Stalingrad, while references to Malenkov's presence there, made in studies written in 1953 and 1954, had become rare by 1955. On the whole, however, Khrushchev's role as a wartime leader was not stressed until after Zhukov's fall from power in 1957.

It is remarkable that through the postwar period there have apparently been so few differences over strategy within the Soviet military establishment, and between it and the political leadership. When new doctrinal approaches were undertaken in 1955, there was apparently no serious conflict. (Though possibly Marshal Vasilevsky was not enthusiastic; his early statements in

1953 and 1954 were very conservative, and he passed into semi-retirement in early 1956 and has since retired.) In 1955, however, there did develop a dispute over the value of a modern conventional ocean-navy. Both Zhukov (and his Army associates) and Khrushchev decided to cut sharply investment in a conventional navy, and Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov—who evidently objected—was replaced by Admiral S. G. Gorshkov (a “Southerner,” both in wartime and postwar service). Later, in 1956, there may have been dispute over operational control of long-range ballistic rockets and over future manned-bomber programs. Chief Marshal of Aviation Zhigarev was relieved and named Chief of the Civil Air Fleet, to conduct the development of modern jet transports built in lieu of bombers, while long-range missiles were organized under a separate command to be headed by Chief Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin.

Interservice rivalries may have existed, and may now exist, within the Soviet military establishment on a wider scale than we in the West can divine. But there are several reasons why such rivalries cannot be expected to reach a scope and intensity comparable to that in major Western countries. One is the historical tradition of the land-oriented, continental horizon of the Russian military and the dominance of the ground soldiers. A second is political—the severe limitations on the development, almost anywhere in Soviet society, of any point of view which has not already received sanction by the Party leadership. Moreover, the nature of the Soviet political system does not encourage belief that such endeavor, even in private, is in the national interest. A third reason is a sociological and psychological phenomenon—the difficulties of developing new ideas in the absence of their expression, debate, and refinement, and getting some service minority to adopt unofficial ideas. Finally, the ideological-political foundation of Soviet military thought is based on a conviction of the need and value of a balanced and varied military capability, a fact that discourages interest in theories proclaiming the superiority and sufficiency of any particular service.



## THE TWENTIETH PARTY CONGRESS AND AFTER

The Twentieth Party Congress in February, 1956, marked both the consolidation of past leadership and policies—in the military establishment, as well as in the Party—and the initiation of some new ones. Marshal Zhukov was made a candidate member of the Presidium of the Party, the first professional officer ever to be accorded such a status. He, Konev, Sokolovsky, and Vasilevsky were retained as members of the Central Committee; Malinovsky and Moskalenko were added. Twelve other military leaders were made candidate members, a considerable decrease from the former representation.<sup>19</sup> One revealing fact was the complete absence of senior officers of the political administration. This was unprecedented, and shows their decline in importance under Zhukov's administration of the Ministry of Defense.

Of the most political significance was the selection of officers acceptable to Khrushchev. In addition to the raising of Malinovsky and Moskalenko to membership (the latter had not even been a candidate previously), the Committee gave candidate status to Bagramian, Chuikov, and Yeremenko—all from the Southern clique. Particularly in the cases of Moskalenko and Grechko, it was evident that Khrushchev as Party Secretary was selecting factional adherents. Nonetheless, although Khrushchev showed some favor to the Southern clique, to other personal friends and supporters, and to Zhukov's personal rival Konev, the Khrushchev-Zhukov axis remained in force. In the course of his secret speech denouncing the cult of Stalin, Khrushchev praised both the wartime commanders in general and Marshal Zhukov in particular, presenting himself as Zhukov's loyal defender against Stalin's hints that he was not a good soldier. The military were gratified by the opportunity afforded by the deflated Stalin image to further their revision of military history and doctrine, and by the quiet rehabilitation of military men whom Stalin had purged.

During the period before and after the Party Congress, the authority of the professional commanders and professional military thinking had been largely freed from political interference. In late 1955, the position of political officer at the company level was abolished. Senior officers were permitted to meet their compulsory political education by what was euphemistically termed "self-study." But the relationship between the Party organizations and the professional commanders was in need of clarification. Accordingly, in April, 1957, by decree of the Central Committee, "Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy" were issued, replacing those issued ten years before.<sup>20</sup> This decree, and an accompanying order of the Minister of Defense, marked a compromise between Army and Party views on the division of authority. The compromise did not, however, settle the issue; various discussions still emphasized the restrictions either on the political organs or on the officers, depending on the point of view of the author.

At all times, of course, the four lines of command—the professional military, the political administration, the Party organization, and the secret-police counterintelligence—have extended from the ministry itself into every battalion of the armed forces. But by 1957, the last three had all declined in influence both absolutely and in relation to the professional command cadres.

Suddenly, in June, 1957, the various opponents of Khrushchev in the Party leadership joined in an effort to depose him. We now have the admission of Khrushchev that Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich obtained a majority in the Presidium. But Khrushchev refused to accept the decision of this majority, and insisted upon carrying the matter to the Central Committee, which is always heavy with men of the Party machine and which, moreover, he had packed with his supporters at the Twentieth Party Congress. It was a critical time for Khrushchev, and although he had the support of many key Party officials, it was without question of great, conceivably crucial, importance that he also had the full support of Marshal Zhukov and the military.

Zhukov is reliably reported to have told the Central Committee plenum itself that the Soviet armed forces would not "permit" anyone to "bid for power." Zhukov, now elected to full membership in the Presidium, subsequently spoke "on behalf of the Armed Forces" in pledging continued support to the Party leadership under Khrushchev.<sup>21</sup>

This was the apogee of the Khrushchev-Zhukov axis. Indeed, these two now appeared to many to be the most powerful men in the Soviet Union. But, for this very reason, could the newly successful Party chief permit Zhukov such a position? In particular, although Zhukov had on this occasion extralegally pledged the Army to Khrushchev's support, could he not on some future occasion attempt to range this power against him? Could Party Presidium member Zhukov be permitted to make charged political statements "on behalf of the armed forces"? This was one facet of the new situation from June to October, 1957—Khrushchev's wariness of the Marshal's rising power and popularity. But there were two other facets that also deeply affected the civil-military relationship.

We have noted earlier the flux in internal power relationships following the death of Stalin. The professional Party apparatus under Khrushchev has ultimately come to be dominant, but this was not the case in 1953 or 1955, or indeed, until 1957. The police had been drastically reduced in power with the purge of Beria. The governmental and managerial bureaucracy had been greatly weakened by the two defeats of Malenkov and his associates, and by decentralization. Meanwhile, the Party leaders were divided. The military gained from these changes an increased relative importance. Under Zhukov, they acquired a substantial degree of autonomy. The whole trend of his administration was, while not anti-Party, non-Party. "Military science" itself was defined in terms stressing purely professional military competence. This development clashed with Party policy, not because the military sought to usurp political prerogatives, but because it threatened to become a self-contained professional body within

the state. Khrushchev and the Party could not accept this since their whole aim was to revitalize the Party as the driving force in all activities of the state. It is precisely the growing tendency toward an autonomous, professional governmental and economic bureaucracy, a would-be independent intelligentsia, and a professionally autonomous military establishment, which the Party has considered a main internal concern.

There is another aspect of the basic incompatibility of the Khrushchev-Zhukov axis worth considering. In words unlikely to reappear in the post-Zhukov era, a Soviet General Staff organ (intended for circulation only to selected Soviet officers) stated in 1955: "The missions of strategy are set by politics, *but political leaders must know the potentialities of strategy*, in order to set tasks before it skillfully at each concrete historical stage."<sup>22</sup> Just as Zhukov pressed for recognition of the principle that career officers could not be criticized in Party meetings or by political officers for the professional orders they issued and the competence they demonstrated, he evidently began to assume that as the leading military strategist he was unchallengeable on strategic judgments in the Presidium of the Party. Although the evidence is not conclusive, there are good reasons to believe that in the months from June to October, 1957, Zhukov spoke with authority not only on military strategy in the specific sense of doctrine and plans (over which there was no dispute), but also on strategic implications of other policies. In short, since military and political strategy must be integrated, Zhukov wanted to do some of the integrating. But so did Khrushchev, and the outcome is well known. Accordingly, in the period since Zhukov's ouster, the military strategists have resumed the role of framing military strategy on the basis of policy handed down from the Presidium.

The removal of Marshal Zhukov was accomplished with no overt signs of difficulty, though by a devious stratagem. Zhukov was sent on a visit to Yugoslavia in October, 1957, and while he was in Belgrade a previously unplanned week-long extension of his trip to include a visit to Albania was announced. Thus

Zhukov was kept out of Moscow for a three-week period during which Khrushchev lined up Malinovsky and others in the military and political leadership for his removal. On October 26, Zhukov arrived back in Moscow to be met by a delegation of military and political leaders who informed him of his dismissal from the post of Defense Minister, a move immediately made public. During the next several days the public was in the dark on the meaning of this measure, while an apparently extended discussion of the whole matter of military-political relations took place in the Central Committee. At the end, it was announced, on November 2, that Zhukov had also been removed from the Presidium and the Central Committee; and he was castigated for fostering a personal cult around himself, and for attempting to "abolish the leadership and control of the Party" over the armed forces. Apparently, the initial plan had been to shift Zhukov quietly to a post of no real authority, but when he fought the issue there could be no compromise short of his capitulation, disgrace, and complete retirement.

### THE MILITARY UNDER KHRUSHCHEV'S PARTY (1957-60)

It seemed likely to many that Marshal Konev would succeed Zhukov. He was the senior First Deputy, a rival of Zhukov's, and, moreover, a man who had shown his readiness to support Khrushchev in the latter's rewriting of his wartime service. But Khrushchev selected instead Marshal Malinovsky, the third-ranking military man and the senior marshal of the Southern-Stalingrad clique. At the same time, Zhukov's Chief of Staff, Sokolovsky, who had been Chief of the General Staff of the armed forces ever since the late days of Stalin, was retained in office. Indeed, all of the deputy ministers were retained initially. Khrushchev thus allayed any suspicion that the military leaders may have had about the possibility of a large-scale purge of the High Command. In a sense, he showed that he recognized the political importance of the military institution and that he did



not intend to assault it. But Malinovsky was not given Presidium status, and the armed forces were restored to a position below the national policymaking level. Khrushchev regained the final voice on matters of national security that Marshal Zhukov had been assuming before his fall.

Marshal Malinovsky's former position as First Deputy Minister and Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces went to Khrushchev's old friend Marshal Grechko. In the year following Zhukov's ouster, nearly two-thirds of the military-district and other key commands were shifted.<sup>23</sup> Most of these were routine transfers, though a few close associates of Zhukov were removed. But as a result of the shuffling of posts in the High Command, a most interesting picture emerged: the Southern clique came to hold most of the key positions. Let us, briefly, note the fortunes of some of the figures we have followed from Stalingrad on. Malinovsky, of course, was now Minister; Grechko headed the ground forces; Popov was a deputy to Grechko; Yereimenko had come to Moscow to head the Academy of the General Staff (the Soviet National War College, which until recently was named for Voroshilov); Bagramian had become Deputy Minister and Chief of the Rear Services for the whole military establishment; Golikov became head of the Political Administration; Moskalenko and Chuikov remained in their key command positions at Moscow and Kiev, and Krylov now joined them at the third center as commander of the Leningrad Military District. Admiral Gorshkov remained naval chief. And, as we have noted, Marshal Konev was still the senior First Deputy Minister for General Affairs and head of the Warsaw Pact Command, and Marshal Sokolovsky remained as First Deputy Minister and Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The most recent act of the drama occurred in April, 1960, in the wake of dissatisfactions among the military with Khrushchev's plan for substantial reduction in the armed forces and alterations in force structure, announced in his speech of January 14, 1960. Though doubtless others too had reservations, the

leading military men who failed to speak publicly in support of this speech by Khrushchev, the senior First Deputy Ministers, Marshals Sokolovsky and Konev, both developed illnesses leading to their retirement. Thus the two remaining holdovers from the Zhukov administration were removed. Today all of the key places in the Soviet military high command are filled by members of the Southern clique. Marshal Grechko assumed Konev's post, Marshal M. Zakharov moved into Sokolovsky's place, and Marshal Chuikov moved up from Kiev to Grechko's old position, fourth in the hierarchy, as Commander in Chief of Ground Forces. Later in 1960, upon the death of Chief Marshal of Artillery Nedelin, Moskalenko was named Chief of the Rocket Troops, and General Krylov assumed command of the key Moscow Military District. Based on recent listings and their positions, the standing of the eight top military leaders is approximately as follows: Malinovsky, Grechko, Zakharov, Chuikov, Biriuzov, Bagramian, Moskalenko, Yeremenko, and Golikov—all members of the Southern group.

And what of the Stavka marshals? Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Sokolovsky, Antonov, Kuznetsov, Novikov, and Voronov are now in retirement. (Similarly, on the political side—though there were other causes—former GKO members Beria, Malenkov, and Bulganin have left the stage.) Although various considerations enter into command appointments, the difference in the fates of these two major cliques are dramatic.

Thus the military leadership is at present a more cohesive group of men than in any other recent period, though there probably are personal and service differences that may give rise to differing attitudes. However, all owe their present status largely to Khrushchev's favor, and presumably he now has reason, based on more than his personal association and acquaintanceship, to believe they are responsive to his trust. Although the fortunes of individuals are of interest when they are as persistent and as politically relevant as they are in the case of Khrushchev's association with the Southern clique of marshals,

the main question remains the institutional one. Malinovsky, after all, is a marshal much absorbed with military interests and charged with defining, advocating, and fulfilling military requirements. The institutional autonomy of the military establishment was not, in fact, basically altered by Zhukov's fall.

Inasmuch as one of the key charges against Zhukov had been his attempts to avoid Party-political interference in the military (not, of course, expressed in these terms), the regime set out to restore Party control at all levels. In what has seemed to many to be a paradoxical move, the chief of the Main Political Administration since 1953, Colonel General Zheltov, was replaced a few months after Zhukov's ouster by a spit-and-polish professional officer—and a Southerner from Stalingrad—Colonel General (now Marshal) Filip A. Golikov. In terms of what the regime has attempted to do, however, this move was readily understandable.

In the post-Zhukov era, considerable stress has been placed on creating a real relationship between professional and Party-political interests. This has been neither easy nor altogether successful. Nonetheless, an effort is being made to make professional commanders and staff officers more interested in Party-political work, and at the same time to make the political officers and Party units better grounded in military affairs and thus more responsive to the real interests and needs of the professionals. A model, if not a goal, of interchangeability has been mentioned—and indeed personified—by Golikov; and leading commanders at lower levels are being urged to assume the leadership of local Party units.<sup>24</sup> There have been many indications in Soviet military newspapers of a persistent failure to achieve a real rapport between Party-political work and professional interests. But although the autonomous interests of the military career officers have not been dissolved, the further progress of their independent development was arrested following the strides that were taken between early 1955 to late 1957. The "instructions" of the Central Committee were revised and supplemented late in 1958 to

remove some of the ambiguous allowances made in the compromise effected early in 1957.<sup>25</sup> The main and novel aspect has been the attempt to create, rather than merely to promulgate, a higher Party-political consciousness throughout the armed forces.

The higher levels of command have also been affected by the pervasive efforts to establish a closer rapport between the professional commanders and the political and Party organs. The institution of the Military Council, with the senior officer of the political administration in each military district or army Group serving as a member along with the two or three senior commanders, has been resurrected since the fall of Zhukov. A new tie of the military district to the corresponding regional republic or *oblast*-level Party organs has recently been cultivated. Both of these developments serve the function of making the officer corps more parallel to the local governmental, agricultural, and managerial bureaucracies, and less of an autonomous and self-contained system that is apart from the surrounding environment, and tied only to its own high command in Moscow.

The most recent major step in the never-ending campaign of political indoctrination was the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Basic Party Units held in Moscow May 11–14, 1960. Its proceedings reveal that the same problems remain—most basically, political apathy in the armed forces—and also that the general course of counteraction that has been followed since 1957 continues. In particular, emphasis on the Party organization is used to bring the professional officers more into the activities of political indoctrination.

The present military leadership has shown no inclination to resume open “Zhukovism” in Party-military relations. The military are called upon for their counsel in discussion of appropriate major policy issues, preceding final decision by the Presidium and submission to the Central Committee of the Party. Thus they contribute their advice as technical specialists—but not as full-fledged participants in national- and foreign-policy strategy-making. The military may be given increased public prominence in times of tension when the leaders want to demonstrate mili-

tary power—for example, Malinovsky's presence at the abortive summit meeting soon after the downing of an American reconnaissance airplane in May, 1960. Such moves should not, however, be taken as marking significant fluctuations in the situation of the military within Soviet political counsels.

The most sensitive issue that has arisen in the period since Zhukov's ouster from the standpoint of the military leaders was caused by the Party and government decision late in 1959 to reduce drastically the size of the armed forces when their strength was at a level that would permit this to be done only by altering the structure of the forces. This program was announced by Khrushchev on January 14, 1960; and it clearly had many internal and external, propaganda, economic, and military purposes and implications. Although we need not review this matter in detail, it does stand out as the first major issue of political-military discord in the post-Zhukov period. And the chief conclusion one may draw is that even in a matter of such central and esoteric professional concern to the military leaders, and indeed to the whole career officer corps, the preferences of the political leadership prevailed. We have noted earlier that in the wake of this decision some senior military men were retired, but the military leadership as a whole—which must have shared concern over the measure—accepted, endorsed, and implemented the decision. It is also pertinent to note in connection with this major policy decision that, contrary to some Western commentary, Khrushchev did not impose a new military doctrine. The military leaders still remain masters within their domain; and they were apparently giving the deciding voice in allocating the military reductions and changing the force structure under the politically imposed manpower ceiling.

The decision in July, 1961, to suspend completion of the reduction in force and to resume nuclear testing—while doubtlessly gratifying to the military leaders—was clearly a political decision related to the unfolding crisis over Berlin. Thus we see that in the first two or three years after the fall of Zhukov and the end of the period of political involvement in the succession struggle,



the military leadership has been stabilized by the dominance of a clique of marshals beholden to Khrushchev, and that it has been assigned only a consultative political role.

An analysis of the future of civil-military relations in the U.S.S.R. depends primarily upon one's prognosis of the state of the political leadership, and, over the long run, upon the evolution of the Soviet society and state. Two things seem clear: first, the long-run tendencies toward the growth of professional interests (including the military) seem stronger than the prospect of a successful renaissance of Party élan; and second, when Khrushchev and his erstwhile rivals from the Stalin regime—and the various military leaders from the war period—all eventually fade from the scene, the new generation of military leaders will probably be even more professional and less bound to the political leaders either by ideology or by personal bonds fashioned in war-time service. This by no means implies conflict between the military and political leaderships; the military are unlikely ever to try to assume a leading role in the political realm save in the unlikely event of a collapse of the Party's rule. It does mean, however, that within another decade or so, military-political relations will have entered a new phase. But this is the province for a future analysis.

1. See, for example, the long, eulogistic biographical articles on Marshal Zhukov and Chief Marshal of Aviation Novikov, both in *Krasnaya zvezda*, January 24, 1946.

2. Quoted in *Pravda*, February 10, 1946.

3. See Jan Kowalewski, in Commander M. Saunders (ed.), *The Soviet Navy* (New York, 1958), p. 99.

4. These "theses" were never published, and indeed their existence was not known until they were cited in *Sovetskii flot*, June 13, 1957.

5. Decree of the Council of Ministers "On the Establishment of a List of Information Constituting a Secret of State, the Divulgence of Which is Punishable by Law," June 8, 1947, in *Izvestiya*, June 10, 1947.

6. For a discussion of the stagnation in Soviet military doctrine, see R. L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York, 1958), pp. 61-63.

7. Marshal G. Zhukov was listed as a nominee for the Supreme Soviet elections in March, 1950, and gave a public address in Warsaw in July, 1951.

## THE MARSHALS AND THE PARTY

8. This decree, never published, is known from references in the Soviet military press, which began at once to publish articles on "one-man command."

9. A complete list of the professional generals and of the "political" and defense-production generals who were elected to the Central Committee in 1939, 1952, and 1956 is provided in an appendix to R. L. Garthoff, *The Role of the Military in Recent Soviet Politics*, RAND RM-1638, March 1, 1956.

10. See *Pravda*, January 13, 1953, for the announcement from which the charges given below are drawn.

11. A more detailed institutional review is given in R. L. Garthoff, "The Military in Soviet Politics," *Problems of Communism*, VI (November-December, 1957), 45 ff.

12. See, for example, the secondhand report by former MVD Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Rastvorov, "How Red Titans Fought for Supreme Power," *Life*, November 29, 1954.

13. Colonel I. Nenakhov, in *Voenmaya mysl'*, No. 9 (September, 1953), p. 6.

14. See editorials in *Krasnaya zvezda*, December 30 and 31, 1954, and the article by Lieutenant Colonel I. Sidel'nikov, in *Krasnaya zvezda*, January 15, 1955.

15. For further discussion of the budget and Soviet comments in budgetary debate, see Garthoff, *The Role of the Military in Recent Soviet Politics*, pp. 9-13.

16. N. Bulganin, in *Izvestiya*, February 10, 1955.

17. For fuller details and discussion, see Garthoff, *The Role of the Military in Recent Soviet Politics*, pp. 40-45.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-50.

19. *Ibid.*, Appendix.

20. The "Instructions" have never been published, but the Soviet military press has given substantial extracts and commentaries. See, in particular, *Krasnaya zvezda*, May 12, 1957.

21. See Zhukov's Leningrad speeches, particularly in *Radio Moscow*, July 16, 1957; and *Krasnaya zvezda*, July 5, 1957.

22. "On Some Questions of Military Science," an editorial, in *Voenmaya mysl'*, No. 3, March, 1955, p. 6.

23. The Soviet authorities do not ordinarily announce appointments or transfer of military men, but the military press does mention military-district commanders and some others from time to time—particularly on the occasion of national celebrations, when they usually deliver addresses—so that a diligent attention to the press reveals shifts in command.

24. See the two very informative articles by Colonel General F. Golikov, in *Partiinaya zhizn'*, No. 6 (August, 1958), pp. 15-23, and in *Pravda*, August 29, 1958.

25. See especially, in addition to Golikov's articles cited in note 24, the editorials in *Krasnaya zvezda*, *Sovetskaya aviatsiya*, and *Sovetskii flot*, all of November 5, 1958. Late in 1957, there was issued a "Thesis on Military Councils," and in November, 1958, a "Thesis on the Political Organs of the Soviet Army and Navy" and "Instructions to the Komsomol Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy," as well as revised instructions to the Party organizations.

*Political Aspects of Military Power  
and Policy in Communist China*

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HAROLD C. HINTON

THE NATURE of military power and policy in Communist China, the most populous country on earth and the second strongest power in the Soviet bloc, is a problem of the greatest complexity and importance. Its complexity is enhanced and its importance attested by the fact that the Chinese Communists tell the rest of the world no more about it than necessary. But what they tell, directly and indirectly, is enough to make it possible to reconstruct at least an outline of the political aspects of

their military policy, which are probably in the long run the most significant facet of the problem.

### THE MILITARY THOUGHT AND PRACTICE OF MAO TSE-TUNG

To date there have been three methods by which Communist parties have come to power on a national, or nearly national, scale. The Soviet party seized power in a coup following a period of largely underground activity and a major military defeat suffered by the government it overthrew. The parties of Outer Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria came to power mainly as a result of occupation of their countries by the Soviet Army. The parties of China, North Vietnam, Albania, and Yugoslavia came to power primarily through their own efforts and after a strenuous period of civil and foreign war.

In China, the most interesting and important of the latter cases, there were three major reasons for the Communist victory.<sup>1</sup> Probably the most important was the Japanese invasion of China (1937-45), which weakened the National Government of China but provided the Communist Party (CPC) with an excellent opportunity to expand its territory and increase its power, an opportunity of which it took full advantage. The second was a number of errors of omission and commission attributable to the National Government and to the Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party, which controlled the National Government. The third and probably the least important but still an indispensable one, was the revolutionary strategy evolved by Mao Tse-tung during the decade between 1928 and 1938.<sup>2</sup> Before Mao's rise to pre-eminence within the CPC at the beginning of 1935, the Party had been dominated by a succession of leaders much less flexible, much more subservient to Stalin, and partly for these reasons much less successful than Mao proved to be.<sup>3</sup>

Mao's strategy for the seizure of power, although it contains some borrowings from Stalin and perhaps from Bukharin,<sup>4</sup> represents essentially a skillful and effective adaptation of Lenin's ideas on the underdeveloped areas to the Chinese scene of the 1930's. Mao's strategy embraces five major elements: the concept of foreign "imperialism" (mainly Japanese and, later, American) and Chinese "feudalism," rather than Chinese capitalism (other than the "bureaucratic capitalists"), as the main enemy of the Chinese revolution; an orthodox Leninist analysis of this revolution as divided into two stages, "democratic" and "socialist," with the Communist seizure of power to occur during the first of these; a disciplined "democratic centralist" Communist Party as the leader of the revolution; "armed struggle" (that is, organized warfare, regular or guerrilla, rather than mere strikes, sabotage, or assassinations) as the principal instrumentality of the revolution; and the "united front," interpreted in a broad sense to mean an appeal by the CPC for support from all "democratic" and "patriotic" (in the sense of anti-"imperialist") elements of the Chinese people, as the second though still indispensable instrumentality of the revolution.<sup>5</sup>

Of the five elements of Mao's strategy, the one which is the most relevant to the subject of this paper, as well as the most practically original by Marxist-Leninist standards, is that of armed struggle. From 1927, when it went into open insurrection against the Kuomintang, until about 1947, the CPC was virtually excluded from the cities of China by its enemies. Mao learned to make the best of this situation, a catastrophe from the orthodox Marxist-Leninist standpoint, by emphasizing the formation of rural bases, or soviets,<sup>6</sup> and of a Red Army, and by relying in practice on the peasantry as the main "class force" of the revolution while maintaining the fiction that the Chinese proletariat, through its vanguard the CPC, was exercising leadership over the peasantry and over the revolution.<sup>7</sup>

Mao regards war and military power as matters of supreme importance: "Whoever has an army has power, for war settles



everything.”<sup>8</sup> War is, therefore, too important to be left to the generals; it must be directed by the Communist Party in such a way as to promote the achievement of the latter’s political and military goals.<sup>9</sup> Mao visualizes the proper relationship between civil and military affairs, between the Party civilian and the Party soldier, as so close that the two are almost indistinguishable.<sup>10</sup>

Mao enumerates three types of warfare, the first two of which he considers regular, since they are fought by large and highly organized military units, and the third of which he considers irregular. The first is mobile warfare, stressing mobility and maneuver and the avoidance of attacks on, or defense of, fixed positions. The second is positional warfare, which consists of precisely the sort of operations which mobile warfare seeks to avoid. The third is guerrilla warfare, which is fought not by unorganized peasants or part-time militiamen,<sup>11</sup> but by organized and trained forces of guerrillas operating under the direction of the Red Army command and often at a considerable distance from their homes, but in small numbers and in a dispersed fashion.<sup>12</sup>

Throughout the period of Mao’s leadership of the Chinese Communist movement up to 1949, the CPC’s choice among these three types of warfare was determined largely by the availability of abundant terrain suitable for maneuver and small-scale operations and by the fact that the CPC was fighting enemies (the National Government and the Japanese) who were technically superior and yet comparatively immobile and politically inept. Mao rightly predicted that his party’s struggle would be long but ultimately victorious. He divided this triangular war, which after the collapse of Japan in 1945 became a two-sided one, into three main stages. During the first, which he called the stage of strategic defensive, the Red Army would initially fight guerrilla warfare but would try to create conditions suitable for mobile warfare, which would ideally be the primary form during this stage; by implication, positional warfare against the superior Japanese forces was to be left in practice to the Na-

tional Government's armies. In the second stage, that of strategic stalemate, guerrilla warfare would be the primary, and mobile warfare the secondary, form. In the third stage, that of strategic offensive, mobile warfare would be primary, and guerrilla and positional warfare would be the secondary forms.<sup>13</sup>

In general, the Red Army conformed to this plan by fighting a shifting combination of mobile and guerrilla warfare, the emphasis falling increasingly on the first as the Red Army grew stronger and its opponents weaker. In December, 1947, Mao formally announced the transition to large-scale mobile warfare as the primary form.<sup>14</sup>

Like other Communists in other countries, Mao insists on the absolute necessity for Party control over the armed forces. This has meant to a high degree control by Mao himself, since he has dominated both the central party and the central military organs of the CPC since the beginning of 1935.

At lower levels Party control was and is maintained in the Chinese Red Army, as in other Communist armies, by three major overt organizational means. The first is the political officer, who is assigned to all units down to and including the company. He stands on an equal footing with the commander and has responsibility for the political affairs of the unit. He is responsible for the political reliability of the commander and the unit as a whole. His signature is required on all reports and orders issued by the commander, although his signature on purely military documents seems to be a mere formality. In some exceptional cases the commander also serves as political officer. Unlike his Soviet counterpart, whose powers at one time were still more extensive in that they included a veto power over purely military orders by the commander, the political officer in the Chinese Red Army has never had his functions seriously curtailed.<sup>15</sup> The political officer usually acts as secretary of his unit's Party committee; supervises the work of the unit's political department (whose director he out-ranks and from whom he is distinct, except in small units, where the political officer discharges both

functions) in insuring the discipline, indoctrination, and political reliability of the unit; and carries on propaganda among the civil populace and the enemy.<sup>16</sup> There have been surprisingly few known cases of friction between Chinese Communist commanders and their political officers.

The second overt means of maintaining Party control in the Chinese Red Army is the system of Party branches and committees, dating from 1928. Party branches, containing all CPC members in the unit, exist at the company level. At higher levels it becomes impossible to assemble and co-ordinate all Party members in the Unit, and the Party branch therefore gives way to a smaller "elected" Party committee. This committee, whose officers usually include the commander, the political officer, and the principal staff officers, discuss and to a great extent decide the manner of implementing directives received from higher commanders or Party committees. Some of the officers of the committee also sit on the Party committee at the next higher level. Party committees in the armed forces are expected to maintain liaison with, and in theory to accept a degree of supervision from, local territorial Party committees.<sup>17</sup>

Although the CPC officially claims to see no incompatibility between the principle of unified command and the existence of the political officer and the Party committee, it seems clear that the Party committee has come to overshadow the political officer and that both tend to impair the authority of the commander.<sup>18</sup> Serious friction has generally been prevented in the past by overriding ideological and Party loyalties, and by the comparative absence of a clear distinction between civil and military affairs within the CPC. With the advance of modernization, however, such a distinction will almost certainly emerge, and with it a tendency toward increased friction such as has existed in the Soviet Army since the disappearance of the original justification for the political-officer system, namely, the presence of a large number of non-Communist officers.

The third means is the maintenance of the ratio of Party

members to total strength at a level of about one to three.<sup>19</sup> The frequency of Party members is, of course, higher in the commissioned ranks, where it approaches 100 per cent, and probably also in such highly mechanized services as the air and armored forces. In addition to the Party members, another large fraction of the total strength of the armed forces—perhaps half—are members of the Communist Youth League.

In addition to these overt means of Party control, there undoubtedly exists within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) a network of covert informers. It is probably directed by Li K'o-nung, one of the CPC's leading specialists in secret intelligence, who is (or at least is known to have been from 1955 to 1957) a deputy chief of the PLA General Staff.

Mao Tse-tung foresaw at least as early as 1938 that final victory would require a degree of modernization, both technical and organizational.<sup>20</sup> Technical modernization was achieved to a degree during the civil war by means of large stocks of Japanese weapons acquired from the Soviet Army in Manchuria in 1946 and American weapons captured from the forces of the National Government, and it has been achieved to a much greater degree since 1950 through industrialization and Soviet aid. Organizational modernization began about the end of 1948 with the formation of four Field Armies under able and politically powerful commanders. Since 1950, it has been extended throughout the PLA with Soviet aid and advice.

Mao's military thought, and especially his views on the political aspects of military power, have virtually monopolized the field within the Chinese Communist movement since about 1935. It might be thought that certain possible limitations, such as the assumption of a politically inept and tactically less mobile opponent, the need for ample room for maneuver, the questionable efficacy of the political aspects of the strategy in areas inhabited by peoples differing in race or culture from the Communist forces, and the comparative neglect of air and sea warfare, would render Mao's military thought inapplicable in environ-

ments different from the one for which it was devised, and obsolete in the era of intercontinental warfare. Indeed, it is likely that some of the more technologically-minded Chinese Communist generals so regard it.<sup>21</sup>

In reality, however, Mao's military concepts are well suited to the kind of war which the PLA is most likely to be called upon to fight (apart from operations against Nationalist and/or American forces in the vicinity of Taiwan and the offshore islands, or against South Korean and/or American forces in Korea)—namely, a limited local war in some adjacent portion of the Asian continent. By the same token, the CPC has long regarded Mao's revolutionary strategy as eminently suitable for adoption by other Communist parties in Asia, and in the underdeveloped world as a whole; clearly, they can implement at least its political aspects on non-Chinese soil better than the CPC itself can. The most celebrated statement of this concept is contained in a speech delivered by Liu Shao-ch'i in Peking on November 16, 1949.<sup>22</sup> As early as February, 1948, however, in its message of greeting to the Communist-dominated Calcutta Youth Conference, the CPC had explicitly commended the entire Maoist strategy, including armed struggle, to the Communist parties of much of non-Communist south and southeast Asia.<sup>23</sup> The CPC must, therefore, bear a share of the responsibility for the Communist insurrections which broke out in certain countries in these regions in 1948.

A similar war or insurrection had begun in Vietnam as early as 1946. There the Communists under Ho Chi Minh consciously adopted Mao Tse-tung's politico-military strategy.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, Vietnam was an almost ideal theater in which to apply it. Its common frontier with China made possible a massive flow of Chinese Communist military aid after 1950, and especially after 1953;<sup>25</sup> its Communist Party was—and is—well led and effective; and because of the political ineptness of its opponent there was no genuinely independent indigenous government to compete for the support of nationalist sentiment. Elsewhere in



southeast Asia, one or more of these conditions was lacking and armed struggle was therefore a failure; for this and other reasons, the CPC began, in 1951, to advocate its virtual suspension and—especially after 1954 and at least until 1958—the implementation of a policy of “peaceful coexistence,” which represented an elaboration of the political elements of the Maoist strategy, with the military component reduced and held in reserve, and with the addition of intensified external pressures and blandishments exerted by the Soviet bloc.<sup>26</sup>

Korea was a much less favorable field for the application of the Maoist military strategy than Vietnam. Chinese Communist intervention, although direct and massive, was therefore only partially successful, whereas in Vietnam it was more successful even though indirect.<sup>27</sup> The enemy in Korea was strong, there was relatively little room for maneuver, and the South Korean populace was insufficiently sympathetic to be susceptible of mobilization for guerrilla warfare on a large scale.<sup>28</sup> The failure to win a decision in Korea, and especially the severe Chinese defeats north of Seoul in April and May, 1951, were probably instrumental, not only in persuading the CPC to initiate truce talks, but also in inducing it to reconsider the suitability of armed struggle, whether overt or not, as a means of advancing the cause of communism in Asia.<sup>29</sup>

It is worth repeating that the CPC still claims to regard Mao's military thought as the basis of its strategic doctrine. Officially at least, no alterations have been made in this strategic substructure in the process of imposing on it a superstructure of modernized organization, technology, and tactics of largely Soviet origin.

### THE ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY POWER AND THE FORMULATION OF MILITARY POLICY

From 1949 to 1954, all three of the major power structures in Communist China—the Party, the government, and the armed

forces—displayed strong regional tendencies. In each of the five major regions into which China was then divided (Northeast, Northwest, East, Central-South, and Southwest) there was a regional bureau of the CPC's Central Committee, a regional government, and (in all but the Northeast) a regional army or Field Army. The First Field Army, in the Northwest, was commanded by P'eng Te-huai; the Second, in the Southwest, by Liu Po-ch'eng; the Third, in East China, by Chen Yi; and the Fourth, in Central-South China, by Lin Piao. The concentration of power at the regional level was not complete; except for Lin Piao, no Field Army commander also held the highest posts in the other two power structures within his region.<sup>30</sup>

There was a sufficiently high concentration of power at the regional level, nevertheless, to enable those who wielded it, especially since they also held important positions at the central level, to influence or even frustrate the implementation within their respective regions of policies laid down by the Party center when they so chose.<sup>31</sup> Semi-guerrilla in nature, the Field Armies had strong local roots, and their commanders were men of great power and prestige. These characteristics tended to hamper not only centralized control over the armed forces but also their modernization and regularization, the need for which was rendered obvious by the Korean war. By about 1952, when it began to transfer a number of mechanized units from the control of the Field Armies to that of PLA Headquarters,<sup>32</sup> the Party center in Peking seems to have made up its mind to inaugurate a gradual dissolution of the Field Armies.

At the end of 1953, the problem of centralization, military and otherwise, became intertwined with the purging of Kao Kang and his alleged associate Jao Shu-shih.<sup>33</sup> Kao, in addition to being chairman of the State Planning Committee and a Politburo member, was the regional boss of the Northeast (Manchuria); Jao was satrap of East China. Kao's main alleged offense was that at the end of 1953, when Mao seems to have been seriously ill, he tried to gain for himself, by means unknown to the CPC's

constitution, a position in the Party and government second only to that of the ailing Mao himself. In the process, he apparently tried without success to gain the adherence of the PLA high command, presumably including the Field Army commanders. It is a curious coincidence, to say the least, that Kao and Jao were the only regional chairmen who did not also command Field Armies. Perhaps one of the real reasons for their fall was that, lacking this source of additional power, they were the most vulnerable of the regional chairmen and therefore the easiest to punish as a warning to the others not to obstruct the abolition of regional power, including the Field Armies, and the establishment of centralized control over the provinces.

During the months following Kao's suicide in the spring of 1954, the abolition of regional power in the Party, government, and armed forces was completed.<sup>34</sup> In the PLA, the Field Armies gave way to Front Armies, which are without strong regional ties and are commanded by men lacking the political power and prestige of the former Field Army commanders. The latter were promoted to the rank of marshal and given high posts at the central level, but they no longer commanded troops. Conscription—or, more accurately, selective service—was introduced informally at the end of 1954, and formally in 1955, in place of the old, more casual, methods of recruitment. Regular military ranks, fixed terms of service for officers, and decorations were also introduced in 1955.<sup>35</sup>

Given the enormous importance which the CPC rightly attaches to military policy, it is obvious that its basic formulation must be a function of the highest Party body, the CPC Central Committee's Politburo—or, more probably, since its establishment in September, 1956, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, composed of Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Marshal Chu Teh, Ch'en Yün, Marshal Lin Piao (elected in May, 1958), and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The Standing Committee probably receives recommendations on military policy from, and entrusts a supervisory power over the implementation of military

policy to, the Military Committee of the CPC Central Committee, which appears to be composed of Mao Tse-tung, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and all the marshals (a rank created in September, 1955) except Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien and probably (since September, 1959) P'eng Te-huai.<sup>36</sup>

Eleven out of twenty regular members of the CPC Politburo, as constituted since May, 1958, have had enough military experience to warrant classifying them as military men, although none—unless one chooses to make an exception of Minister of Defense Lin Piao—holds an active military command at the present time.<sup>37</sup> Roughly forty of the ninety-seven regular members of the Central Committee, including the eleven Politburo members just mentioned, may also be classified as military men. This degree of military participation in Party affairs at the highest levels,<sup>38</sup> which is much greater than is to be found in the Soviet Union, should be interpreted as indicating not the militarization of the Party but rather the utilization of trusted military men, often the best-qualified men available, in largely civilian capacities in a way quite in keeping with Mao Tse-tung's long-standing refusal to draw any clear line between soldiers and civilians.

Within the government, the highest ranking body concerned with military affairs is the National Defense Council, established under the constitution of 1954. Presided over *ex officio* by the Chairman of the Republic, who also holds the title of Commander in Chief of the armed forces, this body appears to have largely ceremonial functions, since it meets seldom and is so large as to be unwieldy. Of more actual importance was the creation under the Cabinet, also in 1954, of the Ministry of Defense, which has probably conferred on Premier Chou En-lai a stronger voice in military affairs than he had possessed before, and appears to have instituted for the first time a degree of civilian control over the armed forces, as that term is usually understood.

Within the PLA itself, the reorganization of 1954 abolished PLA headquarters and transferred the title of Commander in Chief from Chu Teh to the Chairman of the Republic (until

April, 1959, Mao Tse-tung; now Liu Shao-ch'i). The PLA General Staff, which before 1954 served as the staff of the now defunct People's Revolutionary Military Council, now exists as a distinct entity and is apparently subordinate, to a degree at least, to the Ministry of Defense. Its main components are the General Political Department, which supervises the system of political controls already discussed; the General Cadres Department, which is concerned with personnel problems; the General Training Department; the Inspectorate General; the General Rear Services Department; and the Finance Department. The Navy, Air Force, and individual arms and services of the Army seem to have the status of special staff sections, inferior in rank and prestige to, or at least more specialized than, the departments of the General Staff.

In sum, control over the armed forces and over the formulation and implementation of military policy is divided in some fashion among five bodies: the Politburo and Military Committee of the CPC Central Committee, the National Defense Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the PLA General Staff. Control is actually much less loose and divided than it might appear to be, since there is some overlapping of membership among these bodies, all key positions are held by experienced CPC members who know each other well, and all lines of authority ultimately converge at the summit of the Party apparatus.

#### RECENT TRENDS AND CURRENT PROBLEMS

One of the most interesting and important questions that can be asked about the PLA is whether it, or rather its commanders, exert or attempt to exert influence on domestic or foreign policy. As already indicated, the high proportion of military men in high Party bodies does not signify military control over those bodies. Like other Communist parties, the CPC tends to subordinate military to political (or, in other words, Party) considerations to a greater degree than do many non-Communist regimes. The



course of events in Communist China since 1958, however, strongly suggests that the PLA command actively tries, not always with complete success, to make its voice heard in the formulation of domestic and foreign policy. The CPC, for its part, has found it necessary both to make some concessions to the PLA's viewpoint and to reassert, more strongly perhaps than ever before, its long standing principle that it is the Party that commands the gun and not the reverse.

The reassertion of this principle has probably been rendered easier by the fact that the PLA command is not itself of one mind, but is broadly divided into two schools of thought, one of which closely approximates what appears to be the view of the dominant section of the CPC leadership—the latter being itself divided on certain important questions of domestic and foreign policy—<sup>39</sup> whereas the other tends to adhere to what the CPC press often refers to, with contempt, as a “purely military viewpoint.”

The first school may be broadly associated with the Ministry of Defense. It stresses the likelihood of, and the need to be prepared for, an extended and possibly broken-backed “people's war,” in which China's huge population and the tight ideological and organizational controls exerted by the CPC over that population would in time outweigh the enemy's technological superiority. This school also favors a reduction in the military budget (which has in fact been somewhat reduced below the peak level attained in 1955, if we may believe the published figures) through greater reliance on reserves and militia, extensive use of the PLA as a labor force, a higher priority for general economic than for purely military investment, increased Party control over the PLA, and reliance on the deterrent and protective effect of the Soviet Union's nuclear capability. The outstanding spokesman for this school, until his relief in September, 1959, was Minister of Defense P'eng Te-huai.

The other school, associated with the PLA General Staff, stresses the possibility and dangers of an enemy surprise attack,

and the need for a large and thoroughly modern force-in-being and hence for a Chinese nuclear capability. It deprecates the use of the PLA as a labor force and by implication denies the adequacy of Mao Tse-tung's military thought to the era of inter-continental warfare.<sup>40</sup>

The range of differences just outlined clearly embraces both domestic and foreign policy, which in the study of Communist China can never be safely isolated from one another. For the sake of convenience, however, we may begin by considering certain recent domestic trends which bear on the relations between the Party and the PLA.

The main domestic mission of the PLA, of course, is to act as the CPC's ultimate means of control over the populace.<sup>41</sup> It appears that military pressures, largely indirect rather than direct, were used in 1957 to aid in checking the dissolution of collective farms and in reforming them.<sup>42</sup> In the spring and summer of 1957, the PLA itself began to be subjected by the CPC to a program of "rectification." Officers and men were indoctrinated at length on the continuing validity of Mao Tse-tung's military thought, on the importance of "collective leadership" of military units by Party committees, on the need for these committees to maintain close relations with territorial CPC committees and local governments, and, in short, on the need for Party control over the PLA. Officers found a number of their privileges curtailed and were required to serve in the ranks for one month out of each year.<sup>43</sup> Officers' dependents were sent home to their native villages in large numbers. Since the autumn of 1958, military personnel, allegedly as individuals rather than as units, have been sent to help in the "consolidation" of people's communes.<sup>44</sup>

If large-scale risings should occur among Chinese peasants, as they might if the food shortages of 1959 and 1960 continue, it is at least open to question whether the CPC could rely on the PLA, which is composed overwhelmingly of Chinese peasants, to suppress them. It is a safe assumption that many soldiers of the PLA dislike the impact of the "Great Leap Forward" on their

native villages. This problem appears to be the cause of considerable concern in Peking.

As yet, it has not assumed critical proportions in the predominantly Chinese areas. In the non-Chinese regions, however, where the CPC's problems are complicated by intense ethnic, cultural, and religious antagonisms, the Party and the PLA have had a more difficult time in maintaining control. The PLA has been used to suppress risings by Kazakhs in Sinkiang (1951),<sup>45</sup> by Hui (Chinese-speaking Moslems) in Kansu (1952 and 1958),<sup>46</sup> by Khambas and others in Tibet since 1955,<sup>47</sup> and perhaps in other cases that have not come to light.

During the summer and autumn of 1958, concurrently with the formation of people's communes, the CPC launched a campaign to enrol virtually every able-bodied adult in the militia.<sup>48</sup> The actual military significance of this movement is not very great, for although its official rationale is to improve the nation's defense against external attack,<sup>49</sup> it is not likely to be very effective for that purpose. The main objectives of the campaign seem to be to establish a still tighter control over the populace and to create a gigantic labor force.

The commune movement as a whole, however, has a genuine military aspect. Among its purposes is probably an accentuation of the traditionally cellular and partially decentralized character of China's political structure, so that the country might be better able to survive a major catastrophe such as a nuclear attack. It is widely believed, but probably wrongly, that the CPC may not regard such a contingency with unmitigated foreboding.<sup>50</sup> It almost certainly aspires to dominate ultimately in Asia, and perhaps in the Soviet bloc and the entire world as well. It is difficult, however, in view of the terrible vulnerability of China's densely packed population to nuclear attack, to see how this aim would be promoted by a major nuclear war, even one in which the main blows fell on the Soviet Union and the United States.

There are no known personal or factional rivalries within the PLA, apart from the differences of policy already mentioned,

that are comparable to the rivalry between Marshals Zhukov and Konev in the Soviet Army; nor are there as yet known to be serious antagonisms between professional commanders and political officers. Tensions between the PLA and the police, if they exist, must be much less serious than they were in the Soviet Union under Stalin. Organized units of the Public Security Forces are not known to keep regular units of the PLA under surveillance, as was the case in the Soviet Union during World War II. Unlike Outer Mongolia, where the Ministries of Defense and Public Security were for some years headed by the same man, Communist China permits no duplications among the ministers and vice-ministers of these ministries.

If domestic order or national security appeared to be threatened by some serious factional controversy within the CPC itself, the PLA command might very well feel obliged, or at least tempted, to intervene. The most likely occasion of such a controversy would be the death or incapacitation of Mao Tse-tung. In such a case the PLA command would probably try first to bring about a reconciliation and a restoration of "collective leadership." Failing that, it might throw its weight to one faction as against the other; in the event of a struggle between Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai, the PLA would probably prefer Chou.<sup>51</sup> Only as a last resort, in all likelihood, would the PLA try to seize power on behalf of one or more of its own commanders. It is conceivable, of course, that a split within the CPC would produce a corresponding split within the PLA and prevent it from acting as a coherent unit.

In respect to foreign affairs, the PLA like any other military establishment has the mission of guarding the country against external threats and conducting operations on foreign soil if so ordered. Its defensive capabilities are probably equal to the task, except in the case of nuclear attack. Its ability to wage offensive warfare is limited by lack of nuclear weapons and appropriate delivery systems, at least for the time being, to adjacent non-Com-

munist Asian countries, any of which (with the possible exception of India) it could overrun if the CPC's top leadership should decide that a general war involving the United States would not result or was a risk that must be accepted.

What is probably the CPC's main short- or medium-term objective lies in the area where domestic and foreign policy overlap. This is the complete reunification of the country through the "liberation" of Taiwan and the offshore islands. Events of 1957, both on the mainland—the "antirightist struggle" against critics of the regime—and on Taiwan—the suppression, by troops acting on the personal order of President Chiang Kai-shek, of the May 24 riots in Taipei, which if unchecked might have led the United States to review its commitments to the island—must have made it obvious to the CPC that the chances of a "peaceful liberation" by means of an agreement with the Kuomintang were slight. And yet a military "liberation" would probably be impossible without nuclear weapons. Since 1955, the Soviet Union had been making some aspects of its nuclear technology available to China on a limited scale; but as of 1957, it had neither turned over any nuclear weapons, nor made available the full knowledge and equipment which China would need in order to manufacture its own, nor made any firm commitment to do these things.<sup>52</sup> Nor had the Soviet Union given any assurances, in public at any rate, of direct aid in the "liberation" of Taiwan.<sup>53</sup>

The allegedly successful testing of a Soviet ICBM in the summer of 1957 and the launching of the first sputnik on October 4, 1957, seem to have raised hopes in Peking that the Soviet Union could be persuaded or maneuvered into increasing its program of nuclear aid to China and putting its increased power and prestige at the disposal of the CPC in its efforts to "liberate" Taiwan; for example, by deterring American retaliation. These questions were probably foremost on the agenda of a high-ranking Chinese military mission, led by Minister of Defense P'eng Te-huai and



including Chief of Staff Su Yü, which visited Moscow in November, 1957; but it apparently failed to obtain the desired commitments.

It was probably for this reason, at least in part, that the CPC announced in February, 1958, that it would withdraw the "Chinese People's Volunteers," who would have been in a difficult position in the event of a war fought without nuclear cover, from Korea. They were in fact withdrawn, and the responsibility for the defense of North Korea was to a degree dumped on the Soviet Union.

In May, 1958, when the "Great Leap Forward" was getting under way, high-ranking figures in the CPC and the PLA predicted publicly for the first time that China would be able to make its own nuclear weapons in the not too distant future, with important results for its world position. These statements may have been made in part for their psychological effect on Japan, against whose government the CPC was then launching an economic and propaganda offensive; but it is also true that during the ensuing summer the CPC began to operate a small atomic reactor which it had received from the Soviet Union.<sup>54</sup>

All the current issues so far discussed, and perhaps others as well, were probably reviewed at an important conference of military leaders convened by the CPC Central Committee's Military Committee between May 27 and July 22, 1958.<sup>55</sup> Some of them were reviewed once more with Khrushchev and Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky when they visited Peking from July 31 to August 3, but again apparently without satisfactory result.<sup>56</sup> The CPC, which had already (in July) launched its militia campaign, whipped up a propaganda storm over Lebanon and Taiwan, and occupied for the first time its coastal airfields opposite Taiwan, then decided on a limited but still dangerous operation against Quemoy, the most exposed of the major offshore islands. Even if Quemoy held out, as it did in fact, the operation might force the United States to clarify its intentions with regard to the offshore islands and might extract nuclear

weapons, or at least a stronger declaration of support, from Khrushchev.

The result was mixed on both scores. Khrushchev, for his part, after some threatening but rather vague statements in support of the CPC, made it reasonably clear on October 5 that his commitment was a purely defensive one, covering an American attack on Chinese soil but not a Communist attack on Taiwan or the offshore islands. Communist military pressure on Quemoy had already eased, and on October 12, Su Yü's relief was announced; he was succeeded by General Huang K'o-ch'eng, a member of the CPC Central Committee's Secretariat. It is impossible to be certain whether this was done mainly to propitiate Khrushchev, or whether Su had in fact been guilty of urging the Quemoy operation in the mistaken belief that it would extract what was wanted from Khrushchev, and was being punished for his error of judgment, or whether some more obscure explanation is the correct one. The fact that Su was appointed a Vice-Minister of Defense on September 17, 1959, at the same time that Minister of Defense P'eng Te-huai's relief was announced, suggests that both these episodes may have represented among other things the oscillating comparative influence of the two schools of thought within the PLA that have already been mentioned.<sup>57</sup>

Like that of Su Yü, P'eng Te-huai's relief seems to have had an international aspect. In the spring of 1959, not long after the Tibetan crisis of March, he visited eastern Europe, and he and Vice Foreign Minister Chang Wen-t'ien attended a conference of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in May. In the light of later events, it seems likely that they explained the actions which the CPC proposed to take along the Sino-Indian frontier to prevent the escape of additional Tibetans and the re-entry with arms of those who had already gotten away; to safeguard the military highway that had been built two years earlier across the Indian-claimed Aksai Chin Plateau in Ladakh connecting western Tibet with western Sinkiang; and to humiliate the government of India. Probably annoyed by the Soviet Union's promise of a

\$378 million credit to India on July 30, and almost certainly annoyed by the government of India's ouster of the Communist government in Kerala on July 31, the CPC proceeded to strengthen its position along the frontier. On August 25, the PLA occupied Longju, an Indian border checkpoint lying just south of the McMahon Line in the Northeast Frontier Agency. As usual in such cases, the challenge was rendered ambiguous by the false assertion that Longju lay in fact to the north of the line, whose validity (except apparently for the portion between China and Burma) the CPC rejects in any event. On September 9, a Tass statement took a nominally neutral stand on the dispute, while in effect favoring the Indian side by expressing regret that it had arisen at all. On September 17, P'eng Te-huai, Huang K'o-ch'eng, and Chang Wen-t'ien were all relieved of their posts; Chang has been seen in public only once since that time, and P'eng and Huang not at all. P'eng was succeeded by Lin Piao, the PLA's most successful and prestigious field commander and a man whose political influence seems to have been rising steadily since 1954; and Huang, by Minister of Public Security Lo Jui-ch'ing, a Party policeman with a most unsavory reputation for intrigue and ruthlessness. Lin Piao's statement on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist regime reads almost like a catalogue of at least the domestic politico-military problems discussed in this paper.<sup>58</sup>

The main problems of this kind currently facing the CPC and the PLA may be summarized by way of conclusion.<sup>59</sup> The Party is concerned about the reliability of the rank and file of the PLA, especially in the event that peasant soldiers are required to fire on peasants in revolt over food shortages or some similar grievance. The Party appears to be having difficulties with at least a section of the PLA command, which resents being assigned certain missions, particularly the "liberation" of Taiwan and the offshore islands, without being given the probably indispensable means, namely, nuclear weapons. To date, so far as is known, the Soviet Union has given Communist China limited

aid and training in nuclear technology, has probably given the PLA instruction in the use of short-range missiles and nuclear-capable artillery, and may have actually turned over some missiles; but it has apparently not yet turned over nuclear weapons or warheads or the full knowledge and equipment necessary for their manufacture and delivery.<sup>60</sup> Nor has it unequivocally pledged the support of its own nuclear capability except in the unlikely event of an American attack on the mainland of China. The CPC gives signs of desiring a stronger Soviet commitment and of a willingness to involve the Soviet Union, if it is possible and necessary to do so, in the struggle for Taiwan. This willingness is probably not to be explained by the lighthearted attitude toward a third world war that the CPC sometimes affects and that is widely attributed to it, but to a belief that the United States will back down if confronted with sufficient force. There is little convincing evidence that the CPC is willing to risk a contest with strategically superior American military power without Soviet support, at least until it develops its own nuclear capability. Occasional statements that appear to indicate the contrary are almost certainly in the nature of whistling in the dark.<sup>61</sup> It seems likely that the CPC's assertion that any local war launched by the "imperialists," as allegedly in Laos, may burgeon into total war<sup>62</sup> ought to be viewed with some, though not total, skepticism. The CPC is not controlled by irrational fanatics; nor, for all its experience and sophistication in politico-military matters, is it led by giants eight feet tall.

1. Soviet policy made a small positive contribution, and American policy may have made some negative contribution, but they were of minor importance as compared with the other factors mentioned here and, in any case, tended to some extent to cancel each other out.

2. Published analyses of this strategy are rather rare. One is Edward L. Katzenbach and Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung," *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1955, pp. 321-40.

3. It is also worth noting, however, that Mao's formula for the exercise of power, as distinct from his strategy for the seizure of power, is thoroughly Stalinist in that it accepts the three essentials of Stalin's formula for building "socialism in one country": the totalitarian police state, the forced development of heavy and

strategic industry, and the collectivization of agriculture (see Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," July 1, 1949, in C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* [Cambridge, Mass., 1952], pp. 449-61, esp. 456-58). The CPC specifically identified these three things as major achievements of Stalin in its first published statement on the "de-Stalinization" question, "On the Historical Experience Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *People's Daily*, April 5, 1956.

4. Mao's concept of New Democracy (see *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* [New York, 1954], III, 106-56; hereinafter cited as *Selected Works*) may owe something to a speech by Bukharin before the Sixth Congress of the CPC, held in Moscow in June and July, 1928.

5. *Selected Works*, III, 65, 128, 152.

6. Cf. *Selected Works*, I, 71-104.

7. Cf. *Selected Works*, III, 93-94.

8. *Selected Works*, II, 271.

9. "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the Party."—*Selected Works*, II, 272.

10. "There is a distance between a civilian and a soldier, but that distance is not as long as the Great Wall and can be quickly removed; to take part in revolution and war is the method of eliminating it."—*Selected Works*, I, 183.

11. Before 1949, the CPC's military establishment was composed of three distinct components: the combat and garrison units of the regular Red Army, the guerrilla forces, and the militia.

12. *Selected Works*, I, 242-48.

13. *Selected Works*, II, 183-93.

14. Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," December 25, 1947 (excerpts in O. B. van der Sprenkel *et al.*, *New China: Three Views* [New York, 1951], pp. 152-75, esp. 156-58). For an account of the concluding campaigns in the civil war, see General L.-M. Chassin, *La Conquête de la Chine par Mao Tse-tung* (Paris, 1952), pp. 154 ff.

15. On the CPC's refusal to give its political officers the sweeping power to control military as well as political acts of commanders, see the work of 1939 by Lo Jui-ch'ing, *Political Work in Anti-Japanese Military Forces*, translated in Gene Z. Hanrahan, *Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics*, no publisher, July, 1952.

16. Chin Ta-k'ai and Chang Ta-chün, *Chung Kung chün-shih p'ou-shih* ("An Analysis of Chinese Communist Military Affairs"), (Hong Kong, 1954), pp. 66-73.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 64. Cf. Marshal P'eng Te-huai's report to the first session of the Eighth National Congress of the CPC (New China News Agency dispatch [hereinafter cited as NCNA], Peking, September 19, 1956).

18. There has been a recent tendency, as in the Soviet Army, to exalt the Party committee as against both the commander and the political officer (cf. *Liberation Army Daily*, July 1, 1958).

19. *Selected Works*, I, 83, 307.

20. *Selected Works*, II, 238-39.



## POWER AND POLICY IN COMMUNIST CHINA

21. "... In the course of modernized building of our army, a very few comrades, because of the influence of bourgeois military thinking and doctrinairism, have showed some erroneous tendencies. One-sidedly stressing modernization and regularization, they neglected the revolutionary nature of the people's army and neglected Party leadership. . . . They one-sidedly stressed unification and centralization, overstressed the individual authority of officers. . . . They one-sidedly stressed the part of atomic weapons and modern military techniques."—*Liberation Army Daily*, August 1, 1958.

22. NCNA, Peking, November 23, 1949.

23. "The great victories of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and of people's independence and democracy against America and Chiang Kai-shek are doubtless of enormous encouragement in aiding the peoples of the various countries of Southeast Asia. And in this respect, the people of China have set an extremely valuable example to the peoples of the eastern countries."—"Congratulations on the Opening of the Southeast Asia Youth Conference," NCNA, North Shensi, February 16, 1948. The exceptions, as indicated by later Chinese Communist and Soviet statements, were India, Pakistan, Thailand, Japan, and—until 1950—South Korea, all of them areas in which there were strong governments or occupation armies and no effective Communist-led guerrilla forces.

24. Philippe Devillers, *Histoire du Viêt-Nam de 1940 à 1952* (3rd ed.; Paris, 1952), p. 452.

25. Robert Guillain, *La Fin des illusions* (Paris, 1954), pp. 39–42; cf. Allan B. Cole (ed.), *Conflict in Indochina and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945–1955* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1956), pp. 125–30.

26. Note the directive by the Politburo of the Malayan Communist Party, dated October 1, 1951 (Communist China's National Day), to its guerrilla units to stop large-scale offensive operations and go on the defensive (abridged translation in Gene Z. Hanrahan, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya* [New York, 1954], pp. 130–33).

27. The two major reasons for Chinese Communist intervention in Korea are probably the ones officially given by the CPC (for example, in NCNA, Peking, October 25, 1958): there was an assumed threat to Chinese territory (Manchuria); and another Communist state (North Korea) was in danger of extinction. Stalin was probably eager to see the CPC intervene, and the CPC too may have wanted to forestall the necessity for direct Soviet intervention. More broadly, the CPC probably wanted to prevent the enhancement of American, and the corresponding diminution of Chinese Communist, power and prestige that would have followed a successful reunification of Korea by American troops acting under United Nations auspices (cf. Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* [New York, 1960], pp. 157–60).

28. For discussions of the PLA's performance in Korea, see Hanson W. Baldwin, "China as a Military Power," *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1951), pp. 51–62; Major R. C. W. Thomas, "The Chinese Communist Forces in Korea," *The Army Quarterly* (October, 1952), pp. 35–41.

29. Cf. Soong Ching-ling, "On Peaceful Coexistence," *People's China* (June 1, 1951), and Jacob Malik's proposal of June 24, 1951, for truce negotiations. References to "armed struggle" in southeast Asia (other than Vietnam) disappeared from the CPC press after the middle of 1951.

30. Cf. Chin and Chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-30; "The Central Organization of the Communist Party of China," *Current Background*, No. 137 (American Consulate General, Hong Kong), (November 15, 1951).

31. For example, Lin Piao announced on July 1, 1949, that first priority in his region would be given to work in the rural areas (NCNA, Peking, July 21, 1949; note the delay in publication), only a few months after the CPC Central Committee had decided that the "center of gravity" of Party work should lie in the cities (Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *op. cit.*, p. 444).

32. Chin and Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

33. The CPC's official statement on this affair was published in the *People's Daily* on April 5, 1955.

34. The change in the governmental sphere was announced in NCNA, Peking, June 19, 1954; the regional Party organizations were dissolved during the ensuing autumn (for example, see *Yangtze Daily*, November 15, 1954), only to be revived six years later following a decision of the Ninth Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee (NCNA, Peking, January 20, 1961).

35. Chin Ta-k'ai, "Chung Kung chün-shih chih-tu ti pien-ke" ("Changes in the Chinese Communist Military System"), *Min-chu p'ing-lun* ("The Democratic Review"), (March 16, 1955), pp. 153-55.

36. That is, Chu Teh, Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, Chen Yi, Lo Jung-huan, Nieh Jung-cheng, and Yeh Chien-ying. These, plus P'eng Te-huai, were, at any rate, the persons who made the principal speeches at the conference of May 27-July 22, 1958 (see below). Before the governmental reorganization of 1954, the Military Committee probably consisted of the Communist members of the People's Revolutionary Military Council, which before its abolition in 1954 was the highest governmental body concerned with military affairs.

37. Cf. "Directory of Top National Positions in Chinese Communist Party, Government, and Armed Forces," *Current Background*, No. 513 (July 16, 1958). These men are Chu Teh, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan, Chen Yi, P'eng Te-huai, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, Li Hsien-nien, Li Ching-ch'uan, and T'an Chen-lin.

38. The degree of military participation in governmental bodies is naturally lower, but it is still high as compared with the situation in the Soviet Union.

39. Cf. Harold C. Hinton, "Intra-Party Politics and Economic Policy in Communist China," *World Politics* (July, 1960), pp. 509-24.

40. Alice Langley Hsieh, "Communist China and Nuclear Warfare," *The China Quarterly* (April-June, 1960), pp. 4-5.

41. Chu Teh recently defined the PLA's mission as "fighting, taking part in production and keeping in touch with the masses" ("People's Army, People's War," NCNA, Peking, July 31, 1958).

42. This was implied by *Liberation Army Daily*, October 26, 1957.

43. PLA General Political Department directive of November 21, 1957 (NCNA, Peking, November 27, 1957).

44. PLA General Political Department directive of September 20, 1958 (NCNA, Peking, September 21, 1958).

45. Godfrey Lias, "Kazakh Nomads' Struggle Against Communists," *Times* (London), February 17 and 18, 1955. Among the grievances of the minority

peoples in Sinkiang is the presence of several hundred thousand discharged servicemen organized in "Production and Construction Army Corps," who engage on a full-time basis in the same kinds of economic activity (road-building, land reclamation, etc.) to which PLA personnel on active duty also devote some of their time (cf. Saifudin's report on the situation in Sinkiang, *People's Daily*, December 26, 1957).

46. Cf. "Ma Chen-wu and Other Hui Rightists in Kansu," *Current Background*, No. 533 (November 7, 1958).

47. See the official announcement on this revolt, NCNA, Peking, March 28, 1959.

48. "Development of People's Militia in Communist China," *Current Background*, No. 530 (October 31, 1958); Ralph L. Powell, "Everyone a Soldier: The Chinese Communist Militia," *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1960), pp. 100-111.

49. "If and when external enemies dare to attack us, then the entire armed population will be mobilized to wipe out the enemies resolutely, thoroughly and completely."—"Greet the Upsurge in Forming People's Communes," *Red Flag* (September 1, 1958). The militia movement may well be disliked by the PLA command, or at least some of its members, on the ground that it tends to interfere with conscription, diverts funds and energy from more fruitful military activities, and presents the regular forces with at least symbolic competition.

50. Such was the burden of one of Tito's charges against the CPC in his Labin speech of June 15, 1958 (see *New York Times*, June 16, 1958), which evidently embarrassed the CPC since it took eleven days to reply (*New York Times*, June 27, 1958). See also Edvard Kardelj, *Socialism and War* (Belgrade, 1960).

51. Liu is believed to have poor, and Chou to have good, relations and connections with the PLA command. Roderick MacFarquhar, in "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," *Pacific Affairs* (December, 1958), pp. 323-35, interprets the recent emphasis on Party hegemony over the PLA as one aspect of an effort by Liu, with Mao's support, to strengthen his position as against Chou. The selection of Liu to succeed Mao as Chairman of the Republic, in April, 1959, was probably somewhat unpopular with the PLA but was balanced by the designation of Chu Teh, an old soldier apparently acceptable to both the PLA and to Chou, as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, a post of considerable potential importance.

52. Cf. A. Doak Barnett, "The Inclusion of Communist China in an Arms-Control Program," *Daedalus* (Fall, 1960), pp. 831-45.

53. The Chou-Bulganin statement of January 18, 1957, issued at the conclusion of an important visit by Chou En-lai to the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, does not mention the Taiwan issue.

54. Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 832, 835; Hsieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8. Some aspects and implications of China's acquisition of nuclear weapons are discussed in John A. Berberet, *Science and Technology in Communist China* (Technical Military Planning Operation, General Electric Company, December 8, 1960), pp. 103-23; Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York, 1960), pp. 17, 240-42, 247, 252-53, 272; Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, N. J., 1960), pp. 151-52, 229, 231, 303, 487-88, 501-5, 509-10, 519.

55. NCNA, Peking, July 25, 1958.

56. Text of the communiqué, which again failed to mention Taiwan, in *New York Times*, August 4, 1958.

57. On the Quemoy crisis, see General Lawrence Kuter, "The Meaning of the Taiwan Strait Crisis," *Air Force* (March, 1959), pp. 103-12; Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait," *Orbis* (Fall, 1959), pp. 332-50; Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbrolio: Chiang Kai-shek and the United States," *The Western Political Quarterly* (December, 1959), pp. 1075-91.

58. Lin Piao, "Hold High the Red Banner of the Party's General Line and Chairman Mao's Military Thought and Advance in Big Strides," NCNA, Peking, September 29, 1959.

59. These problems are discussed, in somewhat Aesopian language, in Li Chih-min, "A Military Expert of the Proletariat Must Also Be a Politician of the Proletariat," *Red Flag* (December 1, 1960). For useful recent summaries of military trends in Communist China, see S. M. Chiu, "The Chinese Communist Army in Transition," *Far Eastern Survey* (November, 1958), pp. 168-75; N. von Ostrowska, "The Development of the Chinese Red Army," *Military Review* (January, 1960), pp. 82-87 (abridged translation from *Wehrkunde* [May, 1959]); Bruno Maurach, "Zehn Jahre chinesische Wehrpolitik," *Revue militaire générale* (May, 1960), pp. 619-38.

60. Cf. P. G. Gittins, "The Red Dragon of China: A Brief Review of Communist China as a Military Power," *Australian Army Journal*, No. 132 (May, 1960), pp. 5-18.

61. Cf. Mao Tse-tung, "Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers," *People's Daily*, October 31, 1958. A companion piece, "Chairman Mao on the October Revolution," *World Knowledge* (November, 1958), was given little publicity by the CPC because Moscow was not doing enough to justify the claim of Soviet support for the CPC's aims and for "national liberation struggles" in general which it contained. See also the articles by various PLA officers on the "paper tiger" thesis in *Philosophical Research*, No. 8 (December 10, 1958). Volume V of the Chinese edition of Mao's *Selected Works*, published on October 1, 1960, also emphasized the paper-tiger thesis and received at least the formal endorsement of the PLA command (Lin Piao, "The Victory of the Chinese People's Revolutionary War is a Victory of Mao Tse-tung's Thinking," *Red Flag*, October 1, 1960).

62. Yu Chao-li (pseud.), "New Situation in the People's Struggle throughout the World," *Red Flag*, January 1, 1961.

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